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Group Level Cues and The Use of Force in Domestic and Foreign Policy Contexts

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GROUP LEVEL CUES AND THE USE OF FORCE IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXTS

by

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ABSTRACT

To what extent do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to embrace their leader's actions during domestic and international security crises? Studies traditionally have focused on top-down elite cue-driven models to study how the public's attitudes are influenced during international and domestic security crises, largely disregarding the bottom-up effects social peer groups can have on individuals' attitudes. This is problematic as the public is regularly exposed to cue messages from elites and social peer groups, both of which are expected to help determine how successful leaders will be in mobilizing public support on a tactical level. To address this dissertation, conduct three studies drawing on prospect theory and audience costs evaluating to what extend elite and social group cues are able to moderate the American and Indian public's willingness to support or oppose the use of force in the context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, international and domestic security crises. Relying on ten survey experiments, the results from the three studies present robust evidence that the tactical use of elite and social group cues is not particularly effective as these information signals are unable to consistently induce preference shifts among the public during domestic and international security crises.

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I also would like to extend my appreciation to my vice-chair Dr. Thomas Dolan and my outside committee reader Dr. Jeffrey Bedwell. Dr. Thomas Dolan was instrumental in keeping my theoretical frameworks on track while anticipating some of the external criticisms, thus reducing my habit to overtime focus more exclusively on the procedural and methodological aspects of the project. Similarly, Dr. Bedwell not only patiently read my project's chapters while graciously accommodating some of the differences in research between political science and psychology but also provided me with the opportunity to collect student responses from his department.

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CHAPTER ONE: ELITE, SOCIAL GROUP CUES AND THE PUBLIC

Introduction

To what extent do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to embrace their leader's actions during domestic and international security crises? Using the theoretical frameworks of prospect theory and audience costs, this dissertation studies under what conditions and to what extent elite and social group cues moderate the public's willingness to support the use of force in the context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, international and domestic security crises. Studies traditionally have focused on top-down elite cue-driven models to examine how the public's attitudes are influenced to support or oppose their leaders' actions during international or domestic security crises, largely disregarding the bottom-up effects from social group cues. This is problematic as the public is regularly exposed to cue messages from elites and social peer groups, both of which are expected to help determine how successful leaders will be in mobilizing public support on a tactical level. The number of studies investigating the comparative effects of elite and social group cues across policy issues and countries is limited at best, despite some preliminary evidence showing that social group cues' ability to influence the public's attitudes just as well as elite messages in the US and China. Thus, this dissertation builds upon the literature by conducting three original studies investigating the ability of elite and social group cues to induce preference shifts to

produce benefits for the leader during crises involving risky interventions and the country's reputation for resolve. Drawing on prospect theory, the first study tests to what extend elite and social group cues in the form of endorsements moderate the American public's willingness to support or oppose humanitarian interventions. The study relies on five survey experiments fielded among U.S respondents. In contrast, to other studies and policy areas, the findings suggest that in the context of humanitarian interventions and trade disputes, prospect theory's framing effects seem to overwhelm the endorsements cues by elites or social groups, even after controlling for respondents' party affiliation and core political dispositions.

The second study addresses two gaps in the literature 1) it examines for the first time the microfoundations of audience cost theory in two major non-western democracies, India, and Nigeria, and 2) it captures to what extent elite and social group cues moderate public approval of their leaders' actions during security crises among non-western publics. The study draws on four original survey experiments in India and one in Nigeria, finding that respondents are willing to punish leaders who back down against the opposing country, as their preferences are not significantly affected by cues from elites or social groups. Hence, bringing doubt about the ability of these communication strategies to induce changes in the public's attitudes during domestic and international security crises.

The third study contributes to the terrorism and public opinion literature by demonstrating that a broadly defined theoretical framework of audience costs can be successfully applied to domestic security crises. Drawing on survey experiments in India and Nigeria, the results suggest that despite the tactical use of positive elite and social group endorsement cues to sway the public in the desired direction, leaders are susceptible to reputational costs if they back down to attempt negotiations when facing domestic armed actors during the escalation phases of domestic security crises. The findings bring new insights into leaders' incentives to use force

despite the dangers of overreacting and improving the local populace's support for the domestic armed actor.

Overall, this dissertation improves our understanding of the microfoundations and mesofoundations, determining the public's willingness to support the use of force in the broader context of prospect theory and audience costs. Additionally, the dissertation presents evidence that the tactical use of elite and social group cues is not particularly effective as these information signals are unable to consistently induce preference shifts among the public during domestic and international security crises.

CHAPTER TWO: DETERMINING SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS: PROSPECT THEORY VS CUES

Introduction

What is better at determining the public support for humanitarian interventions: prospect theory's framing effects or elite and social group cues? Few issues have sparked such intense debates as the American public's willingness to support risky humanitarian interventions defined as the use of military force across borders to prevent the loss of life and human rights violations.[1] From a policy perspective, the public plays an important role in the government's foreign policy decision-making. However, due to the potential human costs[2], constituents need to be convinced to support them as it is often the case interventions in civil conflicts present little to no serious threats to the intervening country's national security or strategic interests.[3] More frequent than others, the US public has been faced with the decision to support or oppose humanitarian interventions across the world, from Central and South America, South-East Asia, Africa, to Europe (Boettcher, 2004; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). For instance, in 2011, the United States participated in the international coalition against the autocratic Libyan

[1] See Boettcher (2004).
[2] Measured in the lives of civilians and soldiers, see (Gartner, 2008; Kriner & Shen, 2014; Johns & Davies, 2019).
[3] See (Finnemore, 1996; Kreps & Mahey, 2018; Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Toms & Weeks, 2013)

government, citing humanitarian reasons and, in particular, the responsibility to protect.[4] Humanitarian interventions involve risk for the intervening country due to the possibility of failure, the expected military, and civilian casualties (Garrett, 1997; Natsios, 1997; Boettcher, 2004). Human suffering is often caused by the affected country's oppressive regime or the general inability of the government to maintain the rule of law, resulting in the collapse of authority (Garret, 1997). However, despite the expected costs, the literature finds consistent support among the public's willingness to use force to preserve or improve the welfare of the "others" (Wheeler, 2000).[5] An example of this phenomenon is the American public's initial support for the humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Sobel, 1998; Eichenberg, 2005). Because of policymakers' need to generate public support through mass communication strategies, scholars have explored how the different framing of the issue by political parties and broader social groups[6] influences subjects' attitudes about the proposed humanitarian intervention.[7] If public support is nonexistent, election-conscious governments may be more reluctant to undertake them.[8] This brings attention to the study's central question, which communication strategy – prospect theory's framing effects or endorsement cues are better able to induce preference shifts among the American public's willingness to support risky humanitarian interventions to help "others" in regions non-central to their country's national security interests.[9]

[4] https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/03/libya-and-responsibility-protect

[5] Although not in an intervention context, Osmundsen and Petersen (2020) find that the public is generally willing to accept risky policies to preserve or improve the welfare of others despite the lack of clear risk for their own personal wellbeing.

[6] As pointed manifested mainly through subjects working circles, school, and social media communication. This paper utilized the self-referenced social group. For a similar usage, see Mann and Sinclair (2013) and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).

[7] As the reality is that people are exposed to both frames and endorsement cues at the same time (Drunckman & Kifer & Parkin, 2009)

[8] In contrast, to Boettcher (2004) and Sullivan (2008) I do not refer to any of the stages of the intervention after the initial decision to act/do no act as a function of the among of public support. Perhaps the best example is when due to lack of public support the US abstained from intervening is the case of the Rwandan Genocide. The paper does not address change of public attitudes across time.

[9] https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/03/15/little-support-for-u-s-intervention-in-syrian-conflict/

Traditionally studies have examined prospect theory's framing effects and elite and social group cues' ability to influence the public's decision to support or oppose interventions and other foreign policies in isolation. To address this gap in the literature, I conducted a study using 387 undergraduate university students and 1622 respondents from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, examining the competing theoretical explanations of prospect theory's framing effects and cues through their interaction in the context of humanitarian interventions.

The results from the study make two contributions. First, the study performed a novel test of the competing effects of elite and social group cues and prospect theory's framing effects on moderating the public's willingness to support or oppose humanitarian interventions[10] and trade disputes. The results of the study provided strong support for the framing effects while not finding consistent support for the elite and social group cues.[11] As a result, the study's findings cautiously suggest that in the context of humanitarian interventions, the framing effects seem to overwhelm the endorsements cues by elites or social groups.

Second, the study presents evidence in support of the claim that the American public still broadly supports limited humanitarian intervention in regions secondary to their country's national interests in the changing geopolitical environment characterized by more frequent occurrences of big-power competition rather than unilateral or multilateral interventions to stabilize countries in crisis. The study's findings suggest that humanitarian interventions, even with limited numbers of US troops on the ground, retain substantial levels of support, at least among the American public, despite that the country is in the process of rethinking its role in international security by renegotiating security agreements and role in international organizations.[12] Thus, giving credence to the claim that the "bipartisan liberal internationalist

[10] See Drunckman, Hennessey, Charles, and Webber (2010)
[11] Defined as an endorsement by political parties (elites),see Bullock (2011) and subjects with the same political ideology using the key term – people with your political views/social peers - (social group cues) see Mann and Sinclair (2013), Bond, Settle, Fariss, Jones, and Fowler (2017), and Kertzer and Zeitzoff, (2017).
[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com

consensus"[13] is likely still relevant in shaping the public and the elite's foreign policy decision-making.

Framing Effects

The public often receives information about their country's foreign and domestic policies both through cues and frames (Druckman & Kifer & Parkin, 2009; Bechtek & Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2015). The framing effects operate through emphasizing specific considerations of an issue, which are then brought to the forefront to form individuals' opinions (Boettcher, 2004; Leeper & Slothuss, 2018). These considerations direct the subjects to modify the relative importance[14] they attach to given facets part of the issue leading to preference shifts (Wood, 2000; Druckman 2001b; Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Studies have demonstrated frames can be used to emphasize particular aspects during political rallies by far-left or far-right groups such as public safety or free speech where the former tends to induce negative perceptions, while the latter positive responses and perception by the public.[15]

The study focuses on foreign policy frames based on prospect theory's framing effects.[16] Prospect theory postulates that risky behavior tends to be asymmetric relative to an individual's reference point. The theory's main behavioral pattern depends on the framing effect. The framing effect is observed when two equivalent statements make decision-makers more likely to choose different plans of action (Rabin, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The central

https://www.dw.com/en/trump-confirms-us-troop-cut-in-delinquent-germany/av-53824305

[13] (Ikenberry & Parmar & Stokes, 2018; Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019).

[14] The term weight is also used regularly in communication studies.

[15] See Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997)

[16] For a brief discussion of alternative frames of foreign policies, see Baum (2009) and Foyle and Van Belle (2010).

claim is that individuals' risk-taking behavior is primarily determined by the framing of the issue in the domain of gains or losses. For instance, Berejikian and Zwald (2020) demonstrate that simple semantic changes in the description of the scenarios trigger significant preference shifts among respondents' risk tolerance during international deterrence crises. Similarly, a public statement[17] focusing on the potential casualties of the intervention will tend to direct attention toward the costs rather than the rewards thus affecting the individuals' choice (Whyte, 1993).

Prospect theory's framing effect is well established and regularly used to help explain the public's preference towards war and military intervention (Minz & Geva, 1998; Farnham, 1992; Gause & Fieldman, 1998; Huth & Benett & Gelphi, 1992; Levi & Whyte, 1997; Boettcher, 2004; Berejikian & Zwald, 2020). Studies have demonstrated across cultures and dozens of experiments that people tend to be risk-averse if they are more likely to win – the domain of gains; whereas, if the situation is perceived to be more likely to end in losses, people tend to become risk-acceptant (Starmer, 2000; Haerem & Kuvaas & Bakken & Karlen &, 2011; Eraker & Sox, 1981; McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2005; Vis, & Van Kersbergen, 2007; Fanis, 2004; Vis, 2011). These studies find that when the costs are measured in human lives, respondents tend to be more risk-acceptant in their behavior compared to when costs are financial in contrast to the Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1981) classic individual gambling/economic decision in prospect theory experiments (Wang, 2011).

Following Boettcher's (2004) approach, I relax the definition of framing effects when applying prospect theory decision problems to better approximate real-world foreign policy issues on which the study is focused. Specifically, the study introduces more uncertainty into the expected costs[18] by presenting them as non-equivalent intervals. The reason is that most risky

[17] That can also be a social media post.
[18] Measured in the expected loss of lives and jobs.

political choices the public is faced with include costs framed as non-equivalent intervals and not exact numbers and estimates. Similar to McDermott (2004) and Boettcher (2004), I expect that subjects will experience preference reversals expressed through the changes in their willingness to accept the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant course of action across the intervention scenarios. Thus, according to the classic framing hypothesis, it can be expected that by just semantically emphasizing the probability of casualties (domain of losses),[19] subjects will be more likely to choose the risk-acceptant plan of action. In contrast, emphasizing the potential of saving lives (domain of gains), subjects will be induced to select the risk-averse plan of action for the intervention.

(H1) Hypothesis 1: In the domain of gains, participants are more likely to choose the risk-averse plan[20] of action across the scenarios.

(H2) Hypothesis 2: In the domain of losses, participants are more likely to choose the risk-acceptant plan[21] of action across the scenarios.

Elite and Social Group Cues

Testing prospect theory's baseline hypothesis in isolation is necessary but to directly answer the main research question; the study explores the frames' ability to moderate participants'

[19] In the case of humanitarian crises, the domain of losses refers to the expected civilian and military casualties if the intervention takes place.
[20] Plan A
[21] Plan B

willingness to support humanitarian interventions when interacting with elite and social groups cues.[22] There are several different types of cues, all with different functionality in shaping individuals' attitudes (Druckman & Hennesey & Charles & Webber, 2010). Cues can be visual, party identification, elite cues, social groups endorsements, body language, and others (McLeod & Shah, 2008; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991). In broad terms, the cue literature identifies them as information filters enabling individuals to make draw conclusions and make decisions without engaging in costly learning to acquire more detailed information on issues that might not be important for their wellbeing social status and considered remote from our daily life (Downs, 1957; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Rucker and Petty 2006; Mann & Sinclair, 2013). This study focuses on party (elite) and social groups cues in the form of endorsements as these types are prevalent in the public foreign policy debates prior to escalation and interventions. An additional reason is that cues in the form of endorsements have been shown to have a pivotal role in domestic[23] and foreign policy settings as respondents' attitudes are affected by them (Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Prime examples are situations in which the political parties endorse a particular policy with a public statement.

Subjects' proclivity to conform to cues from elite and social groups with which they share political ideology has been supported extensively (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Respondents' psychological affinity and tendency to conform with ideologically similar groups is even stronger in complex international issues such as the decision to support or

[22] And military interventions for regime change or for the protection of security interests. Furthermore, studies have shown the respondents rely on others to shape their preferences and choices in the domestic and foreign policies, see Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).

[23] Downs, (1957); Lau and Redlawsk (2006); Lupia (1994); Lupia and McCubbins (1998).

oppose humanitarian interventions (Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Mann & Sinclair, 2013).

People tend to see international politics as disconnected, hard to grasp, and unable to affect their daily lives (Bechtel & Scheve, 2013; Tingley & Tomz, 2014; Millinix, 2015; Guisinger & Saudners, 2017). The public lacks strong incentives to stay informed about issues such a humanitarian intervention which makes their decisions susceptible to cues from political parties[24] and social groups.[25] Understanding the cue effects' interaction with the framing effects is of particular importance to policymakers and social groups because today's information-saturated environment constantly exposes individuals to political messages through traditional media, social media, community meetings, and at their workplace. As a result, elite and social group cues make it possible for the average individual to collect information on the issue, process it, and make a decision to support or oppose the proposed policy (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). For example, foreign policies are often framed, by the elite and social groups, in terms of losses or gains to serve their political interests while harnessing individuals' tendency to prefer news channels or social media that share their worldview (Munson & Resnick, 2010; King & Pan & Roberts, 2017; Berejikian & Zwald, 2020).[26]

To test to what extent elite and social group cues might moderate the public support of humanitarian interventions, I postulate three hypotheses. I expect that respondents' level of support for the proposed humanitarian interventions will be more likely to conform with the

[24] The elite cues

[25] Including the public and self-referenced groups (Arnese & Johannesson & Linde & Dahlberg, 2018)

[26] It is normal for the public to be exposed to competing messages, presented in semantically different frames and covering current foreign policy issues (Zaller, 1992; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Kertzer & Brudger, 2017).

elite or social group cue[27] they are exposed to, regardless, whether the decision problem is framed in the domain of losses or the domain of gains.

(H3) Hypothesis 3: Subjects' decision to support or oppose a risk-acceptant or risk-averse plan of action for the humanitarian intervention is more likely to conform with the elite cue[28] they are exposed to, regardless of the loss or gain frame.

(H4) Hypothesis 4: Subjects' decision to support or oppose a risk-acceptant or risk-averse plan of action for the humanitarian intervention is more likely to conform with the social group cue[29] they are exposed to, regardless of the loss or gain frame.

It can also be expected that individuals' self-identified party affiliation will make them more likely to conform with partisan elite or social group cues, regardless of how the expected outcomes of the humanitarian intervention are framed.

(H5) Hypothesis 5: Partisans will be more likely to change their level of support or opposition when exposed to a party or social group cue informing them about the position held by their party[30]

[27] See Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) and their study demonstrating that in the foreign policy attitudes, social group cues might even have a bigger effect on respondents' position than elite cues.
[28] Party endorsement of the plan is represented by either the Republican or the Democratic Party.
[29] Group Endorse cue informing participants about the position taken by the majority of their compatriots in the particular situation.
[30] The democratic or the republican party.

Research Design

The study's empirics rely on two survey experiments designed to examine the interaction between prospect theory's framing effects and the elite and social group cues effects on the level of public support for humanitarian interventions. The first experiment consists of approximately 387 undergraduate students from a large public university in the United States that participated between the months of October and December 2019. The second experiment relies on 1622 respondents recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk during January 2020. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the domain of gains or the domain of losses.[31] In addition, respondents are randomly assigned to receive either the elite cue or the social group cue subjects in both experiments were presented with the five scenarios in a randomized order. The design of the two experiments can be seen graphically in Figure 1. To start, respondents were asked about their political dispositions, then they were informed that the scenarios they are to read about are ongoing:

"In the next lines, you will read about five decision scenarios that the US government currently faces. You will be asked to choose a plan of action for each of them. Please read them carefully."

Next, following on Levy (1997), Boettcher (2004), Linde and Vis (2017), and Vis and Kuijpers (2018), subjects were presented with five decision problems described in a short text. Three of the scenarios described realistic humanitarian crises. By introducing the different scenarios, the study controls for the type of humanitarian crisis, its location, ethno-religious constitution of

[31] Referring to the hypotheses (See Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). For the specific framing, see Appendix A.3 Questionaire.

the population in danger, expected casualty ratio, and the probability of success because these factors are expected to affect the public's willingness to take risks and support humanitarian interventions.[32]

First, the experiments varied the location of the affected country for the three decision problems – Cameroon (West-Central Africa)[33], the hypothetical country of Aboria (broadly representing the crisis in the Sudanese's region of Darfur)[34], and Venezuela (South America)[35] because the public's behavior could be influenced by country specific effects.[36] Second, the experiments varied the type of crisis. The first type is when we can observe systematic repression against civil society groups (see Garret, 1999). This type of crisis is represented by the street clashes in Venezuela, where the humanitarian crisis has evolved into a power struggle between President Nikolas Maduro and the opposition leader Juan Guaidó.[37] The second type of humanitarian crisis is a general breakdown of central authority, producing a de facto anarchy in large parts of the country.[38] For instance, the ongoing political situation in Cameroon between the French-speaking majority and the English-speaking minority is presented as a humanitarian crisis.[39] Similarly, after the long-term Sudanese president Bashir announced a state of emergency due to protests, the government has lost control over large parts of the troublesome region of Darfur, and the situation has become even more anarchic as the UN-lead African peace force have reportedly redrawn much of its peacekeeping personal. The fictional country Aboria represents the situation in Sudan with the goal of observing whether respondents will show similar risk-acceptant or risk-averse behavior in a hypothetical situation.

[32] See Boettcher (2004). Furthermore, it is important to note that media frames are not used in this study.
[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211
[34] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47330423
[35] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-latin-america-47344348
[36] For instance, Boettcher (2004) clearly finds that the American public is more likely to support a risky humanitarian intervention in Bosnia compared to other regions.
[37] As of May 2019.
[38] see Garret (1999).
[39] See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211

Therefore, the experiments include one scenario representing a repressive regime in the case of Venezuela and two depicting countries that have lost control over large regions which are now experiencing anarchic conditions in Cameroon and the country of Aboria.

Third, the study varies the ethnoreligious background of the actors in the humanitarian crisis. For instance, there is evidence from Russia's humanitarian interventions that, indeed, ethnic similarity could have a significant effect on the likelihood that the public will support a full-scale intervention to protect their kin.[40] Lastly, to control for the possibility that the effects of the new scenarios' frames are not domain specific,[41] the study includes two additional decision problems. The first one explores Americans' choice of trade policy in the ongoing US-China trade dispute, whereas the second utilizes the classic Asian Disease situation, enabling a cross-domain comparison.

After reading the introductory text, participants were randomly assigned to the five scenarios.[42] Half of the subjects were presented with the plans framed in terms of losses[43], whereas the other half as gains[44]. The elite and social group cues were incorporated into the treatment texts by including endorsements from democratic, and the republican parties such as *The [Republican/Democratic] party has endorsed $PLAN A/B.* Similarly, some of the participants were informed about the position that their politically like-minded co-partisans have taken: *[Social Cue] the latest public opinion poll shows that the majority of people with your political views have strongly supported $PLAN A/B.* For instance,

[Decision problem Cameroon]

[40] See Allison (2013), Chatterjee (2015), and Niedermaier (2008).
[41] For an extensive discussion on the issue of different policy domains and the framing effects, see Boettcher (2009).
[42] Figure 1 outlines the design of the two experiments.
[43] Domain of losses
[44] Domain of gains

A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Cameroon (a country in Central Africa). The Cameroonian population is divided between two groups: the English-speaking minority and the French-speaking majority. Recently the majority has taken control of most of the positions of power in the country, resulting in rising tensions to which the military has responded with reprisals against villages part of the English-speaking minority. Due to the anarchic situation, an estimated 20,000 lives are at risk. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving the deployment of 1000 U.S. troops.,

Blank // [Social Cue] In the latest public opinion poll shows that the majority of people with your political views have strongly supported $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] The [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B

[Gains alternatives.]

If plan A is selected,

About 900 U.S. troops will return home safely, and many as 15,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be saved.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 67% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely, and 20,000 Cameroonian civilians' lives will be saved. But also, there is a 33% chance that about 850 U.S. troops will return home safely, and about 10,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be lost.

[Losses alternatives.]

If plan A is selected,

About 100 U.S. troops will not return home safely, and as many as 8,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be lost.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 67% chance that all US troops will return home safely, and no Cameroonian civilians will be lost. But also, there is a 33% chance that about 150 U.S. troops will not return home safely, and around 15,000 Cameroonian lives will be lost.

Following each scenario, participants in both experiments were asked to select one out of the two possible plans of action on a five-point scale – strongly support plan A; somewhat support plan A; Neither Plan; Somewhat Support Plan B, and Strongly support plan B.[45] The student participants were also asked to provide a short-written answer for the last scenario they have been assigned to and explain the reasoning behind their choice. The full vignettes and an extract of the open answers are provided in the appendix.

[45] Experiment 2 uses a seven-point Likert scale.



Figure 1: Experimental Design: The figure outlines the design for experiment 1 and 2.



Figure 2: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?



Figure 3: Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does not intervene, its national security interests will suffer because instability will create a breeding ground for terrorists.

Results and Analysis

The study's main finding is that prospect theory's framing effects using the domain of losses or gains outperform the elite and social groups' cues in influencing the publics' willingness to take risks and support humanitarian interventions and trade disputes. This means that individuals presented with crisis scenarios in the domain of losses, describing how many lives will be saved, are significantly more likely to support the riskier plans of humanitarian intervention compared to those confronted with the crisis in the domain of gains indicating the number of lives expected to be saved. The framing effects' statistical significance remains largely consistent across the humanitarian interventions and the US-China trade dispute scenario. Second, the study's results on Figures 2 and 3[46] suggest that Americans still hold substantial support for limited humanitarian interventions due to moral (50%) and security reasons (45%) despite the changing geopolitical environment, the rise of isolationist views, and apprehension to involve US troops in regions secondary to the country's national security interests.

Tables 1-5 demonstrate the results from the experiments using proportion tests, which are one of the traditional methods for analyzing experiments grounded in prospect theory. The tests derive their utility by measuring for significant differences between the proportion of respondents in the domain of losses who select the riskier plans of interventions compared to those in the domain of gains. Based on the results from both experiments, it can be concluded that the frame induced statistically significant preference shifts across most of the scenarios. The level of support among respondents presented with the scenarios framed in the domain of

[46] The questions were asked only to the Mechanical Turk respondents.

losses compared to those in the domain of gains increases with 30.8% on average across the two experiments, 26.6% in experiment one, and 34.6% in experiment two.

Experiment one's results shown in Tables 1-5 reaffirm the strength of the framing effects averaging at 25.3% for the humanitarian interventions and 28.5% for the Trade war and Asian disease scenarios. In contrast, the results provide inconsistent evidence in support of the expectation that elite and social group cues will induce preference shifts among the respondents across the scenarios regardless of the framing. Similarly, the results from experiment two on Tables 1-5 offer robust evidence in support of the framing effect across the humanitarian intervention scenarios averaging 36.3%, the US-China trade war (32%), and the classic Asian disease (26.5%). Consistent with the first experiment, the results from the second study do not provide robust evidence that respondents are susceptible to elite and social group cues in the form of endorsement across the scenarios.[47] On the other hand, the study's results reconfirm the potency of the basic framing effects across the five decision scenarios, despite the that the costs across the three humanitarian scenarios and the US-China trade war were framed as non-equivalent intervals.

In summary, the study finds robust evidence in support of hypotheses one (H1) and two (H2), stating that participants exposed to the domain of gains are more likely to select the risk-averse plans of action when contrasted to those in the domain of losses. Contrary to these findings, the study's results do not provide robust evidence in support of hypotheses three (H3) and four (H4), emphasizing that respondents' decision to support the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan of action will be significantly moderated by the elite and social group cues they are exposed to, regardless of the loss of gain frames. Hence, the combined results of the study offer

[47] See Appendix A.4 Tables 6-10. to the Appendix for a detailed treatment by treatment analysis from Table 6-10.

consistent support for prospect theory's framing effect on respondents' willingness to use force in interventions, but at the same time cautiously outlines the weaker moderating effects that elite and social group cues are having on the public's attitudes across the scenarios when interacting with the former.

To further evaluate the robustness of the main findings, the study subsets the results by party affiliation to capture the potential heterogeneous treatment effects.[48] As a result, the study does not find consistent evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents' partisanship and the source of the cues. The overwhelming majority of the framing effects remain significant and substantively unchanged. In contrast, the predicted partisanship effect on respondents' susceptibility to the elite and social group cues proves to be inconsistent and insignificant in determining the participants' choices of risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of action across the scenarios. The article also controls for location and type of humanitarian crisis and finds no evidence of consistently different framing effects among the three scenarios of humanitarian interventions. For instance, the scenario with the hypothetical country of Aboria experiencing ethnic clashes and an autocratic leader unwilling or unable to control these clashes generate framing effects of a similar degree as the government oppression central to the Venezuelan case. Similarly, the results fail to reveal significantly different levels of support for the majority-minority centered violence in the Cameroonian humanitarian crisis. The results from the US-China trade war and Asian disease scenarios also do not indicate heterogeneous effects based on respondents' partisanship or political ideology.

[48] See the Appendix IV.

Table 1: Aboria Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues

Treatments	Aboria	Domain of Gains % Choosing the Risky Plan	Domain of Losses % Choosing the Risky Plan	Framing Effect
No Cue	Experiment 1	48%	71%	23% (50, .04)
	Experiment 2	37%	74%	37%*** (50, 23)
Democratic Party Endorse A	Experiment 1	60%[49]	81%	21% (48, .06)
	Experiment 2	32%	58%	26%*** (40, 12)
Democratic Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	60%[50]	70%	10% (37, 17)
	Experiment 2	37%	75%	37%*** (50, 24)
Republican Party Endorses A	Experiment 1	68%	68%	0% ()
	Experiment 2	27%	68%	42%*** (55, 29)
Republican Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	0%	92%	X[51]
	Experiment 2	35%	68%	33%*** (47, 19)
Group Endorses A	Experiment 1	37%	76%	39%** (65, 12)
	Experiment 2	33%	59%	26%*** (39, 12)
Group Endorses B	Experiment 1	50%	90%	40%** (65, 15)
	Experiment 2	38%	58%	20%** (34, .06)

Note: Table reports results from tests of proportions. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01; A stands for risk-averse plan/course of action, while B stands for the risk-acceptant plan of intervention/course of action. The dependent variable is again binary one (1) standing for B and 0 – standing for plan A, because of which the two-sample test of proportions could be used to capture the multiple important treatment effects. The higher the percentage indicates that a higher proportion of respondents have chosen the risk-acceptant B plan of intervention/course of action; whereas a lower percentage of support indicates that a higher proportion of the respondents have chosen the risk-averse plan A of intervention/course of action.

[49] An example of a preference reversal but in the opposite direction of the cue of the democratic party which endorsed the risk-averse plan and not the risk-acceptant which the respondents have chosen.

[50] An example of preference reversal as even respondents in the domain of gains in their majority have selected the risk-acceptant plan of action.

[51] Not enough observations as many of the respondents have chosen the neither plan option.



Figure 4: Aboria Experiment 2 Main Effects

Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants' choice of the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with a baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.

Table 2: Venezuela Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues

Treatments	Venezuela	Domain of Gains % Choosing the Risky Plan	Domain of Losses % Choosing the Risky Plan	Framing Effect
No Cue	Experiment 1	58%	95%	37%*** (59, 16)
	Experiment 2	50%	87%	36%*** (48, 24)
Democratic Party Endorse A	Experiment 1	67%	79%	12% (37, 13)
	Experiment 2	49%	70%	22%*** (35, .08)

Democratic Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	52%	92%	39%**(62, 17)
	Experiment 2	42%	76%	35%*** (48, 21)
Republican Party Endorses A	Experiment 1	65%	91%	26%**(49, .03)
	Experiment 2	42%	72%	30%*** (44, 17)
Republican Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	80%	77%	.04 (20, 28)
	Experiment 2	38%	76%	37%*** (50, 24)
Group Endorses A	Experiment 1	46%	79%	33%(59, .08)
	Experiment 2	43%	80%	35%*** (49, 24)
Group Endorses B	Experiment 1	75%	82%	.08% (32, 17)
	Experiment 2	47%	72%	25%*** (38, 11)



Figure 5: Venezuela Experiment 2 Main Effects

Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants' choice of the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with a baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.

Table 3: Cameroon Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues

Treatments	Cameroon	Domain of Gains % Choosing the Risky Plan	Domain of Losses % Choosing the Risky Plan	Framing Effect
No Cue	Experiment 1	32%	80%	49%*** (74, 24)
	Experiment 2	20%	82%	62%*** (72, 51)
Democratic Party Endorse A	Experiment 1	46%	40%	6% (25, 37)

	Experiment 2	23%	64%	40%*** (54, 28)
Democratic Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	28%	71%	43%** (69, 17)
	Experiment 2	21%	66%	45%*** (58, 32)
Republican Party Endorses A	Experiment 1	29%	58%	29%**(57, 0)
	Experiment 2	17%	61%	44%*** (56, 32)
Republican Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	54%	78%	23%*** (55, 28)
	Experiment 2	29%	70%	42%*** (55, 28)
Group Endorses A	Experiment 1	37%	58%	20% (50, .09)
	Experiment 2	15%	61%	46%*** (59, 34)
Group Endorses B	Experiment 1	45%	75%	30%* (59, .01)
	Experiment 2	19%	63%	44%*** (57, 31)



Figure 6: Cameroon Experiment 2 Main Effects

Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants' choice of the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.

Table 4: Trade War US-China Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues

Treatments	Trade War US-China	Domain of Gains % Choosing the Risky Plan	Domain of Losses % Choosing the Risky Plan	Framing Effect
No Cue	Experiment 1	22%	62%	40%** (65, 15)
	Experiment 2	17%	68%	51%*** (63, 40)
Democratic Party Endorse A	Experiment 1	37%	50%	13% (41, 15)
	Experiment 2	25%	49%	25%*** (38, 12)

Democratic Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	26%	62%	36%** (63, 10)
	Experiment 2	20%	57%	37%*** (49, 25)
Republican Party Endorses A	Experiment 1	28%	70%	41%** (67, 15)
	Experiment 2	21%	58%	37%*** (50, 24)
Republican Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	24%	48%	24%* (50, .03)
	Experiment 2	18%	66%	48%*** (60, 36)
Group Endorses A	Experiment 1	17%	68%	50%*** (75, 27)
	Experiment 2	20%	57%	36%*** (48, 24)
Group Endorses B	Experiment 1	14%	72%	58%*** (80, 35)
	Experiment 2	24%	53%	29%*** (42, 16)



Figure 7: US-China Trade War Experiment 2 Main Effects

Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants' choice of the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan of imposing tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.

Table 5: Asian Disease Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues

Treatments	Asian Disease	Domain of Gains % Choosing the Risky Plan	Domain of Losses % Choosing the Risky Plan	Framing Effect
No Cue	Experiment 1	32%	43%	12% (40, 16)
	Experiment 2	24%	61%	37%*** (50, 24)
Democratic Party Endorse A	Experiment 1	35%	47%	12% (42, 17)
	Experiment 2	22%	55%	33%*** (46, 20)
Democratic Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	26%	70%	43% (70, 16)
	Experiment 2	44%	53%	9% (23, 53)
Republican Party Endorses A	Experiment 1	42%	64%	22% (50, .05)
	Experiment 2	15%	38%	24%*** (37, 10)
Republican Party Endorses B	Experiment 1	50%	62%	12% (42, 18)
	Experiment 2	25%	50%	25%*** (38, 12)
Group Endorses A	Experiment 1	23%	53%	30%* (58, 14)
	Experiment 2	16%	48%	32%*** (44, 19)
Group Endorses B	Experiment 1	35%	70%	35% ** (65, .04)
	Experiment 2	30%	56%	26%*** (39, 13)



Figure 8: Asian Disease Experiment 2 Main Effects

Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants' choice of the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant plan tackling the deadly disease. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper examined the interaction between the framing effects and the cues from elites and social groups in determining the public's willingness to accept risk in humanitarian interventions. Its main findings demonstrated that prospect theory's framing effects outperform elite and social group cues in the form of endorsements by more consistently inducing preference shifts with a substantive margin among Americans' willingness to support

humanitarian interventions and trade disputes even when the expected costs are framed in non-equivalent intervals. The findings can be divided into several points.

First, the study's findings demonstrate when interacting prospect theory's framing effects outperform those of the elite and social group cues[52] and consistently shapes the public's willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of humanitarian intervention. All this in regions secondary to their country's national interests in the changing geopolitical environment characterized by more frequent occurrences of big-power competition rather than unilateral or multilateral interventions to stabilize countries in crisis. The study's results demonstrate that both the elite and social group cues do not consistently induce preference shifts or significantly moderate the classic framing effects of prospect theory in the foreign policy context of humanitarian interventions. The framing effects' ability to induce preference shifts remains robust across the US-China trade war and the classic Asian disease decision problems, while the cues again, with a few exceptions, fail to have a consistent effect on respondent's choice of actions across the domain of gains or losses. Overall, the results reaffirm the strength of prospect theory's framing effects while also cautiously indicating that elite and social group cues could act as moderators of the public's willingness to support the riskier course of action in humanitarian interventions. One potential explanation of why the prospect theory's framing effects seem to override the effects of the cues is that the former could be biologically driven due to humans' evolutionary development as suggested by works of McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov (2008), De Martino, Kumaran, Holt, and Dolan (2009), and Trepel, Fox, and Poldrack (2005). Therefore, it can be argued that the information which the

[52] Here defined as political parties (elites) see Bullock (2011) and subjects with the same political ideology (social group cues) see Mann and Sinclair (2013) and Bond, Settle Fariss, Jones, and Fowler (2017), and Guisinger and Saunders (2017), and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).

cues provide needs to be competing to overcome to be able to overcome the fundamental and biologically driven "gut feeling" about the scenarios and the presented plans of action.

Second, due to the well-established pattern that one-sided party cues will moderate the choices of individuals self-identifying as democrats or republicans (Bisgaard, 2015; Bolsen et al. 2014; Druckman et al. 2013; Petersen et al. 2013; Millinix, 2015), the study tested the effect of partisanship. The resulting effects of partisanship on respondents' susceptibility to party endorsements are inconsistent across the loss and gain frames. The results do not provide evidence in support of the expected heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents' party affiliation or political ideology. On the contrary, the results[53] reconfirm the robustness of the framing effects' ability to shape respondents' willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans across the humanitarian intervention scenarios and the trade dispute scenario. In addition, the results suggest that democrats and republicans seem not to consistently follow their co-partisans cues[54] as expected.[55] Similarly, the study does not find evidence of the existence of prevalent heterogeneous treatment effects on respondents' willingness to conform with the cues and support risk-acceptant or risk-averse plans of intervention based on their political ideology.[56] Consequently, these findings further indicate the framing effects' ability to outperform the endorsement cues in foreign policy issues such as humanitarian intervention.[57] Hence, the lack of consistent partisanship effect speaks directly to the robustness of the results as the foreign policy literature has indicated that issues that do not

[53] See the Appendix.
[54] In the form of party or social group endorsements.
[55] (Bartels, 2002; Cambell et al. 1960; Goren, 2002; Jerit & Barabas, 2012)
[56] See the Appendix Tables
[57] Involving non-kin populations (Want, 2011)

affect individuals personally[58] and are not of high salience[59] respondents tend to rely more heavily on cues in contrast to the salient issues[60].

Finally, the study reconfirms the American public's broad support for humanitarian interventions in regions secondary to their country's national interests in the changing geopolitical environment characterized by more frequent occurrences of big-power competition rather than unilateral or multilateral interventions to stabilize countries in crisis. The results indicate that humanitarian interventions, even with limited US troops on the ground, retain high levels of support among the American public despite that the country is in the process of rethinking its role in international security by renegotiating security agreements and role in international organizations.[61] Hence, the findings could be of particular interest taking into account increasing political and ideological pressure placed upon the "bipartisan liberal internationalist consensus"[62] signified by reviewing the sustainability and benefits for the US national security importance of holding the same amount of commitments and leadership in the international system

The paper has several limitations that could help direct future work on the public support for humanitarian interventions and the interaction between prospect theory's frames, elite and social group cues. Most notably, the study does not account for the theorized effect of issue motivated reasoning on the frames, and the cues as the former have shown to strengthen already held beliefs (See Kunda, 1990; Kim, 2007; Lodge & Taber, 2013). For instance, building upon

[58] Respondents placing high salience on an issue tend to be less influence party cues (See Millinix, 2015).
[59] (Rahn, 1993; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Cohen, 2003).
[60] See Bechtel et al (2015) on the limits of framing and cues among salient policy issues.

[61] https://www.washingtonpost.com.
https://www.dw.com/en/trump-confirms-us-troop-cut-in-delinquent-germany/av-53824305
[62] (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007; Snyder & Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2009; Bafumi & Parent, 2012; Krebs, 2015; Ikenberry & Parmar & Stokes, 2018. Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019).

studies by Lodge and Taber (2013) and Millinix (2015), researchers can further investigate the findings by testing how issue-motivated reasoning and completing arguments affect the levels of support and risk-taking behavior in humanitarian crises scenarios. In addition, the work can be extended by including contradicting party endorsements[63] from partisan media channels similar to Boettcher's (2004) approach and observing how they will affect risk-taking among participants. It is of particular importance as the public is less like to place high salience on issues of foreign military intervention, especially in regions not central to the country's national security. An additional reason underlying the need for such future work is that research on public opinion and partisanship by Zaller (1992), Lenendusky (2012), Dancey and Goren (2010), Slothuss and de Vreese (2010), Drunkman, et al. (2013), Robison and Millinix (2015) has shown that polarized party messages, placing emphasis on the conflict between the competing policy solutions increase the importance of partisan affiliation among respondents. As a result, it can be expected that in these circumstances of potential low salience combined with the effects from the polarized party[64] and social group cues in the form of endorsements might consistently moderate or even overcome prospect theory's framing effects. Lastly, additional tests in different international security domains can be conducted to evaluate the workings of prospect theory's framing effects when the scenarios' costs are framed as non-equivalent intervals, as this could suggest broader applicability of prospect theory's framing effects in shaping the public's attitudes on foreign policies.

[63] Elite polarization.
[64] Elite cue

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CHAPTER THREE: BACKING OUT OR WINNING IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CRISES: DOES THE PUBLIC REWARD ITS LEADERS FOR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT?

Introduction

Do national leaders suffer from audience costs in the form of lower approval ratings and a damaged reputation when backing down in international security crises? Do the public reward its leaders for their willingness to fight? Do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leader for backing during international security crises? Following Fearon's (1994) work, there has been much debate and scholarly work regarding the various dynamics, case application, and generalizability of audience costs theory's postulates.[65] Scholars have proposed reasons why leaders could lose office and the role played by audience costs in a variety of situations.

There has been a broad consensus from comparative case studies, observational data, game-theoretic approaches, and survey experiments on how audience cost affects leaders' political fates based on their performance in military engagements.[66] Most importantly, the audience cost literature emphasizes that backing down in international security crises affects the credibility of the threats made by leaders and the reputation of their countries. Leaders are often presumed to make credible threats, and if they take the decision to back down after issuing a

[65] See Potter and Baum (2010) for more details on Democratic Peace, credible signals, and causal mechanisms showing audience costs contributing to democratic peace.
[66] (Cox & Gibilisco, 2018; Tomz, 2007).

public threat, it is expected that they will likely incur costs in terms of lower approval rating, damaged reputation, and reduced electoral support.

Nonetheless, the audience costs literature has been plagued by small amounts of empirical evidence across several of its key claims concerning its external and internal validity central to its explanations of international security crises. As such, the goal of this study is to address some of the key deficiencies in the audience costs literature. On the question of validity across countries and regimes, studies like Downes and Sechser (2012) and Kurizaki and Wang (2015) have started to address the lack of cross-country empirical evaluation of the claim that leaders tend to be removed from office across regime types if they decide to back down, while leaders who induce compliance by the opposing country tend to be rewarded. However, gaps still exist in the temporal coverage of the data, which our study focuses on. Similarly, Bell and Quek (2017), Weiss and Dafoe (2019), and Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) argue that limited external and internal validity of audience cost theory is particularly prevalent among studies using survey experiments as their test countries have been almost entirely Western democracies. The notable exception has been China,[67] where studies have consistently demonstrated that autocratic leaders also incur audience costs if they back down in international crises[68] and their constituents find novel ways to express their disagreement. In this paper, I seek to address this deficiency by using a multi-method approach to explore the validity of audience cost's main claims using survey experiments to examine the theory's cross-country validity and its microfoundations among Indians and Nigerians.

Another major deficiency in the audience costs literature is that studies have tested the theory primarily using support for the use of force among U.S and British publics – citizens of

[67] See Quek & Johnston 2017-2018, Fang & Li (2020); Huang, 2015; Truex, 2017; Li & Chen, 2020)
[68] Supporting the Findings corroborate the cross-sectional work by Weeks (2008) and Downes and Sechser (2012)

countries with very high military capabilities, usually involved in conflicts outside of their regions (Narang & Staniland, 2018; Lin-Greenberg 2019; Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). This focus on "far away" conflicts and on countries possessing military capabilities higher than most other countries[69], with a long tradition of military interventions, and no long-standing strategic rivalries involving territorial claims could misrepresent the publics' willingness to impose audience costs upon their leaders in other less militarily powerful and less developed countries. The study builds on these limitations identified by earlier works[70] by exploring the public's willingness to impose audience costs upon their leaders during international security crises across three non-western democracies in the developing world – India and Nigeria. I selected India because it has active interstate rivalries, which have been shown to inflate the base effects of audience costs while also being the largest democracy in Asia with active foreign policy in the region and beyond. Importantly, the presented scenarios are realistic for the Indian respondents as India has had persistent security crises over the years, which keeps the realities of engaging in war - including possible casualties - in the collective memory of respondents; this lessens the effects of abstraction associated with hypothetical scenarios in survey experiment foreign policy studies identified scholars like Huddleston (2019). In contrast, Nigeria do not have active interstate rivalries, or long-standing territorial disputes with their neighboring countries, and both countries' military capabilities are not on the same level as the United States, Britain, China, and India. However, both countries have past and present dynamics that make them interesting cases for the study. First, Nigeria is Africa's largest democracy and an influential player of the African Union, which has a collective defense policy under its Peace and Security Architecture. Secondly, Nigeria is a major player in Africa's

[69] This problem is partially valid for studies focusing on China as it is one of the two superpowers and a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
[70] See Lin-Greenberg (2019) and Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021)

international affairs and have had a long history of intervention politics for peacekeeping purposes in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the subregional body ECOWAS. Nigerians are thus expected to have useful opinions on international politics and would be sensitive to how their leaders handle international crises.

Based on these deficiencies, I argue that there are three interrelated gaps in the audience costs literature. Namely, the literature does not provide 1) empirical tests of the microfoundations of audience costs theory among the public in non-western democracies, 2) the literature offers scant evidence whether the public tends to approve or disapprove of their leaders' willingness to fight even when they have lost the military engagement against a weaker opponent, and 3) to what extent elite and social group cues are able to moderate or induce preference shifts among the public, particularly in non-western democracies. To address these gaps, I use survey experiments in India and Nigeria to study the audience cost theory's microfoundations and its predicted effects across the two countries in experimental settings.

In this paper, I provide new evidence to answer three questions. First, do national leaders suffer from audience costs when backing down in international security crises across regime types? Using survey experiments, I find that audience cost theory's main claim is valid across countries and regime types as leaders who back down are consistently more likely to lose office. These finding are important for filling the literature gaps as they present novel evidence clearly supporting the cross-country validity of the microfoundations of audience costs theory in India and Nigeria, which are major non-western democracies with current and past military interstate disputes[71], and active involvement in international security issues. Second, do the public reward its leaders for their willingness to fight? This study presents novel evidence from India and

[71] To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no studies testing audience cost theory in India or Nigeria through the experimental method.

Nigeria to suggest that leaders tend to be rewarded for their willingness to use force against the opposing country regardless of the outcome of the military engagement. And third, do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leaders for backing during international security crises? This study tests for the first time the expected effects of elite and social group cues on Indians' willingness to support or oppose their leaders during international security crises, the study's results do not provide robust and consistent evidence that the cues are able to significantly moderate their public choices and produce preference shifts.

Domestic Audience and Its Influence on Countries' Foreign Policy

This paper builds upon previous studies that aim to examine audience costs' validity across countries and regime types using observational data such as Kurizaki and Whang (2015) and Downes and Sechser's (2012) work, and those using survey experiments to test whether the microfoundations of the theory operate in a similar way among non-western publics (Quek, 2019; Moore & Primiano, 2020; Li & Chen, 2020, Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui, 2021). First, I test this core statement for the theory with survey experiments among the Indian and Nigerian publics' willingness to approve of leaders who engage compared to backing down. Second, using only the study's experiments, I empirically evaluate the claim that the public will be supportive of their leaders' willingness to fight regardless of the outcome of the military engagement, even if it has been a failure (Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). Third, I examine the comparative effects of elite and social group cues on Indians' willingness to support or oppose their leaders during international security crises.

Backing Down and Audience Costs

Scholars have long examined the public's ability to influence a country's foreign policy despite the wider scholarly opinion that voters possess little information and hold weak attitudes on foreign policy issues (Fearon, 1994; Aldrich & Sullivan & Borgida, 1989; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016). In democracies, this dynamic is particularly important as citizens can influence leaders' decisions not only by approval ratings but also through the ballot box. Fearon (1994) argues that democracies are more likely to suffer audience costs than autocracies, which implies that democratic leaders are less likely to back down (Partell & Palmer, 1999). This outcome is further confirmed by Kurizaki and Whang's (2015) study, in which they find, using game-theoretical approach, that although audience costs matter to both democracies and autocracies, they are higher for the former.

Scholars such as Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021), and Quek (2017) have recently begun to address the major deficiency in the audience cost literature; namely, most of the studies have focused on studying audience costs in western developed countries with a rich history of military interventions and preponderance of military power compared to their adversaries (Tomz, 2007; Snyder & Borhard, 2011). Because of that deficiency, the question of how generalizable the effects of audience cost are remains largely unanswered. This study follows and build upon the recent studies by Quek (2017), Moore & Primiano, (2020), Li & Chen (2020), Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) that aim to provide novel empirical evidence to test the generalizability of audience costs beyond advanced, western democracies.

To address this limitation in the literature of whether the public tends to approve their leaders' willingness to fight even when they lose the military engagement, I compare the expected effects of audience costs between countries with active rivalries with those that do not have.[72] The reason is that the public in countries with rivalries is more likely to support an escalation of disputes by being affected by the rally around the flag effects (Goertz, et al. 2005), which by itself can increase the hawkish preferences among its constituents (Stephan & Stephan 2017). For that purpose, I have selected India and Nigeria as the test countries. India has a long-running strategic rivalry with two of its neighbors, Pakistan, and China, centering around border disputes and accusations of state sponsored terrorism.[73] Because of India's ongoing rivalries, we can expect that the large sections of the public will rally around the flag in international disputes as any threat will be perceived as serious, involving reputation, territory, and being close to the homeland, rather than happening on a non-contiguous territory beyond a large body of water. In contrast, Nigeria in its recent history have not been involved in any substantial strategic rivalry with any regional country in Africa, while their military potential is significantly lower than that of the major powers and India's offensive capabilities. As a result, I expect a smaller rally around the flag effects among the Nigerian public. Thus, hypothesis one states:

H1: Leaders that back down in international crises are more likely to suffer audience costs.

[72] See Greenberg (2019) and especially Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) which uses the audience costs' theoretical framework to capture the size of the rally behind the flag effects among Pakistan participants.
[73] See Okraska (2018)

Leaders' Willingness to Fight

The audience cost literature argues that war incentives determine leaders' willingness to fight in international security crises (Kroenig, 2013). There is a mutually dependent relationship between democratic leaders and their constituents, making it difficult for the former to back down from earlier diplomatic positions in international disputes out of fear of domestic political costs, even when there is no clear escalation strategy present (Yasui & Nakai, 2016; Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). Recent studies have expanded the external validity of the rally behind the flag phenomena across non-western countries and found that individuals support escalation even if it places their country's soldiers and economic and trade relations at risk (Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). As a result, this study seeks to expand the external validity of audience costs further by including other non-western democracies – India and Nigeria. I expect the study to replicate previous findings from non-western democracies to the effect that backing down from the publicly acknowledged threat is likely to produce audience costs for the leaders of India and Nigeria in the form of lower approval ratings and diminished reputation. The reason is that the act of backing down is seen by large sections of the public as inconsistency, and a failure of leadership to uphold the national honor, commitment, and reputation. Thus, the second hypothesis postulates that:

H2: Leaders that use force and are willing to fight the opposing country are less likely to suffer from audience costs regardless of the outcome of the military engagement compared to those who back down.

Elite and Social Group Cues' Effect on Audience Costs

It is also necessary to review the theoretical framework and mechanisms through which elite and social group cues have been shown to affect public opinion on foreign policy issues. On the one hand, elite cue theory postulates that people's attitudes are shaped by leaders' political positions in a top-down process (Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2016; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Elite cue givers are defined as heads of states, high-ranking political officials, parties, and army generals (Golby & Feaver & Dropp, 2018).[74] As a top-down elite-driven theory of public opinion, the fundamental premise is that the public is "rationally ignorant" across a wide variety of policy issues as they are too distant from their daily lives (Rosenau, 1965; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Zaller, 1992). The existence of this asymmetry of information between the elites and the public creates the demand for cues, providing relevant information for the decisions to be made (Baum & Groeling, 2010; Colaresi, 2007). For instance, elites' interpretation of an event often can be more consequential to the public's position than other factors (Baum & Groeling, 2009).[75]

The literature identifies four mechanisms through which elite cues could shape individuals' attitudes in international and domestic political contexts. First, individuals' attitudes are more likely to be influenced when the cue is communicated by a person an "expert" (Golby & Feaver & Dropp, 2018).[76] The second mechanism operates when individuals seek a "second opinion" as a measure of reassurance. It works well when the cue is communicated by an actor, perceived

[74] Recently scholars have also included foreign leaders (Murray, 2014; Hayes & Guardino, 2011) and international institutions (Thompson, 2006; Peace & Brewer, 2008; Chapman, 2011).

[75] There are relatively few studies on authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes that map the interaction between elite cues and the public's foreign policy positions. Bell and Quek (2017) do focus on the Chinese public opinion about war but not in the frame of elite cues. Nevertheless, the authoritarian regime studies do offer some evidence that public opinion in authoritarian regimes is a factor which leaders consider when taking policy decisions (Rosato, 2003).

[76] Defined as a person generally considered to possess detailed knowledge on the policy issues.

as a nonpartisan, independent expert.[77] Third is how similar are the political views of respondents and the cue-giver. For instance, strong partisans tend to shift their views towards the position held by the relevant political party across salient questions.[78] Finally, respondents' attitudes might be affected if the cue-giver expresses an unexpected opinion on a policy issue (Chapman, 2012; Crawford & Sobel, 1982).

On the other hand, social cue theory[79] similarly assumes that individuals are "rationally ignorant" on most political issues, preferring to rely on their social networks to make the decision (Bernheim, 1994; Turner, 1982; Fiske, 2004). Groups such as unions, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes, are at the center of social cue theory as their members have a psychological affinity towards them (Le Bon, 1896; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Hackman & Katz, 2010). The recent decline of formal membership in social and political organizations (Putnam, 2000) could have magnified the effects of social networks on individuals' attitudes on political issues (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995, Klofstad, 2007, Nickerson, 2008; Sinclair, 2012, Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). Thus, respondents look for information from others with similar political preferences, and they tend to align their attitudes to the social groups they identify with (Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944). These social networks serve as the individuals' information channels which can affect their attitudes on a variety of policy issues (Checkel, 1997; Fanis, 2011; Clarkson et al. 2013; Viser & Mirable, 2004).[80]

[77] See (Grieco, at el., 2011)
[78] See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999).
[79] Elite Cue theory relies on the same assumption.
[80] Studies in social comparison theory provide further evidence of the group incentive to conform, even in the absence of pressure to do so (Isenberg,1986; Milgram, 1974; Sinclair, 2012; Asch, 1951; Stein, 2013; Brewer & Brown, 1998).

Social group cues affect individuals' attitudes and behavior through two mechanisms. First, individuals tend to conform to the policy position of groups that share their political views[81] (Mendelberg, 2002; Radzisweski, 2013). The second mechanism through which social group cues operate consists of individuals' search for a "second opinion".[82] For instance, people are exposed continuously to politically relevant social group cues through new channels and dozens of social media platforms, especially during election campaigns.[83]

Elite and social group cues[84] are often described as "heuristics[85]" used by the actors in the decision-making process to avoid the efforts necessary for the collection of a large amount of information that could inform the individual voters' decisions on political issues of the day[86] (Downs, 1957; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Gulens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Bullock, 2011). As a direct result of these incentives held by the individual voters, the public becomes susceptible to elite[87] and social group cues[88] in shaping its level of approval or disapproval of the government's policies. The power of cues in shaping public opinion and the modern day's information environment, enabling them to be heard by the vast majority of citizens, makes them a target of constant interest to scholars and practitioners in the policy community.[89] Examples of this trend can be found in India's political context, including their leaders' social media campaigns aimed at informing their party supporters and garner new ones.[90] Some scholars would even contend that due to the public's

[81] Homophily
[82] The mechanism of searching for a second opinion is also observed in elite cues.
[83] See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013)
[84] Definition: a is traditionally defined as a message which individuals could use to make an inference and subsequently a decision on the discussed subject (see Bullock, 2011, p. 497).
[85] Others could use the term "cognitive shortcuts".
[86] Many of which are considered distant from our daily lives as well as the influence of issue specific knowledge on respondents' attitudes.
[87] Defined as party cues, see Zaller (1992) and Berinsky, (2009).
[88] Including the workplace, social media, and local community.
[89] For studies on the stability of fundamental political issues, see Page and Shapiro (1992) and Bell and Quek (2017).
[90] Sinha (2017)

use of elite and social group cues, they are able to make a timely decision with the available information whether to support or oppose the proposed policy[91] (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). Knowing that and consequently applying it to audience cost scenarios, it can be said that political parties and social groups will strive to target their respective audiences with messages endorsing or opposing the way the leader has handled the crisis.[92]

Democratic regimes[93] will be relatively more effective in producing audience costs for a leader than backing down after escalating but fail to follow through on their commitment without clear justification. The negative consequences could be losing seats in the national assembly[94], losing national elections, or being forcefully removed from office (Edwards, 1997; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008). Frequently citizens place high salience on foreign policy issues such as the country's rivalry with China and Pakistan. For instance, Vaishnav (2015) argues that in the political context of India, the state of the economy is a major salient issue that can determine electoral success in the general election.[95] However, the two dominant political parties - Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party need to balance their economy-focused election platforms with stances on interethnic and security issues relevant for their Indian constituents.[96] It is reasonable then to argue that elite and social group cues might moderate the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of how the national leader has handled the situation with the opposing country.[97] By taking the potential cue effects into account the study

[91] This might be of particular importance to national leaders as they need to know whether the public will support or oppose the given policy.
[92] For a more general discussion on how elites and social groups frame messages according to their interests see (Zaller, 1992; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Brudger, 2017).
[93] Some scholars present an increasingly convincing experimental evidence that even in authoritarian regimes leaders and political elites needs, at a minimum a moderately supportive public to pursue their foreign policy objectives. For more details see Bell and Quek (2017) work on China.
[94] See Tomz (2009) who finds that in the American political context members of the president's party have higher chance to win seats in local or federal institution of the former maintains high levels of public support.
[95] https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/
[96] Ibid
[97] Referring to the insurgents/rebels. https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/narendra-modi-has-changed-india-s-counter-terrorism-doctrine/story-tJhcWtaoRj8YNClcOQVhBJ.html

can better approximate the informational environment[98] respondents might face before making their decision to approve or disapprove of the leader's actions. Thus, I contend that, all else equal, elite, and social group cues can be expected to have an effect on the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of the leader's actions against opposing country during international security crises.

To empirically test the claim that elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to punish their national leader[99], the study utilizes the political influence of the two major political parties in India to represent the former, and a social group referred to as "people like you" to represent the latter.[100] Thus, the paper explores; 1) the effect of elite consensus[101], and 2) the effect of approving or disapproving social group cues[102] - on voters' willingness to punish their national leader for being inconsistent, despite escalating, in its actions against the opposing country in international security crises.[103]

First, the public's level of susceptibility to elite and social group cues varies across issues (Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). The lack of clear incentives for the

[98] Approximately half of the Indian public has access to the internet. https://main.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIR_04042019_0.pdf. Furthermore, studies have shown that people prefer information from groups that conform to their initial political preferences (Munson & Resnick, 2010; Park et al. 2009;Kaplan & Haelein, 2010).

[99] Accounting for social and elite cues this study will present more evidence for the renewed debate around the question whether public opinion is influenced primarily by elites or it can also be shaped by cues from politically likeminded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).

[100]This study used the general type of social group cues referring to a "group with similar political views" see Gilens and Murakawa (2002) and Kertze and Zeitzoff (2017).

[101] Expressed to participants as a bipartisan support for the prime minister's handling of the security crisis.

[102] As in Tomz's (2007) study the level of political engagement has been shown to affect respondents' willingness to punish their leaders.

[103] To the best of the author's knowledge these questions have remained unexplored. Expectedly the majority of evidence in support of the existence of audience costs originate from major western democracies such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (see Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016) with one exception – Costa Rica see Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson (1993). Thus, studying the theory's validity in the context of major non-western democracies could present additional benefits in addition to theory confirmation, or improvement. This issue is further discussed in the research design section.

public to stay informed[104] about the best approach to tackle security threats from rival countries in the region might make its attitude more susceptible to cues from the country's political parties and individuals' self-referenced social groups[105]. Importantly, the issue of security policy may not always have clear solutions, which[106] might increase the uncertainty under which the public needs to decide whether to support or oppose certain policies. As a result of the protracted nature of Indian's international rivalries in the context of renewed big power competition, especially with China and Pakistan, sections of the public might hold different views on what is the right approach to deal with these long-standing issues. Perhaps, due to this dynamic, the public is being polarized on the issue of approving or opposing their leader's decision to back down or engage the opposing country. I contend that because of the uncertain results of each of the possible responses by the government, respondents' position will be susceptible to cues from political parties and social groups with shared political views that can give some further backing to one position or the other. In such circumstances, subjects will tend to rely on the available cues from politically relevant groups[107] to decide whether they should sanction their leader's actions or support them.[108] Specifically, social group cues could also affect the public's willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leader through the need for conformity. In addition, it can be expected that subjects will also seek a "second opinion" to make a decision as studies dealing among western publics have repeatedly shown (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).

[104] Perhaps importantly because the country insurgent groups affect particular regions of India and not the country's entirety.
[105] Referring to the situation in which respondents are presented with information about the positions of others "like you" on the given policy issue. See Mann and Sinclair (2013).
[106] For more details on the distinction between hard and easy issues and how they affect voter behavior, see Carmines and Stimson (1980).
[107] Recent findings suggests that the effect on public opinion from cues by non-elite social groups could have the same effect or even stronger than traditionally used elite cues from the country's political parties. See Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) and Alab, Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling (2011).
[108] It is not uncommon that some domestic political issues, especially those pertaining to security could have received more attention by the Indian media and as a result affect the sample's respondents by creating "pretreatment effects" as Druckman and Leeper (2012) point.

Respondents' psychological affinity towards ideologically similar groups could be even stronger in complex issues such as domestic security (Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1968; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013). For instance, the perceived similarity of interests might lead to conformity with the group's position on the issue despite the clear indication that the Indian government's portrayal of its security policies to be in the national interest. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to argue that in the Indian political context, the average respondent's level of approval or disapproval will be affected by the social groups' message, regardless how the leader has decided to respond to the opposing country's provocation. Therefore, to test the effect of approving (endorsing) and disapproving (opposing) social group cues, upon the public's willingness to punish their leader the following hypothesis is framed:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove of their leader handling of the crisis to match that of the social group cue they have been exposed to, regardless of the type of action against the opposing country.

Second, the reaction of the country's political elites has been shown to influence the size of audience costs that leaders might suffer (Halling, 1984; Levendusky & Horowtiz, 2012; Schulz, 1998). Having more information at their disposal than the public, political parties[109] could influence the public's willingness to punish the leader (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). The country's political parties can present a message of consensus or division concerning the leader's handling the situation with the opposing country. In cases of elite consensus, the public is presented with a strong message that their leader's actions against the opposing country were adequate to protect the national interest, even in the scenarios in which the decision to back

[109] This effect has been established in the United States.

down has been made.[110] Hence, strong bipartisan signals supporting the leader's actions can be expected to affect respondents' attitudes by moderating the really around-the-flag phenomena across the political spectrum and moderate the magnitude of audience costs that the leader is predicted to incur.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove of their leader handling of the crisis to match that of the elite cue they have been exposed to, regardless of the type of action against the aggressor country.

Research Design and Data

The study's survey experiments in India and Nigeria follow the design first pioneered by Tomz (2007) to capture the micro-foundations of the claims that backing down or losing the military engagement could all produce rewards for the political leaders. I ground the scenarios in the current Indian and Nigerian political contexts to better capture respondents' willingness to approve or disapprove of their leaders' handling of international security crises. The experimental designs provide further insights into the study' main questions: 1) whether Indians and Nigerians tend to reward their leaders for using force as in major western countries, 2) whether leaders are rewarded with higher approval ratings and reputational gains for their willingness to fight, regardless of the outcome of the military engagement. The experiments were conducted between 2019 to 2021 and proceeded as follows. First, respondents were presented with a battery of demographic questions and interest in politics; all adapted to the

[110] For work on how such a consensus among elites affects respondents' decisions see (Baum & Groeling, 2009).

countries' socio-political context. Second, respondents were asked about their political dispositions – militarism and internationalism. Participants were presented with an introductory script stating that they will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that their country has faced in the past and would likely face again in the future. Then, participants were asked to read a short paragraph describing the belligerent actions of the opposing country.

Next, the study randomly assigned respondents to one of the five scenarios shown in Table 6, describing what actions their leader has undertaken as a direct response to the opposing country during the crisis. In treatment group 1) The opposing country does not comply with the threat while the Indian or Nigerian leader decides to deescalate by backing down; 2) The opposing country does not comply, and the Indian or Nigerian leader decides to use force; 3) The leader has decided to use force against the non-compliant country, but the Indian or the Nigerian army conducts a largely unsuccessful military operation that is seen as a loss; 4) Scenario four mimics the third one but with the difference that while conducting a successful military operation the Indian or Nigerian army suffers significantly more casualties than the opposing country; 5) In contrast, scenario five informed respondents that the military has conducted an unsuccessful military operation, however, its forces have inflicted more casualties on the opposing country's armed forces.

Following the treatment, respondents' answers were recorded on the study's primary dependent variable on a five-point Likert scale indicating their level of agreement or disagreement with the leader's decision to back down or engage the opposing country.[111] Participants were also asked to what degree they think that their leader's handling of the crisis has damaged their country's reputation, the results of which can be seen in the Appendix. In the post-treatment

[111] For experiment 2 and 3 in India and with the Nigerian student sample I used 11 point scale which was then dichotomized into a binary scale before analysis.

questions, I also asked participants to record the list of emotions they have experienced with the purpose of capturing some of the fundamental causal mechanisms that determine the public's willingness to impose audience costs upon learning how their leader has handled the crisis and its outcome. None of the experimental vignettes indicated the political regime of the opposing country. For the Indian vignettes, I used a hypothetical country but also scenarios in which the opposing country is Pakistan or China. For the Nigerian sample, I only used a hypothetical country but asked respondents to indicate the country they were thinking about.

Table 6: Design of the Experiments

Treatment Groups	Vignette 1	Vignette 2	Vignette 3	Vignette 4	Vignette 5	Vignette 6
Type of scenario	Backs Down	Engage	Engage Win	Engage Lose	Engage Win More Casualties	Engage Lose Less Casualties

Experiments four and five[112] were conducted only among Indian respondents from Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform in 2019 and incorporate the endorsement messages from elite or social groups cues.[113] Experiment four consists of 1600 Indian respondents and follows a 2x3 design to test the effect of the individual party endorsements that the two major political parties[114] have on Indians' willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's handling of the crises with the rebel group. And experiment five incorporates 1800 Indian respondents with a 4x2 design. The elite cues were symbolized by the two major parties in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress Party. To capture the elite cues' effect, the study randomly manipulated whether respondents received the treatment revealing the position taken by Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party, or the scenario in which they

[112] Only for India.
[113] Regularly used to capture respondents' susceptibility to audience costs, see Davies and Johns (2013).
[114] Grounded in the context of Indian party politics.

are not informed about any of the parties' positions. For example, "*The Bharatiya Janata party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation;// The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation"* which can be either backing down or following through by engaging the threat. Some respondents were also presented with a bipartisan endorsement by both the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party or the scenarios in which they are not informed about any of the parties' positions. The elite cue informs respondents that both parties support the prime minister's actions, indicating a bipartisan consensus.[115] Conversely, a portion of the respondents receive a social group cue informing them that " *For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation."* See the Appendix for the list of the treatment groups in experiments four and five.

The study's four non-probability samples of Indian respondents were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk with an average completion time of 12-13 minutes. Respondents from most of India's regions participated, and their access to the study relied on four criteria: 1) be at least 18 years of age 2) be able to read and comprehend English 3) have Indian citizenship and reside in the country, and 4) they need to have completed a minimum of 50 approved tasks as recorded in their work history[116]. The study's Nigerian sample relied on English speaking undergraduate students currently enrolled in several of the countries' major public universities.[117]

[115] See Appendix B.8 for the list of the full text.
[116] These measures are regularly used to decrease the possibility that the respondents in India are providing fraudulent answers. See Appendix for the samples' characteristics.
[117] The Nigerian Universities were List of the Universities: University of Nigeria Southwest; University of Abuja; North-Central University of Agriculture Abeokuta; Lagos State University; Niger Delta University; Delta State University Abraka.

The study relies on the work by Drunckman and Kam (2011), Berinsky, Gregory, Huber, and Gabriel (2012), who successfully demonstrate that using convenience[118] and student samples allows scholars to successfully study the causal mechanisms of theories while allowing for the production of results generalizable among the targeted population. In addition, drawing from Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz's (2006) work, this study's inference does not depend on capturing the attitudes of any specialized decision making groups such as military officers, local or national political representatives, as these groups often can demonstrate different attitudes concerning security issues compared to the average participants in convenience and university student samples. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that recent studies such as that by Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer (2018) dispute the claim by presenting evidence that the elite decision makers' attitudes are often in unison with the general public after controlling for their ideological affiliation. Finally, as Tomz (2007) and Bakker (2017) point out convenience and student samples on average tend to consist of more motivated, politically active, and educated respondents than the particular country's general population, which do offer benefits. Most notably, the easily comparable results to other studies and the mapping of the views of countries' active civilians which are more likely to influence the government due to their higher education, currently pursuing or already possessing a university degree, and their better socio-economic status. For example, the vignettes presented to the study's Indian and Nigerian respondents were all in English, as the small pilot studies demonstrated well developed skills in the language across both sample populations.

[118] For a more detailed discussion on working with samples from Mechanical Turk, see Appendix B.1.

Experimental Results

Using the results from the survey experiments, I evaluate the expected audience costs effects by capturing respondents' approval levels of the leaders' handling of the international security crisis. First, hypothesis one is supported as nearly identical to the western publics, Indians, as well as Nigerians tend to have significantly higher levels of support for leaders who substantiate their threats with use force against the opposing country compared to backing down; thus, hurting the homeland's reputation for resolve. Second, the results also largely support hypothesis two as Indian and Nigerian leaders might be better able to avoid audience costs domestically, even if they fight and lose the military engagement compared to backing down. Third, the results do not offer robust support for hypotheses three and four. The reason is that experiments four and five suggest that the elite and social group cues are moderators of the public's level of approval and disapproval but are unable to negate the main effects of audience cost theory in international security crises. These findings are discussed in order below.

Findings: Backing Down (H1)

The findings from this study present robust support for hypothesis (H1), stating that leaders who back down in international crises are more likely to suffer audience costs. Table 7 outlines the base treatment effects presented in percentages across the experimental conditions. The percentage indicates the proportion of respondents who have chosen to support their leader's handling of the international security crisis. The results show that, on average, Indians are about 19%[119] more supportive of leaders who have engaged the opposing country compared to backing down. The biggest treatment effect of 31% was evident among those Indian

[119] The effect ranges from 4% to 31%.

respondents who were informed that the opposing country is China which provides further support of the claim[120] that well established rivalries do inflate the magnitude of the audience costs effects. Similarly, 43% of Nigerians approve of their leader's decision to engage the opposing country compared to 18.5% when backing down, thus recording a substantial audience cost effect of approximately 24.5 percentage points. Across both countries, an effect of such size on the leader's approval can influence his decision-making during international security crises.

Next, in Figure 9, I formally test whether the treatment effects are statistically significant using regression models while controlling for several demographic and political covariates. The baseline group is the scenario in which the country's leader has decided to back down after the opposing country has not complied with any of the public threats. Models 1-2 include the results from the vignettes with the hypothetical country, Models 3-4 incorporate the scenarios with Pakistan and China, while Model 5 presents the Nigerian results. The regression results demonstrate robust support for hypothesis one (H1) by indicating that leaders are significantly more likely to suffer from audience costs when they decide to back down compared to engaging the opposing country. The only exception is the India-Pakistan vignette in Module 2, where the treatment effect does not reach statistical significance.

Table 7: Base Treatment Effects by Experimental Condition in Percentages

Scenario	India1 Hypothetical Country	India1 Pakistan	India2 Hypothetical Country	India2 China	Nigeria Hypothetical Country
Backing Down	83.8 (77.7-89.8)	88.5 (83.3-93.6)	59.6 (47.4-71.8)	56.3 (44.8-67.8)	18.5 (11.7-25.3)
Engage Win	94.6	92.5	88.5	87.3	43.1

[120] See Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) and Greenberg (2019).

	(91.0-98.2)	(88.3-96.7)	(81.1-96)	(79.5-95)	(34.0-52.3)
Engage Lose	83.6 (77.6-89.6)	88.6 (83.4-93.8)	64.7 (53.3-76)	63.7 (52.4-75.1)	26.7 (18.5-34.9)
Engage Win More Casualties	86.6 (81.0-92.2)	87.4 (82.1-92.7)	77.4 (67.7-87.1)	82.6 (73.6-91.5)	31.1 (20.8-41.5)
Engage Lose Less Casualties	90.7 (86.0-95.5)	89.2 (84.0-94.3)	85.2 (76.8-93.7)	84.7 (76.4-93)	18.6 (0.08-28.5)

Note: Table 7 reports the base treatment effects in percentage across each of the scenarios. The perception indicates the proportion of respondents have chosen to support their leader's handling of the international security crisis. The percentages in each column are rounded and because of that they may not sum to 100 because they are rounded. The ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in the parentheses.

Findings: Willingness to Fight (H2)

To examine hypothesis two's (H2) expected base treatment effects, I turn to Table 7, and the results do offer some suggestive evidence in line with the claim that leaders' willingness to fight will better protect them from incurring domestic audience costs, even if the military engagement proves to be unsuccessful. For instance, the base treatment effects across the Indian and Nigerian participants range from 0 to 29 percentages points, thus suggesting that it might be safer for leaders to fight a losing war, even if the opponent has fewer capabilities, than backing down. However, as the results on Figure 1 demonstrate, if a more systematic analysis is applied using logistic regression models with controls, there is no robust evidence in support for hypothesis three's (H2) claim that leaders' willingness to fight can reduce the probability that they will suffer audience costs, regardless of the outcome of the military intervention. The Indian public in experiment one, across the hypothetical country and Pakistan scenario, does not demonstrate higher levels of support for leaders who use force and lose the military engagement. Still, I do find that the Indian respondents in experiment two are more

likely to approve of leaders who win the engagement but suffer more casualties or lose the engagement and incur less casualties than the opposing country. Similarly, I do not find support for hypothesis two (H2) among the Nigerian participants because they are significantly more likely to approve of leaders who use force but lose the military engagement. Hence, these findings largely do not corroborate the work by Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui's (2021) work among the Pakistani public indicating that the public could be more risk-acceptant when deciding to support or oppose short term military operations, especially in the context of long-running strategic rivalries.



Figure 9: Main Effects – Public Support for the Leader in Foreign Security Crises. Dependent variables: Leader Approval

Note: The Figure presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval. The baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing country after issuing a public threat. The results are presented as odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while

controlling for respondents' level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader.

Findings: Indians and Nigerians' view on Reputation

Closely following on Lin-Greenberg (2019), the study also captured respondents' views on how their leader's handling of the security crisis has impacted the reputation of the country. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement that their leader's actions during the crisis have damaged the country's reputation. Based on audience costs theory, I expect that Indians and Nigerians will be eager to disapprove of inconsistent leaders as the latter often damage the country's reputation for resolve and the country's ability to induce compliance and concessions by others.

In Table 50 using reputation as the dependent variable [121], the results largely corroborate the findings by Lin-Greenberg (2019) by demonstrating that Indians and Nigerians, similar to the Americans, British, and Chinese, perceive leaders who are inconsistent by backing down as having a negative effect on the country's reputation. For hypothesis two (H2), I find that largely Indians and Nigerians do not perceive an unsuccessful military response by their leader as diminishing the country's reputation relative to the baseline group. The one exception is Model 4 in experiment two in India, the results of which show support for hypothesis two (H2) as Indians are more likely to perceive the scenario in which their leader fights a winning war,[122] but the Indian army suffers more casualties than the opposing side, as beneficial for the country's reputation. In a similar fashion, situations in which leaders lose the military

[121] See the Appendix B.2 to B.4.
[122] More accurately, the engagement described in the treatments resembles an interstate military dispute (MID).

engagement but sustain fewer casualties than the opposing side do seem to benefit the leader's reputation. Hence, I posit that they largely corroborate the attitudinal patterns among Indians and Nigerians, both of which tend not to perceive an unsuccessful military engagement as capable of reducing the country's reputation more than backing down. Nevertheless, due to the paucity of the available data, more empirical work capturing the microfoundations in non-western countries is needed to clearly examine the effects of fighting, incurring casualties, losing, or winning in the context of audience costs.

Findings: The Effects of Elite and Social Group Endorsement Cues

Experiments four and five's treatments incorporate elite and social group cues[123] that have been shown to be able to substantially moderate the size of the classic non-partisan audience costs.[124] By introducing one-party, bipartisan, and social group cues, the study is further able to test the theorized non-partisan audience cost effects of hypotheses three (H3) and four (H4) in the context of Indian politics. The two experiments also re-test the main effect of audience costs, that is subjects' tendency to approve of leaders who engage the opposing country compared to those who back down, while also capturing the influence of endorsement cues on the approval levels and reputational costs. I randomized which respondents will receive the social group cue referring to the politically likeminded Indian voters, the majority of whom either support or oppose the prime minister actions. Likewise, some of the respondents were assigned to receive the one-party or bipartisan endorsement,[125] revealing the position taken by the party coalitions

[123] Endorsements. For the regression Tables see Appendix B.5 and B.6.
[124] See Levendusky & Horowitz (2012); Evers & Fisher & Schaaf (2019).
[125] Elite Cue

led by Bharatiya Janata Party or the Indian National Congress Party. The party endorsements informed respondents that both parties support the prime minister's actions or that neither of them clearly supports or opposes the prime minister's handling of the situation. Similarly, respondents presented with a social group cue will read that "75% of Indians with your political views" approve or disapprove of the prime-minister's decision to back down or engage the country.[126]



Figure 10: Experiment 4 Approval and Vote.

Note: Figure 10 presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing country after issuing a public threat. The results are presented as odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while controlling for respondents' level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader.

[126] For a similar use of social cues see Kertzer & Zeitzoff (2017) and Bond & Settle & Fariss & Jones & Fowler (2016).

Figure 10 presents the main effects of experiment four. The results provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1) that the public will tend to impose audience costs upon their leaders for backing down against aggressor countries in international security crises. The results support hypothesis two (H2) as leaders who engage, but their military operation proves to be unsuccessful are still likely to be rewarded by the public with higher approval ratings, votes, and an improvement of their and the country's reputation. Surprisingly, these results suggest that using force and losing the military engagement might be safer, for democratic leaders, in terms of their approval ratings, voting base, and reputation, than backing down.

Turning to the effect of the group oppose cue[127] it can be observed that it consistently reduces the effect size of the underlying audience costs logic across the treatment groups, but for Models 1 and 2, respondents are still significantly more likely to approve and vote for their leader.[128] Nonetheless, it does seem that the social group's opposition has reduced participants' willingness to point out that the country and prime minister's reputation to insignificance. In a similar dynamic, I find that the effects from the group endorse and the elite endorse cue on approval and voting remain significant, while it fails to convince respondents' that the prime minister's handling of the crisis has improved or damaged the country or his reputation.[129]

The design of experiment five incorporates two major differences.[130] First, the scenario in which leaders decide to stay out of the crisis by not issuing any threats is omitted. Second, in contrast, to experiment four's bipartisan endorsement, respondents were presented with the classic elite cue in the form of a single party endorsement by manipulating the position of the

[127] Social group cue opposes the prime minister handling of the crisis.
[128] See Appendix .B.5
[129] See Appendix B.5 .
[130] It is important to stress that main texts of the vignettes are identical to experiment three.

two major parties in India, the BJP and the INC. The two elite cues allow for the implementation of an original test of the effect of partisanship on Indians' foreign policy attitudes and to what extent they can produce preference reversals in contradiction to the expected non-partisan audience cost effects.[131]

Turning to Figure 11[132] it outlines the main effects of experiment five. As in the other experiments, the results present strong evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1) that the public will impose audience costs upon leaders who decided to back down against aggressor countries in international security crises. The overall effect of the BJP endorsement[133] does not follow the theoretical expectations and, in fact, reduces respondents' approval of the leader's handling of the crisis. Conversely, the INC's endorsement of the prime minister's decision to use force[134] does not significantly affect respondents' willingness to reward the leader with higher approval rates, vote, or improvement in reputation.[135]

[131] Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019)
[132] For the regression results presented in odds ratios see Appendix B.6.
[133] Elite Cue – See Appendix B.6.
[134] To engage the opposing country.
[135] See Appendix Table B.6..



Figure 11: Experiment 5 Approval: Vote.

Note: Figure 11 presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing country after issuing a public threat. The results are presented in odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while controlling for respondents' level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader.

I also subset the sample based on participants self-selected political party affiliation to explore the potential existence of heterogenous effects. The results clearly indicate that when the current ruling party in India, the BJP, endorses the prime minister's decision to engage the opposing country, the approval rate approximately doubles (p=0.01).[136] It also makes respondents much more likely to vote for their leader compared to the baseline condition of backing down, which provides further support for hypotheses one (H1) and two (H2) in Models 1,2, and 3. Comparatively, the INC's endorsement of the prime minister's decision to use force

[136] See Appendix B.5 and B.6.

shows that across the four models, respondents' are significantly more likely to approve, vote, and perceive that the handling of the crises has improved both the country and the prime minister's reputation.[137] Nevertheless, the size of the expected treatment effect is less than that generated by the BJP endorsement. Importantly, the substantive results remain the same when we subset and test by the BJP and INC elite cues, including only non-Tamils and/or Hindu[138] respondents.[139] Perhaps not surprisingly, running the models only on Hindu respondents produces an even larger effect of approval for the prime minister who has decided to engage the aggressor country. Thus, experiment four presents additional evidence that reinforces the main findings that Indian respondents are ready to impose audience costs, in the form of lower approval, lesser willingness to vote, and reputational damages, upon their leaders if they decide to back down after publicly issuing a threat.

Since the findings in experiments four and five might be due to the characteristic of the sample, I evaluated the result from the models again on three subsets of the sample: non-Tamils, Hindus, and those participants who have passed the post-treatment manipulation check. The results from the three sample subsets do not differ from the main results presented in Figures 2 and 3.[140] Therefore, the results from experiments four and five suggest that elite and social group cues are moderators of the public's level of approval and disapproval but are unable to negate the main effects of audience cost theory in international security crises among Indian respondents.

[137] See Appendix B.5 and B.6.
[138] Respondents who have selected Hinduism as their religious affiliation.
[139] See Appendix B.5. and B.6.
[140] The full regression models are presented in Appendix B.5 and B.6.

Conclusion

The study's findings make several contributions to the audience costs literature. First, it uses original survey experiments to explore audience cost theory's core claim that leaders who back down are more likely to be punished (Schultz, 2001; Baum, 2004). As expected, the results demonstrate that audience cost theory's main claim is valid across countries as leaders who back down are consistently more likely to lose office. These findings are important for filling the literature gaps as they present novel evidence clearly supporting the cross-country validity of the microfoundations of audience costs theory in India and Nigeria, which are major non-western democracies with current and past military interstate disputes [141] and active involvement in international security issues. Hence, using new data from survey experiments to test audience cost theory's postulate that leaders will suffer audience costs when backing down during international crises, this study corroborated the findings from quantitative, comparative case studies, and experimental studies that leaders tend to be penalized by the public for inconsistency.

Second, the results from the survey experiments in India and Nigeria provide evidence in support of the argument that democratic leaders might be safer in terms of their approval ratings and reputation, even if they use force in an international security crisis, regardless of the outcome of the military engagement. From a policy perspective, it might be safer for leaders to fight regardless of the result of the engagement, or the incurred military casualties, as this is likely to increase their approval ratings and receive reputational gains compared to backing down. Thus, similar to Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui's (2021) findings, the results from this

[141] To the best of the authors' knowledge, we are not aware of any studies testing audience cost theory in India or Nigeria through the experimental method.

study cautiously suggest that the public in democracies might also reward its leaders for their willingness to act and fight regardless of whether the military engagement was and the distribution of casualties between their soldiers and the opposing side's military personal.

Third, building on the rich set of experimental studies, this study presented an original empirical test of audience cost theory's [142] microfoundations in two major non-western democracies. The results confirm audience costs internal and external validity among Indian and Nigerian respondents, which is particularly important as for years, the majority of experimental evidence originated from developed western countries such as United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016). Naturally, the results from the study also support the proposition that the fundamental mechanisms of audience cost work during the escalation phrases of domestic and international crises among Indian and Nigerian respondents are similar to what has been found in western developed democracies and in China. Further suggesting that leaders who make threats and mobilize the military but subsequently back down will be more likely to suffer from lower approval rates (Tomz, 2009). The study's results demonstrated that similar to the American and the British public, Indians and Nigerians are equally willing to impose audience costs upon their national leaders in international security crises across religion, ethnicity, income, education, and party affiliation in a period of renewed military interstate disputes and big power competition. Consequently, the study provides additional insights when leaders might have incentives to use force and whether they can afford to escalate or not, as they will be aware of electoral and reputational costs of inconsistency. Backing down and not using force against the opposing country can be particularly detrimental for the leader's approval rating as in such crises, the public is likely to experience "rally-behind the flag phenomena," making any concessions to

[142] (Tomz, 2007; Quek, 2017; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013; Kertzer & Brutger, 2017; Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 2019).

the opposing side costly for the government. Thus, the study's findings are a cautious first step demonstrating that the microfoundations of audience cost theory are valid and work in a similar way among the Indian and Nigerian publics as in major western democracies and China.

Fourth, the study examined the effect of single party, bipartisan and social group cues on Indian voters' willingness to impose audience costs on national leaders based on their decision in the context of international security crises. The results extend previous findings by suggesting that Indian respondents' attitudes are also moderated by elite and social group cues sharing their political views[143] in a similar manner as American and European constituencies (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998). For example, the elite cues presented as bipartisan endorsements,[144] shown to induce strong notions of national interest among the public, did reduce the expected base effects of audience costs by shifting participants' choices toward the position held by their party regardless of the scenario.[145] Similarly, the results from the social group cue demonstrate that respondents' do look for information from groups that share their political preferences, and they are likely to confirm with their position (Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944).

Perhaps unexpectedly, the elite endorse cue moderated but failed to produce a choice shift by mobilizing significantly higher support among Indians for leaders who have decided to stay out of the conflict in contrast to the group endorse cue. A potential explanation could be that

[143] See (Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).
[144] Defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009).
[145] See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999).

social group cues by politically like-minded nationals (co-partisans) tend to induce more substantial shifts in the public's choices than even bipartisan party endorsements, which matches the finding by Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).[146] Nonetheless, by comparing the effects of elite and social group cues, it becomes apparent that only several of them successfully induced choice shifts among respondents[147][148] (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Despite their underperformance, elite and social group cues moderate the classic audience cost in international security crises. Still accounting for bipartisan-elite and social group cues, this study added more comparative evidence for the renewed debate whether public opinion is influenced primarily by elites, or it can also be shaped by cues from politically like-minded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Therefore, despite their weaker effect than theoretically expected, the results do suggest that bipartisan and social group cues moderate respondents' approval levels, willingness to vote and perception of an improved reputation of the country and their prime minister across the scenarios and, in some cases, successfully inducing preference shifts.

Future work on the relationship between audience costs in international security crises could focus on several different aspects. First, as Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019) point, scholars can test whether leaders could avoid audience costs by justifying their decision based on new information to the public in non-western democracies.[149] Specifically comparing countries without and counties with current or recent military interstate

[146] Ordinary co-partisans among the public.
[147] The mechanism of searching for a second opinion is also present in elite cues.
[148] See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013).
[149] For research exploring how leaders' justification influences the public see (Gowa, 1999; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Saunders, 2015). For instance, the leader could argue that the government backed down because that was the right strategic decision to make.

disputes or interventions are of especial interest for the further testing and consolidation of the theory's microfoundations. Second, studies can disentangle the empirical claim that citizens' pre-determined policy preferences guide their responses and whether they are willing to impose audience costs on their leader due to belligerency or inconsistency concerns during the crisis is inconsequential to their level of approval or disproval (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016). For example, one approach will be to test whether the dispositional differences between liberal-internationalist compared to conservative-militaristic leaning respondents in non-western democracies tend to impose audience costs upon their national leaders differently based on their belligerence or inconsistent concerns. Third, more work could be done to test the effects on respondents' willingness to impose audience costs after being informed about the position of international institutions,[150] which have been shown to affect domestic political attitudes in western democracies.[151]

[150] Such as the United Nations or a regional security organization – NATO, etc.
[151] (Dragojlovic, 2013, 2015; Hayes & Guardino, 2013; Linos, 2011; Murray, 2014; Chapman, 2011; Chapman & Reiter, 2004).

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CHAPTER FOUR: IN SEARCH OF DOMESTIC AUDIENCE COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA AND NIGERIA

Introduction

Do national leaders suffer from audience costs for being inconsistent in domestic security crises? Due to the policy relevance of the issue, political scientists have long been interested in isolating the circumstances under which the public is more likely to inflict audience costs upon their leaders.[152] One of the reasons for this scholarly interest in audience costs is the basic need of democratic governments to maintain a sufficient level of public support for their foreign and domestic policies (Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Toms & Weeks, 2013). Leaders are aware[153] that their action or inaction against domestic security threats[154] might create domestic audience costs leading to lost seats in the national assembly, experience a decrease in popularity, lose elections,

[152] See Fearon (1994).
[153] There is evidence that leaders are aware of the prospects of audience cost both for them and their opponents, see Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012).
[154] Defined here as an insurgent group and referred to as rebels in the vignettes.

or be forcefully removed from office.[155] Similar to foreign policy support for the use of force, the country's counterterrorism policy often depends on public support to be implemented successfully. For instance, Indians and Nigerians are not strangers to domestic security crises since the two countries have been tackling multiple insurgencies with domestic and foreign backers on their territory after gaining independence (Mitra, 2005; Ukiwo at el (2011); Nwangwu & Onuoha & Nwosu & Ezeibe, 2020). Some of the still active non-state armed groups are the Maoists[156], the NSCN[157], Hizbul Mujahideen[158], and Boko Haram[159] among others. The Indian and Nigerian public repeatedly have been faced with the choice to support or oppose their leader's actions against the insurgents. This exploratory study uses audience cost theory's framework to investigate whether national leaders are likely to suffer from public disapproval when being inconsistent while attempting to start negotiations with the non-state armed actor responsible during domestic security crises. Thus, I argue that as in international security crises, leaders will be equally susceptible to audience costs when dealing with domestic security threats, such as non-state armed groups.[160]

By testing these theoretical expectations, this study makes two contributions to the literature. First, the results provide evidence in support of the notion that a broadly defined theoretical framework of audience costs can be successfully applied to model whether the public is likely to punish their leader for backing down against rebel groups in domestic security crises. Second, adding to the literature's considerable number of studies that elite and social group cues heavily influence

[155] The last mode of regime change is primarily observed in autocratic regimes, see Weeks (2012).
[156] With a Communist Ideology
[157] National Socialist Council of Nagaland follows a mix between communist and ethnonationalist ideology.
[158] The group follows the ideology of radical Islam.
[159] Militant Islamic Organization.
[160] As in the classic Audience Cost application to international security crises. See Fearon (1994).

respondents' attitudes in the form of endorsements,[161] the study's results present new data to suggest under what circumstances domestic politics can sway the public's approval or disapproval levels of their leader's actions against rebels' groups, threatening the country's domestic security.

Empirically the study relies on two survey experiments with Indian and one with Nigerian respondents. Survey experiments are an established method in exploring the existence of audience cost as they allow the researcher to avoid the strategic selection bias, thus observing the effects of backing down or engaging the rebels during crises that otherwise might not have occurred due to leaders' incentives to avoid inconsistency.[162]

Domestic Security Crises and Audience Costs

After Fearon's (1994) classic work on audience cost theory, the fate of leaders who back down while being inconsistent has been a major focus of scholarly work. Audience cost theory postulates that leaders will be punished with lower approval ratings, a worsening reputation, and lower electoral support if they issue empty threats. Claiming generalizability across regimes, countries, and different political cultures, the theory predicts that the public will be less approving of leaders who back down because of two reasons. First, voters tend to perceive those leaders who back down against foreign threats harm the country's reputation for resolve and, as a result, are more willing

[161] See Dunckan (2001); Kuklinski & Hurley (1994); Lupia & McCubbins (1998); Petty & Wegener (1998); Kertzer & Zeitzoff (2017).
[162] See Shultz, 2001; Bam, 2004; Tomz, 2007; 2009; Trager & Vavreck, 2011; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013; Brutger 2014; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016).

to punish them (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007). Second, voters perceive leaders who back down after issuing a threat but failing to act on it as less competent, thus not deserving their support (Schultz, 1998; Schultz, 2001b; Weeks, 2008).

Following on the experimental literature investigating the micro-foundations of audience cost theory (Tomz, 2007; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Johns & Davies, 2012; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016; Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019) this study builds upon it by examining Indians and Nigerians' willingness to disapprove of their leaders' actions during periods of escalation in domestic security crises. As a result, I posit that in such instances of inaction [163] and inconsistency[164], it is reasonable to expect that leaders who back down while initiating negotiations with the non-state armed actor will be punished by their constituents for damaging the state's reputation and national honor [165] in a similar pattern observed during international crises. Importantly, I do not claim that the dynamic of audience cost theory affects the leaders through the entire duration of the conflict with the non-state armed group as they can last for years or decades and experience stages of intensive and low-intensity violence.[166] On the contrary, the main argument of the study is that those two domestic political factors moderate the level to which Indians and Nigerians are willing to punish their leaders for backing down by being inconsistent and attempting negotiations with non-state armed groups [167] during the escalation phases of domestic security crises. Thus, the study tests the working of audience costs theory in domestic security crises by focusing on two factors moderating the size and direction of audience costs 1)

[163] Defined as – deciding not to intervene and send the army – stay out.
[164] Bluffing, see Fearon (1994).
[165] Perhaps due to the rally-behind the flag phenomena, which will make any concession to the rebels hardly being able to be approved by the angry public and eager to punish them, see Groeling and Baum (2008).
[166] For a detailed examination of the state's strategies in dealing with non-state armed actors domestically, see Staniland (2018).
[167] Rebel groups

the power disparity between the government force and the non-state actors, and 2) the effects of elite and social group cues on the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's handling of the domestic security crisis.

The Asymmetric Distribution of Military Power

The first factor is that rebel groups tend to have significantly less military power than the government they fight (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Due to this disparity in force projection and the heightened levels of fear and anxiety these groups instill into the civilian population[168], I contend that these factors are likely to increase the public's willingness to support the use of force and punish leaders who decide to back down and attempt negotiations.[169] Specifically, the public's increased level of anger following rebel attacks against military units or civilian targets can increase support for the use of force as a retaliation strategy. For instance, after the deadliest terrorist attack in Indian administrated Kashmir[170] as well as Nigeria's northern state of Borno, the public pressured the leaders of both countries respond by using force, against the rebel groups responsible.[171] It is broadly assumed that by using force the leader of both countries decreased their chance of suffering from lower approval rates or reputational costs. Another example is the

[168] See Wayne (2018) for a comprehensive review of this literature. Forthcoming https://www.carlywayne.com/policy
[169] As some terrorism scholars suggest, it is exactly the response that the public many times desires after an attack by a rebel group (see Kydd & Walter, 2006). Furthermore, scholars have pointed that this is often the reason why rebels trigger state response and attack the public's attention but rarely receive concessions by the government/s they target (see Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson 2007; Lake, 2002; Abrahms, 2006; Fortna, 2015).
[170] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/at-least-18-killed-in-deadliest-attack-on-indian-security-forces-in-kashmir-in-years/2019/02/14/cf8d01c8-3054-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html?utm_term=.f14ca09bbe10
[171] Jama at-e-Islami – even with the risk of triggering a military interstate dispute with the long-term rival Pakistan.

2015 operation by Indian special forces attacking a training base in the border region between India and Myanmar, belonging to the militant group National Socialist Council of Nagaland as a retaliation for the latter's attack on an Indian army convoy.[172] In addition, in early 2019, the Indian air force conducted one of its officially confirmed airstrikes against the rebel group as retaliation to an early terrorist attack on its soil.[173] At the time, many domestic and international observers have pointed out that if the strongman prime minister of India backs down and or stays out and does retaliate, his reputation and approval ratings might have suffered. Similarly, since 2014 the Nigerian government has been fighting rebel group such as Boko Haram through counterterrorism operations, primarily in its northern regions, and even relying on transborder cooperation with neighboring countries (Cannon & Iyekekpolo, 2018). In addition, for several years, the Nigerian government was involved in repeated periods of escalation and de-escalation followed by negotiations with the Niger Delta militants in the south of the country (Chinwe & Duru, 2018).

The domestic security dynamics in India and Nigeria are not isolated cases as many other countries such as Columbia, the Philippines, Mali, Ethiopia, Myanmar, among others, have and continue to face rebel groups involving dozens of escalation and de-escalation periods through their specific domestic security crises. Consequently, the study contends that during domestic security crises, leaders are presented with two levels of escalation: 1) leaders can send costly signals by verbal threats stating that they will deal with the rebels and punish their members for their actions; 2) a higher level of escalation can be observed when leaders enact curfews while giving sweeping powers to the country's security forces and army to deal with the rebels. A good illustration of

[172] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/bold-operation-by-indian-army-many-militants-involved-in-manipur-ambush-neutralised-in-myanmar/articleshow/47601222.cms
[173] https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1QF11Z

these two levels of escalation by a country's government is the French President's actions after the Paris Attacks and the decision of the government of Sri Lanka to make numerous arrests and enact a curfew following the Church Bombings. As a result, it can be argued that in such situations, leaders who decide to back down to attempt negotiations, after making threats towards the rebels and mobilizing the army, will suffer audience costs in a similar fashion to those during international security crises.[174] Therefore, hypothesis one tests the claim that when rebel groups[175] escalate their use of violence, the public is more likely to disapprove of leaders who decide not to use force and are inconsistent by backing down to attempt peace negotiations.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The public is more likely to disapprove of their leader's decision to back down and attempt negotiations after mobilizing the army and making public threats, compared to the decision to engage the rebels.[176]

Elite and Social Group Cues and Audience Costs

Do elite and social group cues moderate the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leaders' handling of the domestic security crisis?[177] To answer this question, I outline the theoretical framework and mechanisms through which elite cues have been shown to affect public opinion across domestic and foreign policy issues. Elite cue theory postulates that people's attitudes are often shaped by their leaders' political positions in a top-down process (Gilens &

[174] An example of the recent China-India border clashed with casualties https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53118473
[175] The non-state actor.
[176] Representing the core claim of audience costs theory but applied to domestic security crises.
[177] The vignettes, including the cue treatments, were presented only to the Indian respondents.

Murakawa, 2002; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Elite cue givers are defined as heads of states, high-ranking political officials, parties, and army generals (Golby & Feaver & Dropp, 2018).[178] As a top-down elite-driven theory of public opinion, the fundamental premise is that the public is "rationally ignorant" across a wide variety of policy issues as they are too distant from their daily lives (Rosenau, 1965; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Zaller, 1992). The existence of this asymmetry of information between the elites and the public creates the demand for cues, providing relevant information for the decisions to be made (Baum & Groeling, 2010; Colaresi, 2007). For instance, elites' interpretation of an event often can be more consequential to the public's position than other factors (Baum & Groeling, 2009).[179]

Social cue theory[180] similarly assumes that individuals are "rationally ignorant" on most political issues, preferring to rely on their social networks to make the decision (Bernheim, 1994; Turner, 1982; Fiske, 2004). Groups such as unions, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes, are at the center of social cue theory as their members have a psychological affinity towards them (Le Bon, 1896; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Hackman & Katz, 2010). The recent decline of formal membership in social and political organizations (Putnam, 2000) could have magnified the effects of social networks on individuals' attitudes on political issues (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995, Klofstad, 2007, Nickerson, 2008; Sinclair, 2012, Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). Thus, respondents look for information from others with similar

[178] Recently scholars have also included foreign leaders (Murray, 2014; Hayes & Guardino, 2011), and international institutions (Thompson, 2006; Peace & Brewer, 2008; Chapman, 2011),

[179] There are relatively few studies on authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes that map the interaction between elite cues and the public's foreign policy positions. Bell and Quek (2017) do focus on the Chinese public opinion about war but not in the frame of elite cues. Nevertheless, studies of authoritarian regimes do offer some evidence that public opinion in authoritarian regimes is taken into account by leaders when deciding between policies (Rosato, 2003; Li & Chen, 2020; Quek, 2017).

[180] Elite Cue theory relies on the same assumption.

political preferences, and they tend to align their attitudes to the social groups they identify with (Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944). These social networks' serve as the individuals' information channels which can affect their attitudes on a variety of policy issues (Checkel, 1997; Fanis, 2011; Clarkson et al. 2013; Viser & Mirable, 2004).[181]

Elite and social group cues[182] are often described as "heuristics[183]" used by the actors in the decision-making process to avoid the efforts necessary for the collection of a large amount of information that could inform the individual voters' decisions on political issues of the day[184] (Downs, 1957; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Gulens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Bullock, 2011). As a direct result of these incentives held by the individual voters, the public becomes susceptible to elite cues and social group cues[185]in shaping its level of approval or disapproval of the government's policies. The power of cues in shaping public opinion and in the current information environment enables them to be heard by the vast majority of a country's citizens, makes them targets of constant interest both from scholars and practitioners in the policy community.[186] One example of this trend in the Indian political context is the current prime minister's social media campaign, in particular, to inform its party supporters and garner new ones.[187] Some scholars would even go as far to contend that due to the public's use of elite cues in the form of party endorsements, they are able to make a timely

[181] Studies in social comparison theory provide further evidence of the group incentive to conform, even in the absence of pressure to do so (Isenberg,1986; Milgram, 1974; Sinclair, 2012; Asch, 1951; Stein, 2013; Brewer & Brown, 1998).
[182] Definition: a cue is traditionally defined as a message which individuals could use to make an inference, and subsequently a decision on discussed subject (see Bullock, 2011, p. 497).
[183] Other would use the term "cognitive shortcuts"
[184] Many of which are considered distant from our daily lives as well as influence of issue specific knowledge on respondent attitudes.
[185] Most often defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009).
[186] For studies on the stability of fundamental political issues see Page and Shapiro (1992) and Bell and Quek (2017).
[187] Sinha (2017)

decision with the available information whether to support or oppose the proposed policy[188] (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). Knowing that and consequently applying it to domestic audience cost scenarios it is natural that political parties strategically target their respective audiences with messages endorsing or opposing the way the leader has handled a number of situations, including security crises.[189]

As suggested by Levendusky and Horowitz's (2012) study, Democratic regimes[190] will be relatively more effective in producing audience costs for leaders who back down after escalating but fail to follow through on their commitment without providing clear justification. The negative consequences could be a damaged reputation, losing seats in the national assembly[191], losing national elections, or being forcefully removed from office (Edwards, 1997; Tomz, 2007)[192]. It is not unusual for citizens to place high salience on the issue of dealing with internal security threats such as rebels (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). For instance, Vaishnav (2015) argues that in the political context of India, the state of the economy is a major salient issue that can determine electoral success in the general election. However, the two dominant political parties, the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party and their coalition partners, need to balance their economy-focused election platforms with stances on interethnic and security issues in the country.[193] It is reasonable to argue that party endorsements might condition the public's

[188] Which might be of particular importance to national leaders as they need to know whether the public will support or oppose the given policy.
[189] For a more general discussion on how elite cues frame message according to their interest see (Zaller, 1992; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Brudger, 2017).
[190] A number of scholars have presented increasingly convincing evidence that even in authoritarian regimes, leaders and political elites need, at a minimum, a moderately supportive public to pursue their foreign policy objectives. For more details, see Bell and Quek's (2017) work on China.
[191] See Tomz's (2009) finding that in the American political context, members of the president's party have a higher chance to win seats in local or federal institutions of the former maintains high levels of public support.
[192] See Weeks (2008).
[193] Ibid

willingness to approve or disapprove of how the national leader has handled the security crisis. By taking the potential effects from the party endorsements into account, the study can better approximate the informational environment [194] respondents might face before making their decision to approve or disapprove of the leader's actions. Thus, I contend that all else equal, elite cues in the form of single-party endorsements or bipartisan consensus can have an effect on the public's willingness to impose audience costs upon the leader's actions against rebel groups in the escalation phrases during domestic security crises.[195]

To empirically test the claim that elite and social group cues in the form of endorsements affect the public's willingness to punish their national leader[196], the study utilizes the political influence of the two major political parties in India, the BJP and INC.[197] Thus, the paper explores the effect of the BJP and INC individual endorsements[198] and bipartisan consensus on voters' willingness to punish the Indian prime minister for being inconsistent or backing down against rebel groups in domestic security crises.[199]

[194]Approximately half of the Indian public has access to the internet. https://main.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIR_04042019_0.pdf. Furthermore, studies have shown that people prefer to inform their political views from groups that conform to their initial political preferences (Munson & Resnick 2010; Park et al. 2009) (Kaplan & Haelein, 2010).

[195] And by extension to that of the international Security Crises.

[196] Accounting for social and elite cues, this study will present more evidence for the renewed debate around the question whether public opinion is influenced primarily by elites or it can also be shaped by cues from politically likeminded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).

[197]This study used messages from the country's major political parties as the elite cues; see Gilens and Murakawa (2002) and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).

[198] As in Tomz's (2007) study the level of political engagement has been shown to affect respondents' willingness to punish their leaders.

[199] To the best of the author knowledge these questions have remained unexplored. Expectedly the majority of evidence in support of the existence of audience cost originate from major western democracies such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (see Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016) with one exception – Costa Rica see (Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson 1993).

The public's level of susceptibility to elite and social group cues varies across issues (Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). The lack of clear incentives for the public to stay informed[200] about the best approach to tackle a security threat from non-state actors might make its attitude more susceptible to cues from the country's political parties.[201] Importantly, the issue of counter-insurgency operations and anti-terrorism may not always have clear solutions that[202] might increase the uncertainty under which the public needs to decide whether to support or oppose a policy. For example, Goswami (2009) and Agarwal (2013) review the Indian government counter-insurgency program and find that often, it has been ineffective which could further support the claim that there might not be a consensus on what specific counterinsurgency approach should be pursued by the government. One might assume that it is needless to argue against the notion that asking Indian citizens whether they need to engage the rebels with force is an "easy" question that could rarely be affected by contradicting cues.[203] Nonetheless, due to the protracted nature of India's insurgencies, especially the two left-wing rebel groups, the Naxalite-Maoists[204] and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland rebels, sections of the public might hold different views on what is the right approach to deal with the long-standing rebel groups.[205] For instance, a policy of overwhelming retaliation[206] by the army and security forces after attacks by the Naxalite-Maoist

[200] Perhaps importantly because the country insurgent groups affect particular regions of India and not the country's entirety.
[201] Referring to situation in which respondents are presented with information about the positions of others "like you" on the given policy issue. See Mann and Sinclair (2013).
[202] For more details on the distinction of hard and easy issues and how they affect voter behavior see Carmines and Stimson (1980).
[203] Both review the Indian government counter-insurgency program and it has been changing and often ineffective which could be take as a further point in support of the claim that there might not be a consensus on what specific approach must be taken to tackle the threat.
[204] https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency/
[205] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/government-signs-landmark-nagaland-peace-treaty-with-nscni-m-in-presence-of-pm-narendra-modi/articleshow/48332059.cms
[206] Which is one of the strategies pointed out by Staniland's (2018) work.

rebels is often said to decrease the Indian government's ability to stimulate defections or decrease public support for the militants. However, we do not have empirical evidence to determine whether such an approach will decrease the possibility that the country's leader will suffer from audience costs in the Indian context.

Due to this dynamic, the public is being polarized on the issue of approving or opposing their leader's decision to back down or engage the rebels. I contend[207] that because of the uncertain results of each of the possible responses by the government, respondents' position will be susceptible to single-party, bipartisan, and social group endorsements with shared political views that can give some further backing to one position or the other. In such circumstances, subjects will tend to rely on the available cues from politically relevant groups to decide whether they should sanction their leader's actions or support them.[208] In addition, it can be expected that subjects' will also seek "second opinion" by public figures in the given context (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Respondents' psychological affinity towards ideologically similar groups could be even stronger in complex issues such as domestic security (Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1968; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013). For instance, the perceived similarity of interests might lead to conformity with the elite's position on the issue despite the clear indication that the Indian national government's portrayal of the counter-insurgency policy to be in the national interest. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to argue

[207] It is important to note that due to the lack of studies on the issue, the claims are inherently explorative and speculative.

[208] It is not uncommon that some domestic pollical issues, especially those pertaining to security, could have received more attention by the Indian media and, as a result, affect the sample's respondents by creating "pretreatment effects", as Druckman and Leeper (2012) point.

that in the Indian political context, the average respondent's level of approval or disapproval will be affected by the endorsement messages from the two major political parties in India, regardless of how the leader has decided to respond to the rebel group's provocation. Therefore, to test the effect of party endorsements upon the public's willingness to punish their leader, hypothesis two postulates:

Hypothesis 2: Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove of their leader handling of the crisis to match that of the party or social group endorsement they have been exposed to, regardless of the type of action against the rebel group.[209]

Research Design and Sample

The study relies on three survey experiments to test the hypotheses. The first study consists of 1600 Indian respondents follows a 2x3 design to test the effect of the individual party endorsements that the two major political parties have on Indians' willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's handling of the crises with the rebel group. The second study has a 4x2 design and samples an additional 1800 respondents from India, while study three uses 400 Nigerian participants with 2x3 design.

[209] It is important to note that there is evidence that Indian voters do not necessary vote for their caste (Mihay, 2016)

The three survey experiments proceeded as follows. First, respondents were presented with a battery of demographic questions, interest in politics, and support for a given party, adapted for India and Nigeria's socio-political context. Second, respondents are asked about their political dispositions – military assertiveness, political engagement, and party affiliation. Every participant in the three survey experiments was asked to read a situation that their country has faced and will likely face in the future and that they will have to indicate their approval or disapproval of the leader's handling of the crisis. Then, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the treatment scenarios describing how the Indian and Nigerian leaders[210] have decided to respond to a hypothetical and belligerent rebel group, which members have taken control of several villages, thus raising tensions.

In experiment one , I presented subjects with two decision scenarios describing how the Indian prime minister has decided to respond to an armed group in central India, which has taken control of several villages. The treatments shown on Table 1 are built upon two types of responses: 1) – Engage condition in which the national leader threatens and subsequently uses force against the rebels controlling the city, and 2) No engagement condition – in this situation the country's leader threatens the rebels with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply and the country's leader, decides to back down, and not use force while attempting negotiations.

To capture the elite cues' effect, the study randomly manipulated whether respondents received the treatment revealing the position taken by Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party, or the scenario in which they are not informed about any of the parties' positions. For

[210] The prime minister is not named, but with the recent anti-terrorism actions, it can be strongly expected that most respondents will infer that the scenarios are referring to actions taken or being taken by the acting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, who also has a reputation of being a "strongman"; See: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-narendra-modi-strongman-image-pakistan-tension-national-election-looms/

example, "*The Bharatiya Janata party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation;// The* Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation" which can be either backing down or following through by engaging the threat. Hence, participants were presented with a short paragraph, and a summary describing the belligerent actions of the rebels, the leader's threat, and follow-up move.

Table 8: Experiment 1 India Treatment Groups

Introductory Text	The following questions concern the decision of India's leaders when faced with domestic security challengers. You will read about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the situation in different ways. In the following
Backing Down and Attempt Negotiations	Treatment 1 In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the

	prime minister backed down and did not send the army to retake the villages from the rebels. The prime minister announced that the government would start peace negotiations. The rebels continued to operate in the region, remained in control of several villages.
Engage and Win	Treatment 2 In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages.
Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations – Elite Cue BJP Support	Treatment 3 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will

	respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of several villages. The Bharatiya Janata Party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.
Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations – Elite Cue INC Support	Treatment 4 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of several villages. The Indian National Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

Engage and Win – Elite Cue BJP Support	Treatment 5 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. The Bharatiya Janata Party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.
Engage and Win – Elite Cue INC Support	Treatment 6 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. The Indian National

	Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

In experiment two, participants were presented with four scenarios describing how the Indian prime minister has decided to respond to an armed group in north India that has taken control of several villages. The treatments shown in Table 8 are built upon four types of responses: 1) Engage and Win is the condition in which the national leader threatens and subsequently uses force against the rebels controlling the village in a successful military operation, and 2) Backing down – in this situation the country's leader threatens the rebels with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply, and the Indian prime minister decided to back down, and not use force; 3) Stay out - in this scenario the national leader has decided not to issue a threat or engage the rebels and instead attempt to negotiate; 4) Engage and Lose - in the fourth scenario the leader engages the threat but the military operation proves to be largely unsuccessful.

To capture the elite cues' effect, this study randomly manipulated whether respondents received the treatment revealing a bipartisan endorsement by both the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party, or the scenarios in which they are not informed about any of the parties' positions. The elite cue informs respondents that both parties support the leader's actions, indicating a bipartisan consensus.[211] Similarly, the study uses a classic social group cues message to capture its effects by incorporating the statement: "For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the

[211] See Appendix C.4 for the list of the full text.

prime minister's actions in this situation.", which signals opposition or support from the respondents' referenced social and co-partisan groups. The overall framing of the vignettes is practically following the same format as in experiment one.

Table 9: Experiment 2: India Treatment Groups

Introductory Text	The following questions concern the decision of India's leaders when faced with domestic security challengers. You will read about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the situation in different ways.
Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations	Treatment 1 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages.

Engage and Win	Treatment 2 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages.
Engage and Lose	Treatment 3 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages.
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations	Treatment 4

	Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages.
Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations – Social Group Cue Opposes the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 5 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations – Social Group Cue Supports the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 6 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Backing Down - Attempt Negotiations - Elite Cue – Bipartisan Support for the Leader	Treatment 7 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will

	respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party together with their coalition partners expressed support for the prime minister' actions in this difficult situation.
Engage and Win – Social Group Cue Opposes the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 8 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Engage and Win – Social Group Cue Supports the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 9 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Engage and Win – Elite Cue – Bipartisan Support for the Leader	Treatment 10 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. Leaders of the

	Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the prime minister's actions in this difficult situation.
Engage and Lose – Social Group Cue Opposes the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 11 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Engage and Lose – Social Group Cue Supports the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 12 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports

	indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Engage and Lose – Elite Cue – Bipartisan Support for the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 13 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party,

	together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the prime minister's actions in this difficult situation.
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations – Social Group Cue Opposes the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 14 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations – Social Group Cue Support the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 15 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will

	not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations – Elite Cue – Bipartisan Support for the Decision of the Leader	Treatment 16 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages. Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the prime minister's actions in this difficult situation.

The third experiment used Nigerian students who were randomly assigned to one of three scenarios describing how the Nigerian president has decided to respond to an armed group in of the country's border regions that has taken control of several villages. The treatments are built upon three types of responses: 1) Engage and Win is the condition in which the Nigerian leader threatens and subsequently uses force against the rebels controlling the village in a successful military operation, and 2) Backing down – is the situation in which the Nigerian president has threatened the rebels with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply, and the president eventually decides to back down, and not use force; 3) Engage and Lose - in the third treatment group in which the leader engages the threat, but the military operation proves to be largely unsuccessful.

Table 10: Experiment 3 Nigeria Treatment Groups

Introductory Text	The following questions concern the decision of Nigeria's leaders when faced with security challenges. You will read about a situation that Nigeria has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Nigerian leaders have managed the situation in different ways. In the following lines you will read about one approach Nigerian leaders have chosen to take and asked whether you approve or disapprove of it.
Backing Down and Attempting Negotiations	Treatment 1 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in one of Nigeria's border regions.

	Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The Nigerian president has stated that the government will respond by sending in the army. However, the president backed down and did not send the army against the rebels but instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of several villages.
Engage and Win	Treatment 2 Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages in one of Nigeria's border regions. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The Nigerian president has stated that the government will respond by sending the army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages.
Engage and Lose	*Treatment 3* Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control over several villages in one of Nigeria's border regions.

	Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The Nigerian president has stated that the government will respond by sending in the army. The army was sent and started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely unsuccessful. The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the region and remained in control of the villages.

Following the treatments, the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement, on a five-point Likert scale[212], with their leader's handling of the crisis. Respondents were also asked whether the actions of their leader have improved or damage the country's reputation and their willingness to vote[213] for him or her. None of the vignettes indicated the ideology of the rebel group or the number of casualties resulting from the initial attack and the ensuing operation by the Indian or Nigerian security and armed forces. I use the term "rebels" instead of insurgents because the former could be more well known among the English-speaking Indian and Nigerian respondents. The Nigerian respondents were not presented with the cue treatments.

The Indian respondents were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk.[214] The study sampled respondents from all of India's regions. To be included in the study, individuals must 1) be at least 18 years of age, 2) be able to read and comprehend English, 3) have Indian citizenship, and reside

[212] The Nigerian respondents were asked to indicate their level of disagreement on an 11 point scale.
[213] Results from the dependent variable on voting are presented in the Appendix.
[214] Furthermore, Berinsky et al. (2012) finds that on average Mechanical Turk Samples are more, or at least, equally representative with student samples.

in the country, as indicated in their official profile.[215][216] The Nigerian sample consists of approximately 400 university students sampled from several universities across the country.[217] The Nigerian students were sampled with cooperation from local academics. Each of the students was invited to participate in the study through their online course groups on WhatsApp[218] is frequently used by scholars in Africa to collect samples for both academic and non-academic research.

It can be argued that the study use of convenience and student samples does not pose significant external validity problems that are normally assumed because of three reasons. First, the study follows the logic of Drunckman and Kam (2011), Berinsky, Gregory, Huber, and Gabriel (2012), who successfully demonstrate that using convenience and student samples allows scholars to successfully study the causal mechanisms of theories while maintaining a sufficient amount of generalizability among the general population. Together with other studies such as that by Mintz and Geva (1993), they have convincingly demonstrated that when theory-guided experiments examining specific cause and effects relationships are replicated, the results are similar and sometimes identical. Second, drawing from Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz's (2006) work, this study's inference do not depend on capturing the attitudes of any specialized decision making groups such as military officers, local or national political representatives, because the latter often have been shown to make a substantially different decision than the normal student population. Third, as

[215] This is controlled by applying the recently developed Qualtrics/Mechanical Turk Protocol (Burleigh, Kennedy, and Clifford's (2018). Respondents will also have to indicate their state of residence.
[216] These measures will substantially decrease the possibility that the respondents in India are providing fraudulent answers by using software for automatic responses.
[217] List of the Universities: University of Nigeria Southwest; University of Abuja; North-Central University of Agriculture Abeokuta; Lagos State University; Niger Delta University; Delta State University Abraka;
[218] The sampling was originally planned to be in person. However, due to the Pandemic, the students were contacted via their official university WhatsApp group profiles. The collection of the responses was conducted with guidance and collaboration from local academics.

Tomz (2007) and Bakker (2017) point out, convenience and student samples on average tend to consist of more motivated, politically active, and educated respondents than the particular country's general population do offer benefits. Most notably, the easily comparable results to other studies and the mapping of the views of countries' active civilians, which are more likely to influence the government due to their higher education and their better socio-economic status. As an illustration, the vignettes were presented to the study's Indian and Nigerian respondents were all in English, as the small pilot studies demonstrated well-developed skills in the language across both sample populations. Furthermore, the majority of the Indian and Nigerian respondents indicated that they are currently pursuing university degrees or, for the Indian sample, have already graduated.

Experimental Results

If the article's theoretical expectations are correct, the results from experiment one on domestic security crises should present evidence in support of two patterns of behavior. First, the majority of the respondents should be more likely to support[219] their national leader for the policy of engaging the rebel group while imposing audience costs among those treatment groups in which the leader has decided to back down after issuing a threat. Second, the cues treatments would moderate the size of the audience costs relative to the baseline condition in which the leader is

[219] Reward their leader.

inconsistent by backing down while initiating negotiations with the rebel group. To test the hypotheses, the study relies on logistic regression[220] using a binary variable to capture the level of approval coded as one and disapproval coded as zero of the leader's handling of the security crisis. The results are further tested across several subsets of the samples to evaluate the robustness of the findings. All models control for respondents' age, gender, education, income, party affiliation, leader approval, militarism, and political engagement. The findings are discussed below.

Table 11: Leader Approval Base Treatment Effects by Experimental Condition in Percentages

Scenario	India Experiment 1	India Experiment 2	Nigeria Experiment 3
Back Down and Attempt Negotiations	82.0 (86.9-96.7)	78.7 (71.2-86.3)	16.0 (10.0-22.2)
Engage Win	91.8 (74.7-89.3)	94.6 (90.0-98.8)	34.5 (26.6-42.4)
Engage Lose	NA[221]	85.4 (79.2-91.6)	32.3 (24.5-40.0)
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations	NA[222]	77.0 (69.1.-85.0)	NA[223]

Note: The Table reports the base treatment effects in percentage across each of the scenarios. The percentages in each column may not sum to 100 because they are rounded. The ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in the parentheses. The perception indicates the proportion of respondents who have chosen to support their leader's handling of the domestic security crisis.

[220] The results also generally remain the same if OLS regression models are used for the analysis.
[221] This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 1 India.
[222] This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 1 India.
[223] This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 3 Nigeria.

Findings: Backing Down and Attempting Negotiations (H1)

The findings present robust support for hypothesis (H1), stating that leaders who back down during the escalation phases of domestic security crises dealing with non-state armed actors such as rebels are more likely to suffer public disapproval and reputational costs. Table 11 outlines the base treatment effects presented in percentages across the experimental conditions of the three survey experiments. I find that in experiment one and experiment two, on average, Indians are about 10% and 16% more supportive of leaders who have engaged the rebel group as a result of their escalation compared to backing down and attempting negotiations with the armed non-state actor. The baseline treatment effect among Nigerians also supports hypothesis one (H1) as they are on average 18.5% more likely to approve of their leaders who decide to engage the rebel group compared to backing down and attempting negotiations. On the other hand, and as expected, the treatment effect is smaller, amounting to approximately 7% among those Indian respondents in experiment 2 who were informed that their leader had used the security forces and army units, but the operation was largely unsuccessful. In contrast, Nigerians' level of support remains practically the same despite that they were informed of the unsuccessful security operation initiated by their leader. Turning to the last substantial treatment effect, it can be observed that the Indian respondent in experiment two demonstrates the same amount of support for a leader who have decided to deal with the escalation by staying out, while attempting negotiations with the rebel group. Before we turn to the regression model, it is important to observe that the Indian respondent consistently indicate higher levels of baseline support for their leaders across the scenarios ranging from 79 to 95% approval of their leader's handling of the crises. Compared to Indians' high levels of support for their leaders in the context of domestic security crises, Nigerians' support for their leader, even

in the context of crises, is substantially lower, ranging from 16 to 35%. Such discrepancies are discussed in the conclusion, together with suggestions for future research.



Figure 12: Main Effects – Public Support for the Leader in Domestic Security Crises. Dependent variables: Leader Approval and Vote

Note: Figure 12 presents the logistic regression result with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down while attempting to initiate negotiations. The results are presented in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals, while controlling for respondents' level of militarism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader. The regression result from the Stay Out treatment group are presented in Appendix C.3.

Turning to Figure 12, I formally test whether the treatment effects are statistically significant using logistic regression models which control for respondents' demographic and political covariates. The baseline group for all presented Modules in Figure 12 is the scenario in which the country's

leader has decided to back down while attempting to initiate negotiations with the rebels after the latter has not complied with the former's public threats. The results from experiment one in India (India 1) provide evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1), stating that the Indian public will impose audience costs upon their leaders if they back down against proactive rebel groups in domestic security crises during escalation phrases of the confrontation, compared to those that engage in a successful military operation.

The results from experiment two in India (India 2) and experiment three in Nigeria (Nigeria 3) provide robust evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1). There are no consistently significant treatment effects among the sections of respondents presented with the scenario in which their leader has conducted an unsuccessful military operation against the rebels. The only exception is the result from the Nigerian experiment three, as its respondents are significantly more likely to approve of leaders who have conducted an unsuccessful military operation compared to the baseline. Even after controlling for respondents who have passed the post-treatment manipulation check and repeating the results on a subset of Non-Tamils[224], the results still provide robust support for hypothesis one (H1).

Findings: The Effects of Elite and Social Group Endorsement Cues[225]

To start with, Figure 13 presents the main effects from experiment one with baseline treatment in which the Indian prime minister backs down while initiating negotiations, thus not sending the

[224] See Appendix C.3.
[225] The cue treatments were included only in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 among the study's Indian participants.

army to engage the rebel group. Overall, the results from the one-sided party endorsement do not present robust evidence in support of hypothesis two (H2)'s claim as the party endorsements by the INC, or the BJP fails to significantly moderate respondents to approval rates, willingness to vote, and be more likely to say that the country or the prime minister's reputation has improved because of the latter's handling of the crisis. Despite the cues, the regression results demonstrate robust support for hypothesis one (H1) by indicating that leaders are significantly more likely to suffer from audience costs when they decide to back down while initiating negotiations compared to engaging the rebel group by starting a security operation. In contrast, Figure 13 show that endorsement message in the form of social group cues, part of experiment two, can significantly moderate respondents' willingness to penalize or reward their leader based on his handling of the security crisis. For instance, respondents are more likely to approve of their leader's decision to stay out and initiate negotiations as a result of being informed that their politically likeminded fellow citizens support the Indian prime minister's decision. On the other hand, the bipartisan endorsement cues fail to induce consistent preference shifts and negate the core audience costs effects across the three treatment groups. Thus, on average, across the cue treatments, the results from experiments one and two suggest that social group cues are better able to moderate respondents' level of approval or disapproval of their leaders during domestic security crises.



Figure 13: Main Effects – Cue Effects on the Public Support for their Leader in Domestic Security Crises. Dependent variables: Leader Approval

Note: Figure 13 presents the logistic regression result from experiments one and two with binary dependent variables measuring respondents' willingness to approve of their leader's handling of the crisis. The baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down while attempting to initiate negotiations. The results are presented in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while controlling for respondents' level of militarism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader.

Next, in Tables 113 and 114[226], the results are shown as a subset of the treatment effect among BJP and INC supporters. Table 113 records that BJP supporters are significantly more likely to approve of a prime minister who engages and uses force against the rebels, thus capturing the theoretically expected result. However, despite the BJP endorsement of the leader's handling of the crises, the results do not show that the party's supporters are more likely to support their leader

[226] See Appendix C.3.

across the two scenarios – backing down while initiating negotiations and engage. The results provide additional evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1), as INC supporters are more likely to approve and indicate that the leader's decision to engage the rebels has improved his and the country's reputation. Surprisingly, INC supporters' level of approval, willingness to vote and perception of the country's reputation do not seem to be significantly affected by the INC's endorsement of the leader's actions. On the contrary, Tables 123 and 124[227] provide more support for hypothesis one's (H1) claim of the non-partisan logic of audience costs. Two exceptions are worth noting. In particular, the BJP party endorsement of the leader seems to have significantly affected INC supporters' willingness to vote for leaders who have decided to engage the rebels. Nonetheless, at the same time, the INC supporters are adamant that their leaders who have decided to engage the rebels have damaged their reputation. Overall, the results from experiment one suggests that single-party cues/endorsements could, in some cases, moderate the opinion of India's partisan supporters. In short, the single party endorsement cue treatments fail to consistently affect the public's level of approval, intent to vote, and reputational costs for the country and the prime minister during the escalation phases of domestic security crises. Hence, it can be argued that leaders not acting decisively with force against armed non-state actors during the escalation phases of domestic security crises are likely to suffer from lower approval ratings and a lower voting base, and a damaged reputation across the partisan divide despite the pro-government messages of endorsement.

When testing the results on the subset of respondents who support either the BJP or the INC the initial patterns remain robust and thus support hypothesis one (H1), as they are more likely to

[227] See Appendix C.3

approve of the prime minister's decision to engage, resulting in a successful military operation against the rebels.[228] Alternatively, in the scenario in which the prime minister has decided to stay out, BJP supporters have indicated that such a strategy will damage the prime minister's reputation, perhaps due to damaging his image of a resolute leader. In contrast, in the same scenario in which the prime minister decides to stay out and try a diplomatic approach towards the rebels, INC supporters do seem to be reacting differently as they are more likely to vote for such a leader. Nonetheless, despite the two results, both BJP and INC supporters are adamant in their support for leaders who engaged the rebels, despite that the military operation ends unsuccessfully for the Indian army. Hence, the underlying importance of leaders to act aggressively during the escalation phase to consolidate the feeling of resolve while acting to punish the rebel group, despite the potential to increase the support for the rebel group further.

To further evaluate the robustness of audience costs' main effects and the cue's moderating effect, I test whether the main findings retain their direction and significance among respondents self-identifying as Hindus or those who have passed the post-treatment manipulation check.[229] The results reconfirm the main effects, strongly suggesting that there are no heterogeneous treatment effects based on religion or those participants who have successfully passed the manipulation check. Lastly, I conducted additional analyses in the Appendix exploring the possibility that the effects are driven by those respondents that have not passed the manipulation check. After excluding all participants who have failed the post-treatment manipulation check I find that the

[228] See Appendix C.3.
[229] See Appendix C.3.

results are identical and present no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects based on religion or those participants who have successfully passed the post-treatment manipulation check.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study's results have several implications for audience cost and the public opinion literature. First, following on the rich set of experimental studies on audience costs,[230] the study, tested for the first time and found support for the theory's main claim that leaders who back down while initiating negotiations are likely to experience decreased approval ratings and incur reputational and electoral costs in the context of domestic security crises. The results from this exploratory study demonstrated that in the context of domestic security crises,[231] Indians and Nigerians tend to be more willing to support leaders who have engaged the rebels regardless of whether the operation has been unsuccessful or successful compared to backing down or choosing a more diplomatic approach by staying out. The results also highlighted that the dynamic, magnitude and direction of the audience costs incurred by leaders who engage the aggressor country in international crises in either a successful or not engagements are largely identical to that of the domestic crises. In short, the findings reconfirm previous studies by Levendusky and Horwitz (2012), Lupton (2018), and Evers, Fisher, and Schaff (2019) that voters tend to impose audience costs predominantly in a non-partisan manner in situations of national importance.

[230] (Tomz, 2007; Quek, 2017; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013; Kertzer & Brutger, 2017; Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 2019).
[231] As in International Security Crises.

The study's result adds to the literature by suggesting that leaders perhaps need to be equally careful with the swings in public approval and have incentives to avoid making false threats, as they could be caught bluffing and thus suffer from domestic repercussions (Tomz, 2009; Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013; Quek, 2017). Specifically, during escalation phases of domestic security crises, the public's opinion might affect leaders' behavior to a significant level because the opposing non-state armed actor's attempts to improve their bargaining position by signaling determination. Such escalation phases initiated by the armed group often possibly trigger rally-behind the flag phenomena, which makes any concession to the rebels in the form of negotiations unlikely to be approved by the angry public eager for retaliation and punishment.[232] For instance, the dynamics of public approval in domestic security crises demonstrate that it might be safer for national leaders to act aggressively regardless of the results because they will incur audience costs for inconsistency such as backing down while initiating negotiations when facing an attack by a rebel group. Then the expected response by the leader cannot be mired by inconsistency and attempts at negotiations,[233] because, as the results suggest, the public will be experiencing rally around the flag and strongly disapproving of failures to engage the rebels as the latter is seen to be damaging the country's reputation and willingness to act.[234] Hence, this exploratory study offers, for the first time,[235] evidence that akin to international crises, national leaders are subject to the same incentives to avoid false threats while attempting negotiations due to the possibility of audience costs when dealing with rebel groups during the escalation phases of domestic security crises.[236]

[232] See Wayne (2019)
[233] Bluffing. See Fearon (1994).
[234] See Groeling and Baum (2008).
[235] To the best of the author's knowledge, other studies have not tested the directional effect of peoples view on military assertiveness and domestic security issues such as rebel groups through the lenses of audience cost theory.
[236] As already mentioned, loss of seats in the national assembly, loss of popularity, loss of power, or regime change.

Second, the study examined the moderating effects of social group cues and the effects of elite cues in the form of one-party endorsements and bipartisan endorsements on Indian voters' willingness to impose audience costs on national leaders based on their handling of the domestic security crisis. The results extend previous findings by suggesting that Indian respondents' attitudes are moderated by party endorsements and social group cues sharing their political views [237] similar to American and European constituencies (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998). For instance, regardless of their partisanship, the study found that Indian voters tend to disapprove of leaders who have decided to back down and being inconsistent, thus further corroborating the cross-country validity of audience costs theory (Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Tomz, 2007; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 2019). The absence of consistent effect from the one-sided party endorsement on respondents' willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader presents additional evidence of the importance of reputation, credibility, and resolve as already identified by scholars such as Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth (2014), Kagan (1995), Tang (2005), Tingley and Walter (2011). On the other hand, bipartisan party endorsements [238] seem to have consistent on participants notion of national interests resulting in the reduction of the expected partisan effects as the respondents support the leader's actions regardless of the scenario.[239] Also, and even to a large extent, the study's results

[237] See (see Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).
[238] Defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009).
[239] See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999).

clearly indicate the potential of social group cues to affect the public's willingness to impose audience costs upon their leaders or approve of their actions.

Comparing the effects of the one-party endorsements with the bipartisan party endorsements, it is apparent that the former has a significantly weaker effect on respondents' choices in the context of audience costs scenarios[240] thus, replicating some of the results by Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019). Building upon the work by Dempsey (1987), Zaller (1992), Berinsky (2009), Entman (2004), Jordan and Page (1992), Page and Shapiro (2010), Bullock (2011), Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) by accounting for the effect of one party, bipartisan, and social group endorsement cues, this study adds more empirical evidence on the interaction of audience costs and elite cues' transformative influence upon the public's attitudes in the context of security issues.

Consequently, the study offers additional insights into when leaders might have incentives to use force and whether they can afford to escalate or not, as they will be aware of the electoral costs of inconsistency. Backing down and attempting negotiations with the rebel group/s perceived as the weaker side can be particularly detrimental for the leader's approval rating as in such crises, the public is likely to experience "rally-behind the flag phenomena," making any concessions to the rebels hardly acceptable. The study provides further insights on the conditions under which the public's position can shift and when such efforts will fail to sway the support of the masses in the intended direction by comparing the effects of party and bipartisan cues. Lastly, the results provide a fresh look upon governments' decision to use force during the escalation phases in domestic security crises such as the protest movement in Hong Kong, the separatist groups in Catalonia and

[240] See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013).

Cameroon, the Philippines' military operations against the Islamic militants, or the Indonesian state's crackdown of the renewed secessionist movements in West Papua.

The study has several limitations, which I acknowledge could pose questions about the validity of the results. Notably, the convenience samples, the oversampling of the Tamil minority, the more educated and politically engaged. The severity of the problem is diminished because the principal results remain robust when performing all the analyses on a subset of the samples accounting only for the non-Tamils, despite the reduced number of participants. In addition, closely following Tomz's (2007; 2009) argument, taking into account respondents demonstrating high levels of political awareness, the result remains robust. The rationale is that citizens with higher levels of political awareness and education tend to be the politically active citizens and are more consequential to the probability that the leader will suffer audience costs and likely better represent what would be the public's reaction. The second issue of concern is that the study does not capture the effect of single or bipartisan party endorsements opposing the actions of the leader during the security crisis. Third, it is not clear whether the Indian respondents' will associate the hypothetical rebel group in central India with the Maoist rebels and how this could affect their responses[241]. Also, due to the increased levels of national fever, partisanship, and the country's recent military interstate disputes with Pakistan[242] and China,[243] the support for hawkish policies might increase, and subjects should be more willing to punish their leader for backing down, while the latter, might increase the Indians susceptibility to elite cues from groups which share their political ideology.

[241] The former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly urged for national unity to tackle the Maoists threat for domestic security; see https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-security-Manmohan/article16302952.ece
[242] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-idUSKCN1QG0IR
[243] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/india-china-border-clashes.html

Forth, it is unclear how India and Nigeria's active rebel groups might affect the responses attitudes of the participants due to the lack of public opinion studies on the issue. In particular pertaining to the scenarios depicting a domestic security crisis, this study does not claim that it strictly satisfies all the formal conditions of audience costs theory nor that it tests the classic type of the theory traditionally applied to model international military crises.[244] I fully acknowledge that transferring the theoretical postulates and assumptions of audience cost theory to domestic security crises faces the limitation that non-state actors such as rebel groups might not be subject to the same amount of audience cost as the country's leader, if at all. Regardless, there is clear evidence that rebel groups also have to manage their public image and reputation for resolve in order to keep their mobilization efforts productive and improve their bargaining position. Therefore, the results from the study are to be interpreted cautiously and viewed primarily as exploratory, attempting to evaluate the workings and microfoundations of audience costs theory during the escalation phases of domestic security crises compared to international ones.

Future work on the relationship between audience cost and domestic security threats such as rebel groups could proceed in several different directions. First, audience cost theory's applicability to domestic security crises can be tested in additional democratic states, which can further speak to the external and internal validity of the microfoundations of theory and that they are not country specific. The reason is that the attribution of audience costs could vary based on the non-state armed groups' characteristics and whether their actions are perceived to be a serious threat by the public. Second, as Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019) point,

[244] As originally designed by Fearon (1994)

scholars can test whether leaders could avoid audience cost by justifying their decision on new information to the public in non-western democracies.[245] Countries of especial interest are Russia, Columbia, Turkey, Algeria, Mexico, Kenia, Brazil, and Indonesia due to their history of fighting non-state armed groups with periods of escalation of violence and signaling by the latter. Third, studies can disentangle the empirical claim that citizens have pre-determined policy preferences and whether they are willing to impose audience costs on their leader due to belligerency or inconsistency concerns during the crisis is inconsequential to their level of approval or disproval (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016). Fourth, more work is needed to test the effects on respondents' willingness to impose audience costs after being informed about the position of international institutions,[246] which have been shown to affect domestic political attitudes[247]. Lastly, future work should comparatively explore the effect of contradicting party cues, making the leader's party affiliation explicit to participants, vary the strength of the non-state actor[248], and its political objectives on the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of the leader's handling of the domestic security crisis.[249]

[245] For research exploring how leaders' justification influences the public see (Gowa, 1999; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Saunders, 2015). For instance, the leader could argue that the government-backed down because that was the right strategic decision to make.
[246] Such as the United Nations or a regional security organization.
[247] (Dragojlovic, 2013, 2015; Hayes & Guardino, 2013; Linos, 2011; Murray, 2014; Chapman, 2011; Chapman & Reiter, 2004).
[248] As the evidence demonstrates that armed groups perceived as weak lead to less fear, anxiety, and the resulting demand by the public for a more authoritarian hardline response (see Wayne, 2018).
[249] Such work has been done in foreign policy crises by (Gelpi & Feaver, & Reifler, 2009; Mueller, 1971; Gartner, 1997).

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CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION

Using the theoretical frameworks of audience cost and the prospect theory, this dissertation project aimed to shed light on the extent to which elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to embrace their leader's actions during domestic and international security crises. Through the work to answer this often central question in the international relations and public opinion literatures, several cautious conclusions and suggestions for future work can be made.

First, the results from paper one demonstrated that when interacting prospect theory's framing effects outperform those of the elite and social group cues and consistently shapes the American public's willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of humanitarian interventions. Also, in paper one, the study found that the expected effects of partisanship on respondents' susceptibility to party and social peer group endorsements compared to the frames of gains or losses. In short, the results do not provide evidence in support of the expected heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents' party affiliation or political ideology.

Second, in paper two, using the framework of audience costs theory, the study examined the extent to which elite and social group cues moderate public approval of their leaders' actions during security crises among Indians. Similar to the American participants, the results from paper two indicated that cues from elites or social groups do not consistently induce preference shifts in Indians' willingness to punish their leader for backing down or engaging in an unsuccessful military interstate dispute against another country. Consequently, casting further doubt about these

endorsement messages' potential to induce consistent preference shifts among the public during international security crises as political elites and social peer groups often use them. On the other hand, the findings of paper two suggest that the attitudes of the Indian participants are sometimes moderated by the elite and social group endorsement cues in a similar fashion to their American and European counterparts. In particular, the elite cue presented as bipartisan endorsements were able to induce strong notions of national interest among the public and, as expected, reduced the core effects of audience costs by moderating participants' choices toward the position held by their party regardless of the actions of the given Indian leader. Conversely, in a similar manner, the social group cue effects demonstrated that respondents do look for information from groups that share their political preferences, and they are likely to somewhat moderate their attitudes based on their peer group. Therefore, despite their underperformance than theoretically expected, the results do suggest that bipartisan and social group cues moderate respondents' approval levels, willingness to vote, and perception of an improved reputation of the country and that of their prime minister across a number of scenarios depicting international security crises.

In paper three, this dissertation project provided further novel empirical evidence on the comparative effects and ability of elite and social group cues to moderate and induce preference shifts among the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's handling of domestic security crises. Again, drawing on survey experiments in India, the results cautiously suggest that despite the tactical use of positive elite and social group endorsement cues aimed at convincing the public approve of their leader's actions during the domestic security crisis, the latter are still highly susceptible to reputational costs if they back down to attempt negotiations. The absence of consistent effect from the one-sided party endorsement on respondents' willingness to approve or disapprove of their leaders presents additional evidence of the importance of reputation,

credibility, and resolve during domestic security crises. On the other hand, bipartisan party endorsements seem to more consistently moderate participants' notion of national interests resulting in the reduction of the expected partisan effects as the respondents support the leader's actions across the different scenarios. Also, to a large extent, the study's results indicate the potential of the often underappreciated bottom-up dynamics of social group cues to affect the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's actions. Therefore, the findings reconfirm previous studies demonstrating that, even in domestic security crises, regardless of whether they have been presented with a contradictory single party, bipartisan, or social group cue, the public most often tend to impose audience costs predominantly in a non-partisan manner in situations involving national security and their country's reputation for resolve.

Overall, this dissertation project improves our understanding of the microfoundations and mesofoundations, determining the public's willingness to support the use of force in the broader context of prospect theory and audience costs. Moreover, the dissertation presents evidence that the tactical use of elite and social group cues might not be particularly effective in situations involving national security interests as these information signals might moderate but seem to be unable to consistently induce preference shifts in the public's attitudes during domestic and international security crises. My claim is not that single party, bipartisan, or social group endorsement cues do are unable to induce consistent preference shifts among the public. On the contrary, the experimental results primarily suggest the need for more work to establish the domain-specific effect of these endorsement messages as there are only partially explaining the public's tendency to support or oppose actions of their leader during international and domestic security crises.

Furthermore, the three papers demonstrate the utility of null results, which can stimulate the additional refinement of theoretical frameworks while presenting substantive empirical findings. Specifically, the study's results indicate the need for careful mapping of the specific issues and domains among which elite and social group cues tend to manifest stronger effects able to induce preference shifts or more consistent moderation of the American and Indian public's attitudes. Likewise, the inability of partisan affiliation to consistently moderate or produce preferences shift among the study's American and Indian respondents in the context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, international and domestic security crises does suggest that when country's security and its reputation for resolve are at stake endorsement messages in the form of cues are mostly ineffective. Also, the comparative effects of elite and social group cues and their ability to moderate the public attitudes across countries, situations, and policy issues clearly illustrated that scholars should include the latter more systematically in their work. Hence, scholars need to regularly incorporate the bottom-up dynamics of social group cues as they can no longer primarily focus on the top-down elite cue-driven models when examining these messages' effects on the public's decisions to support or oppose their leaders' foreign and domestic security policies.

APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 2 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

A.1 Sample Characteristics

Experiments on Mturk have not been without their critics. Nonetheless, there are several positives and negatives in using the online tool survey of Mechanical Turk. The first being that researchers can gather survey data from thousands of online respondents at lower costs and for a shorter period than any other tool currently (Berinsky & Huber & Lenz, 2011). Positive number two is that in studies using Mechanical Turk, the unrepresentativeness of the drawn samples can be decreased to a minimum by increasing the quota of respondents from specific categories the researcher has detected to be underrepresented. This possibility makes generalizable inferences more valid, reliable, subject to replication, and a valuable addition to student samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015).[250] For instance, Levay, Freese, and Druckman (2016) compare population-based samples and those drawn from the Mechanical Turk and find that by increasing the number of participants from the relevant and unrepresented religious, political, or ethno/religious group can significantly improve the level of representativeness of the sample and increase the validity of experimental scholars' inferences.

Meanwhile, Amazon's Mechanical Turk has also received a large amount of criticism from the literature (Levay & Freese & Druckman, 2016). The fundamental drawbacks are that studies using it tend on average to collect samples that often can be slightly unrepresentative of countries population in terms of demographic (younger), political ideology of respondents (more liberal), and the possibility of fraudulent use by some workers (Gerber & Huber & Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Huber & Hill & Lenz, 2012; Huber & Paris, 2013; Leeper & Freese, & Druckman, 2015). This study reduces the problems of oversampling more liberal leaning workers on Mechanical Turk by deliberate sampling a practically identical number of self-identifying democrats (40.63%) and republicans (38.66%).

Scholars have also pointed at the possibility that Mechanical Turk's pay rates affect its workers' work quality. However, a study by Andersen and Lau (2018) addresses this criticism by present evidence from two different social science studies. Their results demonstrate that pay rates used in

[250] Combining student samples with mechanical Turk samples can provide benefits as similar results from both populations could provide valuable insights and increase the validity of the experimental findings.

Mechanical Turk do not systematically affect the quality of respondents' work. This study compensated the workers with $0.70 dollar cents for their participation lasting on average 12-13 minutes. Another source of concerns is the practice of individuals permanently living outside of the US to use Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to participate in studies limited only to US residents. To avoid the dangers of such fraudulent participants, this study applied Burleigh, Kennedy, and Clifford's (2018) recently developed Qualtrics/Mechanical Turk Protocol for screening out international respondents using VPS.

Turning to the sample characteristics, the paper operates with one student sample (referred to as experiment 1) consisting of 387 respondents from a large public university in the United States and one nation national sample (referred to as experiment 2) of American adults amounting to 1622 respondents. In experiment one, males account for 39.53 percent of the sample, while in experiment two, males account for 53.88 percent of the respondent pool. Experiment 1 demographic structure consists of 10.59% white respondents, 25.06% African American, 11.37% Asian, 14.73% Native American, Biracial 16.28%, and 25.96% have chosen not to indicate their race/ethnicity or to select other. While overall in experiment one 108 respondents or 27.91% identify as Latino/Hispanic.

Table 12: Experiment 1 Student Sample

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	96.90
	30-39	1.55
	40-49	1.03
	50+	Less than 1
Ethnicity	White	10.59
	Black	25.06
	Biracial	16.28
	Asian	11.37
	Native American	14.73
	Other	21.96
Education	High School or below	41.86
	Some College	55.56
	Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree	2.58
Income	Less than $25,000	88.89

	$25,000 to $35,000	2.84
	$35,000 to $50,000	3.62
	$50,000 to $75,000	2.07
	$75,000 to $100,000	0.78
	Over $100,000	1.81
Political affiliation	Democrat	53.75
	Independent	18.09
	Republican	28.17
Gender	Women	60.21
	Men	39.53
Ideology	Conservative	24.29
	Moderate	32.56
	Liberal	42.15

Note: Total number of respondents = 387

The Mechanical Turk Sample (Experiment 2) closely follows the national demographic structure consists of 72.75% White, 13.75% as African-American, 6.78% Asian, less than one percent Native American, 4.01% Biracial, and 2.34% have not identified their ethnicity or race. In contrast to Experiment 2, approximately 14% (228) of the respondent identify as Latino/Hispanic. Both experiments 1 and 2 include more liberals 42.15% and 41.47%, moderates 32.56% and 23.30%, while conservatives' amount to 24.29% and 35.33, respectively. Respondents' partisanship affiliation in experiments 1 and 2 consists of 53.75% and 40.63% identifying as democrats, 18.09% and 20.72% independents, and 28.17 and 38.66% republicans.

Table 13: Experiment 2 Mechanical Turk Sample

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	25.15
	30-39	36.74
	40-49	19.42
	50-59	11.28
	60+	7.40

Ethnicity	White	72.75
	Black	13.75
	Biracial	4.00
	Asian	6.78
	Native American and Other	Less than 3
Education	High School or below	12.27
	Some College	72.26
	Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree	15.47
Income	Less than $25,000	22.44
	$25,000 to $35,000	14.18
	$35,000 to $50,000	20.41
	$50,000 to $75,000	22.81
	$75,000 to $100,000	11.90
	Over $100,000	8.26
Political affiliation	Democrat	40.63
	Independent	20.72
	Republican	38.66
Gender	Women	60.21
	Men	39.53
Ideology	Conservative	35.33
	Moderate	23.30
	Liberal	41.47

Note: Total number of respondents = 1622

A.2 List of the Treatments

Treatments	Domains	Cues	Student Sample	Mechanical Turk Sample
1	Gains	Elite Cue Democrat A[251]	29	115
2	Losses	Elite Cue Democrat A	28	115
3	Gains	Elite Cue Republican A	28	116
4	Losses	Elite Cue Republican A	29	116
5	Gains	Elite Cue Democrat B	27	117
6	Losses	Elite Cue Democrat B	27	116
7	Gains	Elite Cue Republican B	25	117
8	Losses	Elite Cue Republican B	28	116
9	Gains	Social Cue A	29	116
10	Losses	Social Cue A	28	115
11	Gains	Social Cue B	26	116
12	Losses	Social Cue B	28	116
13	Gains	No Social or Elite Cue	27	116
14	Losses	No Social or Elite Cue	28	115

[251] A – indicates the risk-averse policy option, while B – indicates the risk-acceptant policy option

A.3 Questionnaire

[Demographic questions]

Q How old are you?

- 18-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60+

Q What is your biological (genetic) sex

- Male
- Female
- Other

Q What gender do you currently identify with

- Male
- Female
- Other
- Prefer Not to Answer

Q Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

- Strong Democrat
- Weak Democrat
- Independent Democrat
- Independent
- Independent Republican
- Weak Republican
- Strong Republican
- Very strong Republican

Q Do you agree or disagree with the US president’s decision to impose sanctions on Russia? This question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say" below as a sign that you are paying attention.

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Slightly Agree
- Prefer not to say
- Slightly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Q What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Less than High School Diploma
- High school Diploma
- Some College or Associate's Degree
- College/University Bachelor's Degree
- Graduate/Professional School Degree

Q What is your race/ethnicity?

- African American/Black
- Asian
- Caucasian/White
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- Biracial
- Other
- Prefer not to say

Q Do you consider your ethnicity to be Hispanic/Latino(a)?

- Yes
- No

Q What is your annual income?

- Less than $25,000
- $25,000 to 35,000
- $35,000 to 50,000
- $50,001 to 75,000
- $75,001 to 100,000
- Over $100,000

Q Have you migrated to the United States or you were born here[252]

- I migrated
- I was born in the United States
- Prefer not to answer

Q How would you describe yourself politically?

- Very liberal
- Liberal/Progressive
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Very Conservative

Q Did you vote in the 2016 presidential elections?

- Yes
- No

Q For which candidate did you vote in the 2016 Presidential Elections

- Donald Trump
- Hilary Clinton
- Other
- I did not vote
- Prefer not to answer

Q Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

	Never	One Time	Sometimes	Several Times	On a Regular Basis
Worked for a political campaign	○	○	○	○	○
Donate money to a political campaign	○	○	○	○	○
Served in a community board	○	○	○	○	○
Organize to solve a community problem	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted a government official	○	○	○	○	○
Participated in a political gathering or rally.	○	○	○	○	○

Q How closely do you follow national politics

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat Closely
- Not too Closely
- Not at all

Q How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat Closely
- Not too Closely
- Not at all

Next, you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and the US's role in the international political system. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

Q The best way a country can ensure its security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential international challengers.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q To what extent do you agree that the United States is superior compared to other nations?

- Strongly agree
- Agree

- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q To what extent do you agree that some things the United States has done in the recent past made you feel ashamed.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
American culture	○	○	○	○	○	○
Race/Ethnicity	○	○	○	○	○	○
Religion	○	○	○	○	○	○
Language	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q The United States should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved in other nations' conflicts

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

In the next lines, you will read about five political situations that the US government currently faces or might face in the future and asked to choose a plan of action for each of them. Please read them carefully.

[Subjects are presented with the five scenarios in a randomized order.]

[Decision problem 1 Fictional Scenario in the country of Aboria of East-Africa]

A congressional committee is discussing the situation in the country of Aboria. Currently, the country's rural areas are plagued by warring ethnic groups fighting for control of resources, and the authoritarian leader of Aboria has been unwilling to control them. The country's is also experiencing food shortages further aggravated by the political instability and intergroup violence that prevents aid agencies from reaching civilians, placing about 50,000 lives at risk. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving 1500 U.S troops. [*Social Cue] In addition a recent public opinion poll the majority of people with your political views have strongly [supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] For reference, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B*

[Domain of Gains]

If plan A is selected,

About 1300 U.S. troops return home safely from the intervention, and their presence may save about 30,000 civilian lives in Aboria.

If plan B is selected,

There is an 80% chance that about 1400 U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention and their presence may save around 50,000 civilians lives in Aboria, but a 20% chance that about 1200 U.S. troops will return home safely, and around 10,000 civilian lives in Aboria will be lost.

[Domain of Losses]

If plan A is selected,

About 100 U.S. troops may die, be wounded, or be captured in the operation, and about 5000 civilians' lives in Aboria will be lost.

If plan B is selected,

There is an 80% chance that U.S. troops will sustain no casualties, and no civilians lives in Aboria will be lost, but a 20% chance that about 300 U.S. troops will not return home safely, and instead will die in combat, be wounded, or be captured, and around 10,000 civilian lives in Aboria will be lost.

Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose

- Strongly support plan A
- Mostly Support Plan A
- Somewhat support plan A
- Neither Plan
- Somewhat support plan B
- Mostly Support Plan B
- Strongly support plan B

Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its national security interests will suffer because instability will create a breeding ground for terrorists.

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Decision problem 2 Venezuela]

A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Venezuela. The South American country is experiencing a severe economic and political crisis. For the past several years, the opposition party in Venezuela has been pushing for reforms in the economy to stop the food crisis in the country. So far, the pro-government paramilitary units have killed approximately 56 protesters trying to open the border crossing for humanitarian aid. The leader of Venezuela has proposed policies, including arrests, to limit the influence of the opposition movement which endangers the lives of about 5000 civilians. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving 2500 U.S troops. *[Social Cue] Interestingly in a recent public opinion poll the majority of people with your political views have strongly [supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] For reference, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B*

[Domain of Gains]

If plan A is selected,

About 2400 U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention and their presence may save around 3000 Venezuelan civilian lives.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 95% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention and their presence may save around 5000 Venezuelan civilian lives, and a 5% chance that about 2300 U.S. troops will return home safely, and about 3000 Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.

[Domain of Losses]

If plan A is selected,

About 150 U.S. troops may die, be wounded or be captured during the operation, and about 500 Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 95% chance that the U.S. troops will sustain no casualties, and no Venezuelan civilians' lives will be lost, and a 5% chance that about 200 U.S. troops will die in combat, be wounded, or be captured, and around 2000 Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.

Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose

- Strongly support plan A
- Mostly support plan A
- Somewhat support plan A
- Neither plan
- Somewhat support plan B
- Mostly support plan B
- Strongly support plan B

Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its national security interests will suffer because of a spillover of violence into neighboring countries.

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Decision problem 3 Cameroon]

A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Cameroon (a country in Central Africa). The Cameroonian population is divided between two groups: the English-speaking minority and the French-speaking majority. Recently the majority has taken control of most of the positions of power in the country, resulting in rising tensions to which the military has responded with reprisals against villages part of the English-speaking minority. Due to the anarchic situation and an

estimated 20,000 lives are at risk. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving the deployment of 1000 U.S. troops. [Social Cue] Similarly, in the latest public opinion poll the majority of people with your political views have strongly [supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] For reference, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B

[Domain of Gains]

If plan A is selected,

About 900 U.S. troops will return home safely, and many as 15,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be saved.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 67% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely, and 20,000 Cameroonian civilians' lives will be saved. But also, there is a 33% chance that about 850 U.S. troops will return home safely, and about 10,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be lost.

[Domain of Losses]

If plan A is selected,

About 100 U.S. troops will not return home safely and as many as 8,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be lost.

If plan B is selected,

There is a 67% chance that all US troops will return home safely, and no Cameroonian civilians will be lost. But also, there is a 33% chance that about 150 U.S. troops will not return home safely and around 15,000 Cameroonian lives will be lost.

Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose

- Strongly support plan A
- Mostly support plan A

  Somewhat support plan A
- Neither plan
- Somewhat support plan B
- Mostly support plan B
- Strongly support plan B

Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its reputation for resolve will suffer, making it more difficult to achieve future foreign policy goals.

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Decision Problem 4 US-China Trade War]

US China G Social B The US president needs to choose and implement the type of tariffs to be imposed on China. In five days, the president must specify the type of tariff plan to be implemented as about 200,000-250,000 US jobs are at stake. The president's research team has come up with four tariff plans. [Social Cue] In the latest official opinion poll, people with your political views [support/oppose] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] Most of the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B

[Domain of Gains]

If tariff plan A is selected the US economy will create approximately 80,000 to 110, 000 jobs.

If tariff plan B is selected then there is a 90% chance that the US economy will create approximately 120,000 to 150,000 jobs, and a 10% chance that it will lose 200,000 to 220,000 jobs.

If tariff plan C is selected there is a 60% chance that the US economy will create approximately 160,000 to 190,000 jobs, and a 40% chance that no jobs are created.

If tariff plan D is selected there is a 50% chance that the US economy will create approximately 220,000 to 250,000 jobs, and a 50% chance that it will lose between 220,000 to 250,000 jobs.

[Domain of Losses]

If tariff plan A is selected the US economy will lose 80,000 to 110,000 jobs.

If tariff plan B is selected there is a 90% chance that the US economy will lose 110,000 to 150,000 to jobs, and a 10% chance that approximately 200,000 to 220,000 jobs are created.

If tariff plan C is selected there is a 60% that the US economy will lose 30,000 to 50,000 jobs, and a 40% chance that it will lose 200,000 to 220,000 jobs.

If tariff plan D is selected there is a 50% chance that the US economy will lose between 220,000 to 250,000 jobs, and a 50% chance that it will create 220,000 to 250,000 jobs.

Q Please indicate which Tariff Plan you choose?

- Tariff Plan A
- Tariff Plan B
- Tariff Plan C
- Tariff Plan D
- Neither Plan

Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT use an increase in tariffs to stop Chinese unfair trading practices its economic interests will suffer

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT use an increase in tariffs to stop Chinese unfair trading practices its security interests will suffer

- Strongly agree
- Mostly Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Mostly Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Decision problem 5 The Asian Disease Design]

The U.S. is making preparations for the outbreak of a rare Tropical disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs/plans to combat the disease have been proposed. After repeated tests of the medications, the consequences of each of the programs will be as follows. [Social Cue] In the same opinion pool, people with your political views [support/oppose] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] Officially, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B

[Domain of Gains]

If Plan A is selected: "200 people will be saved"

If Plan B is selected: "there is a 1/3 (33%) probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 (67%) probability that no people will be saved"

[Domain of Losses]

If Program A is selected: "400 people will die.

If Program B is selected: "there is a 1/3 (33%) probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 (67%) probability that 600 people will die.

Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose?

- Strongly support plan A
- Mostly support plan A
- Somewhat support plan A
- Neither plan
- Somewhat support plan B
- Mostly support plan B
- Strongly support plan B

[Post-Treatment Manipulation Checks]

Q What was the difference between the two plans across the decision problems?

- Number of casualties and relative risk
- Government debt
- Corruption

A.4 Regression Models and Robustness Checks

The Tables in Appendix IV show the results from the large Mechanical Turk sample (Experiment 2). All results shown in this section of the appendix use logistic regression models.

Table 14: Results for Aboria Main Effects

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A[253]	(3) Dem B[254]	(4) Rep A[255]	(5) Rep B[256]	(6) Group A[257]	(7) Group B[258]
Domain of Losses	5.810***	3.696***	7.698***	7.668***	4.549***	2.755***	2.727***
	(2.199)	(1.234)	(3.132)	(2.827)	(1.638)	(0.944)	(0.895)
Males	1.195	0.908	1.749	1.491	0.715	2.505***	0.966
	(0.424)	(0.293)	(0.665)	(0.552)	(0.260)	(0.893)	(0.315)
Education	1.139	1.038	0.831	1.187	0.920	1.020	0.856
	(0.126)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.132)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.084)
Age	1.022	1.107	1.184	1.060	0.941	1.020	1.132
	(0.171)	(0.151)	(0.203)	(0.177)	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.171)
Militarism	0.880	0.780	0.827	0.830	1.404	0.603	0.718
	(0.314)	(0.238)	(0.275)	(0.250)	(0.435)	(0.186)	(0.220)
Internationalism	0.967	0.907	1.303	0.972	1.329	1.210	0.899
	(0.262)	(0.251)	(0.336)	(0.287)	(0.370)	(0.309)	(0.244)
Political Awareness	0.639**	0.655**	0.395***	0.642**	0.486***	0.745	0.517***
	(0.145)	(0.119)	(0.090)	(0.134)	(0.104)	(0.151)	(0.095)
Constant	0.607	0.731	0.233	0.528	0.358	0.053***	0.472
	(0.685)	(0.652)	(0.274)	(0.634)	(0.358)	(0.053)	(0.510)
Observations	159	182	165	169	169	173	184
Pseudo R-squared	0.154	0.113	0.220	0.211	0.162	0.112	0.113

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[253] The democratic party has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.
[254] The democratic party has endorsed the risk-acceptant plan of action.
[255] The republican party has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.
[256] The republican party has endorsed the risk-acceptant plan of action.
[257] The group has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.
[258] The group has endorsed the risk-acceptant plan of action.

Table 15: Results for Venezuela Main Effects

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	7.200***	3.310***	5.589***	3.522***	6.315***	4.980***	4.436***
	(3.019)	(1.145)	(2.157)	(1.232)	(2.464)	(1.843)	(1.685)
Males	1.775	1.150	1.351	1.632	1.109	1.403	1.491
	(0.670)	(0.376)	(0.506)	(0.579)	(0.422)	(0.509)	(0.550)
Education	1.044	0.934	0.745**	0.969	0.970	0.959	0.825*
	(0.122)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.102)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.090)
Age	0.776	1.055	0.959	1.272	1.509**	1.145	1.027
	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.208)	(0.260)	(0.181)	(0.171)
Militarism	1.094	1.736*	0.864	0.888	1.694	0.814	0.410**
	(0.415)	(0.520)	(0.292)	(0.252)	(0.574)	(0.267)	(0.143)
Internationalism	0.863	1.170	0.745	1.023	0.756	1.119	1.238
	(0.251)	(0.316)	(0.191)	(0.286)	(0.221)	(0.292)	(0.370)
Political Awareness	0.613**	0.485***	0.467***	0.517***	0.499***	0.533***	0.368***
	(0.132)	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.078)
Constant	0.266	1.152	3.535	0.335	0.854	1.043	0.170
	(0.302)	(1.089)	(4.035)	(0.377)	(0.920)	(1.032)	(0.203)
Observations	179	188	167	170	171	179	186
Pseudo R-squared	0.208	0.126	0.190	0.144	0.227	0.162	0.231

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: Results for Cameroon Main Effects

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	26.195***	7.823***	9.653***	7.527***	6.502***	13.538***	10.192***
	(10.992)	(2.900)	(3.863)	(2.799)	(2.388)	(5.728)	(4.184)
Males	2.217**	0.750	3.245***	1.073	0.954	2.003*	2.968***
	(0.861)	(0.261)	(1.340)	(0.393)	(0.350)	(0.832)	(1.207)
Education	0.862	1.127	0.990	1.206*	0.926	1.083	1.061
	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.137)	(0.125)
Age	1.163	1.075	1.094	1.039	0.887	0.971	1.173
	(0.203)	(0.156)	(0.186)	(0.178)	(0.139)	(0.192)	(0.208)
Militarism	0.959	0.936	1.030	0.720	1.168	0.585	0.846
	(0.362)	(0.303)	(0.357)	(0.212)	(0.373)	(0.210)	(0.310)
Internationalism	0.755	1.275	0.795	0.792	1.208	0.933	1.061
	(0.220)	(0.374)	(0.207)	(0.235)	(0.347)	(0.281)	(0.342)
Political Awareness	0.994	0.648**	0.800	0.928	0.597**	1.110	0.423***
	(0.218)	(0.127)	(0.169)	(0.190)	(0.128)	(0.246)	(0.098)
Constant	0.400	0.190*	0.125*	0.081**	0.493	0.128*	0.018***
	(0.469)	(0.188)	(0.152)	(0.096)	(0.503)	(0.151)	(0.024)
Observations	194	176	161	172	163	172	174
Pseudo R-squared	0.346	0.188	0.226	0.177	0.162	0.257	0.259

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: Results for Trade War Main Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)

Baseline: Domain of Gains	No Cues	Dem A	Dem B	Rep A	Rep B	Group A	Group B
Domain of Losses	11.995***	3.627***	7.344***	6.639***	8.354***	5.070***	4.124***
	(4.680)	(1.196)	(2.741)	(2.384)	(2.984)	(1.695)	(1.399)
Males	1.228	1.270	1.903*	1.340	0.551*	1.160	0.974
	(0.456)	(0.405)	(0.700)	(0.475)	(0.198)	(0.393)	(0.322)
Education	0.990	0.906	1.004	1.152	0.991	0.932	0.849
	(0.108)	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.086)
Age	0.846	0.880	0.942	0.981	0.935	1.084	0.763
	(0.143)	(0.114)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.144)	(0.155)	(0.128)
Militarism	1.481	0.924	1.895*	0.629	1.098	1.160	0.703
	(0.561)	(0.270)	(0.623)	(0.194)	(0.367)	(0.365)	(0.225)
Internationalism	0.536**	1.215	1.157	0.768	1.026	0.880	0.794
	(0.148)	(0.324)	(0.277)	(0.229)	(0.288)	(0.220)	(0.219)
Political Awareness	1.212	0.696**	0.804	1.412*	0.946	0.811	1.007
	(0.254)	(0.126)	(0.158)	(0.261)	(0.176)	(0.159)	(0.172)
Constant	0.778	0.144**	0.040***	0.074**	0.550	0.188*	0.560
	(0.840)	(0.134)	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.565)	(0.188)	(0.605)
Observations	182	195	183	180	183	194	189
Pseudo R-squared	0.240	0.0877	0.164	0.159	0.180	0.119	0.108

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: Results for Asian Disease Main Effects

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	4.775***	4.977***	1.537	3.676***	2.578***	6.307***	3.007***
	(1.673)	(1.703)	(0.511)	(1.650)	(0.860)	(2.456)	(0.950)
Males	1.423	1.141	1.636	1.301	1.043	0.871	1.095
	(0.489)	(0.382)	(0.554)	(0.574)	(0.350)	(0.324)	(0.350)
Education	0.809**	0.913	0.856	0.971	1.027	1.066	0.877
	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.130)	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.085)
Age	0.819	1.049	0.873	0.681	1.046	1.016	0.998
	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.121)	(0.166)	(0.139)	(0.164)	(0.149)
Militarism	1.057	0.832	1.292	0.561*	1.440	0.860	0.919
	(0.357)	(0.256)	(0.392)	(0.196)	(0.436)	(0.287)	(0.278)
Internationalism	0.968	1.027	1.175	0.904	0.971	0.931	0.805
	(0.237)	(0.280)	(0.261)	(0.324)	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.214)
Political Awareness	0.711	0.703*	0.647**	0.651*	0.648**	0.849	0.664**
	(0.148)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.169)	(0.129)	(0.190)	(0.118)
Constant	1.389	0.051***	2.244	0.378	0.363	0.111**	0.265
	(1.484)	(0.048)	(2.292)	(0.549)	(0.350)	(0.121)	(0.282)
Observations	173	191	165	148	177	178	192
Pseudo R-squared	0.132	0.140	0.0546	0.131	0.0668	0.136	0.0813

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Democrats

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	5.565***	2.978**	26.613***	6.581***	3.491**	3.673**	2.019
	(3.217)	(1.637)	(23.919)	(4.062)	(1.966)	(2.346)	(1.188)
Males	1.607	1.588	2.094	1.772	1.216	5.010***	1.485
	(0.821)	(0.828)	(1.327)	(1.111)	(0.669)	(2.873)	(0.907)
Education	1.021	1.046	0.893	1.090	1.051	0.725*	0.713*
	(0.163)	(0.154)	(0.193)	(0.182)	(0.179)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Age	1.038	1.157	1.642*	0.881	0.977	1.157	0.725
	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.478)	(0.216)	(0.220)	(0.328)	(0.211)
Militarism	1.598	0.760	1.176	1.033	1.737	0.324**	0.756
	(1.023)	(0.418)	(0.659)	(0.521)	(0.885)	(0.168)	(0.399)
Internationalism	0.945	0.820	1.204	0.882	1.252	1.556	1.288
	(0.388)	(0.357)	(0.504)	(0.401)	(0.618)	(0.720)	(0.598)
Political Awareness	0.793	0.457**	0.471*	0.791	0.752	0.699	0.195***
	(0.248)	(0.159)	(0.214)	(0.227)	(0.253)	(0.288)	(0.085)
Constant	0.365	0.984	0.095	0.166	0.580	0.027**	0.385
	(0.591)	(1.387)	(0.170)	(0.320)	(0.889)	(0.041)	(0.687)
Observations	70	77	70	70	71	81	77
Pseudo R-squared	0.156	0.168	0.304	0.193	0.108	0.246	0.259

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Democrats

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	9.779***	4.097**	8.963***	7.912***	6.662***	8.076***	2.513
	(5.924)	(2.596)	(6.641)	(4.964)	(4.385)	(5.472)	(1.606)
Males	1.343	1.340	1.051	1.741	1.092	1.145	3.683*
	(0.724)	(0.795)	(0.614)	(1.221)	(0.666)	(0.644)	(2.602)
Education	0.985	0.986	0.766	1.211	0.977	0.897	0.725
	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.153)	(0.224)	(0.176)	(0.161)	(0.147)
Age	0.875	1.093	0.787	1.261	1.691*	1.657*	0.547**
	(0.224)	(0.275)	(0.219)	(0.369)	(0.468)	(0.507)	(0.167)
Militarism	1.839	4.280**	1.381	1.810	2.603	0.634	0.257**
	(1.171)	(3.011)	(0.752)	(1.032)	(1.585)	(0.335)	(0.156)
Internationalism	1.259	1.226	1.098	0.939	0.697	1.817	1.842
	(0.569)	(0.603)	(0.439)	(0.494)	(0.397)	(0.793)	(0.985)
Political Awareness	0.835	0.285***	0.372**	0.705	0.329***	0.587	0.178***
	(0.254)	(0.115)	(0.159)	(0.232)	(0.134)	(0.215)	(0.082)
Constant	0.495	0.529	3.534	0.036	0.194	0.415	0.159
	(0.818)	(0.840)	(5.907)	(0.076)	(0.356)	(0.649)	(0.314)
Observations	80	70	70	70	76	83	81
Pseudo R-squared	0.221	0.272	0.164	0.260	0.290	0.233	0.372

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 21: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Democrats

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	168.692***	9.260***	106.542***	19.302***	4.437***	62.677***	13.080***
	(175.088)	(5.969)	(112.070)	(13.897)	(2.419)	(63.260)	(9.503)
Males	3.134	1.228	2.829	1.108	1.208	2.430	1.996
	(2.368)	(0.710)	(2.431)	(0.790)	(0.642)	(1.778)	(1.364)
Education	0.552**	0.994	1.103	1.131	1.069	0.794	0.747
	(0.144)	(0.166)	(0.290)	(0.211)	(0.180)	(0.185)	(0.166)
Age	0.965	0.914	0.914	0.899	1.102	1.306	0.759
	(0.335)	(0.242)	(0.346)	(0.275)	(0.256)	(0.504)	(0.247)
Militarism	1.664	1.128	2.534	1.796	1.213	0.179**	0.271**
	(1.326)	(0.741)	(2.169)	(1.026)	(0.618)	(0.128)	(0.180)
Internationalism	1.345	1.715	1.419	1.099	0.919	0.642	1.688
	(0.843)	(0.840)	(0.753)	(0.579)	(0.459)	(0.377)	(0.825)
Political Awareness	0.783	0.356**	0.319**	0.849	0.780	0.615	0.354**
	(0.346)	(0.151)	(0.183)	(0.283)	(0.260)	(0.338)	(0.146)
Constant	1.661	0.652	0.165	0.017*	0.414	0.019*	0.024*
	(3.931)	(1.033)	(0.361)	(0.039)	(0.645)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Observations	86	73	69	67	74	82	74
Pseudo R-squared	0.564	0.248	0.505	0.311	0.130	0.433	0.308

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 22: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Democrats

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	17.845***	1.707	5.833***	4.827***	5.043***	5.926***	3.895**
	(12.888)	(0.930)	(3.897)	(2.773)	(3.012)	(3.057)	(2.266)
Males	1.115	2.421	1.522	0.544	0.276**	0.623	1.326
	(0.706)	(1.329)	(0.929)	(0.323)	(0.173)	(0.317)	(0.753)
Education	1.017	0.860	0.774	1.132	1.059	0.811	0.888
	(0.186)	(0.135)	(0.165)	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.134)	(0.151)
Age	0.612	0.923	1.285	0.992	1.126	0.979	1.079
	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.368)	(0.247)	(0.302)	(0.223)	(0.302)
Militarism	3.615*	0.546	1.634	0.765	1.940	2.258	0.314**
	(2.806)	(0.329)	(0.952)	(0.374)	(1.190)	(1.129)	(0.172)
Internationalism	0.490	0.703	0.733	0.891	0.784	1.002	0.931
	(0.227)	(0.312)	(0.302)	(0.407)	(0.427)	(0.440)	(0.438)
Political Awareness	1.801*	1.112	1.001	1.545	1.044	0.861	0.982
	(0.593)	(0.354)	(0.388)	(0.444)	(0.352)	(0.283)	(0.303)
Constant	1.844	0.054*	0.049	0.117	6.738	0.424	0.034*
	(3.325)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.217)	(11.842)	(0.649)	(0.062)
Observations	75	77	71	71	80	93	75
Pseudo R-squared	0.319	0.0955	0.137	0.138	0.179	0.187	0.119

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 23: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Democrats

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	1.850	2.983*	2.150	3.523*	1.565	14.926***	2.823*
	(0.956)	(1.683)	(1.203)	(2.620)	(0.848)	(10.255)	(1.507)
Males	1.167	1.238	2.409	2.114	0.618	0.442	1.805
	(0.578)	(0.661)	(1.331)	(1.772)	(0.335)	(0.279)	(0.967)
Education	0.882	0.789	0.771	0.805	1.063	0.732	0.963
	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.144)	(0.162)
Age	0.760	1.276	1.196	0.514*	0.914	1.221	0.927
	(0.204)	(0.288)	(0.261)	(0.197)	(0.203)	(0.335)	(0.248)
Militarism	0.443	1.343	1.189	0.806	1.593	1.848	1.238
	(0.265)	(0.799)	(0.570)	(0.536)	(0.840)	(1.108)	(0.620)
Internationalism	0.658	0.788	0.860	0.575	0.614	0.607	1.232
	(0.250)	(0.363)	(0.319)	(0.366)	(0.309)	(0.323)	(0.533)
Political Awareness	0.826	0.658	0.907	0.495*	0.742	0.450*	0.629
	(0.250)	(0.226)	(0.308)	(0.199)	(0.232)	(0.208)	(0.185)
Constant	0.366	0.079	2.557	1.009	0.669	0.038	0.127
	(0.563)	(0.122)	(3.750)	(2.548)	(1.051)	(0.087)	(0.210)
Observations	72	76	70	55	73	90	80
Pseudo R-squared	0.0927	0.150	0.0904	0.251	0.0519	0.339	0.0872

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 24: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Republicans

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	13.149***	3.131**	3.195*	5.193**	13.882***	4.265*	3.258**
	(9.936)	(1.579)	(2.163)	(3.564)	(11.126)	(3.368)	(1.848)
Males	1.069	0.640	3.413	1.609	0.995	3.116	0.741
	(0.861)	(0.354)	(2.550)	(1.051)	(0.753)	(2.435)	(0.390)
Education	0.970	1.158	0.543***	1.564**	0.775	2.219**	0.875
	(0.250)	(0.178)	(0.113)	(0.349)	(0.192)	(0.695)	(0.143)
Age	0.799	1.070	1.456	1.306	1.246	0.623	1.462*
	(0.272)	(0.226)	(0.461)	(0.406)	(0.431)	(0.218)	(0.334)
Militarism	1.713	0.625	0.615	0.540	1.575	0.425	0.800
	(1.353)	(0.306)	(0.401)	(0.352)	(0.984)	(0.396)	(0.477)
Internationalism	1.287	0.917	0.776	0.949	1.025	1.397	0.728
	(0.806)	(0.435)	(0.358)	(0.570)	(0.575)	(0.774)	(0.370)
Political Awareness	0.246**	0.773	0.289***	0.415*	0.209***	0.608	0.540**
	(0.135)	(0.198)	(0.113)	(0.214)	(0.101)	(0.206)	(0.163)
Constant	0.593	1.255	0.003**	0.904	0.287	0.024	0.145
	(2.049)	(1.993)	(0.009)	(2.430)	(0.714)	(0.066)	(0.318)
Observations	56	79	70	58	63	55	77
Pseudo R-squared	0.307	0.126	0.309	0.277	0.382	0.229	0.167

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 25: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Republicans

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	16.738***	1.755	2.120	1.029	8.163***	5.250**	7.604***
	(14.954)	(0.856)	(1.350)	(0.645)	(6.217)	(4.397)	(5.190)
Males	2.153	0.587	1.428	1.720	1.972	2.323	1.286
	(1.743)	(0.307)	(0.974)	(1.075)	(1.381)	(1.870)	(0.790)
Education	0.671	1.020	0.639**	0.888	1.207	1.104	0.853
	(0.188)	(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.177)	(0.248)	(0.309)	(0.159)
Age	0.458**	1.015	1.538	0.972	1.694	1.132	1.416
	(0.172)	(0.198)	(0.469)	(0.280)	(0.546)	(0.381)	(0.367)
Militarism	3.393	0.929	0.600	1.725	1.974	0.958	0.657
	(2.872)	(0.433)	(0.391)	(1.027)	(1.223)	(1.079)	(0.438)
Internationalism	0.670	0.891	0.218***	0.623	0.846	0.497	1.094
	(0.478)	(0.393)	(0.113)	(0.383)	(0.417)	(0.362)	(0.578)
Political Awareness	0.289**	0.610**	0.538*	0.254***	0.381**	0.334***	0.512*
	(0.154)	(0.149)	(0.180)	(0.121)	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.175)
Constant	0.112	5.280	0.154	5.073	7.827	19.998	0.015*
	(0.309)	(8.620)	(0.368)	(11.734)	(19.117)	(65.823)	(0.037)
Observations	64	87	71	61	62	57	73
Pseudo R-squared	0.388	0.0859	0.298	0.236	0.279	0.351	0.275

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 26: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Republicans

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	18.489***	9.772***	5.596**	2.988*	20.782***	5.493**	15.474***
	(13.596)	(5.921)	(4.140)	(1.980)	(19.239)	(4.157)	(12.332)
Males	4.257**	0.249**	9.570***	1.355	0.959	2.257	4.272**
	(3.006)	(0.158)	(8.030)	(0.828)	(0.712)	(1.821)	(2.969)
Education	0.932	1.257	0.566**	1.609**	0.632*	1.656*	1.314
	(0.175)	(0.222)	(0.136)	(0.359)	(0.161)	(0.463)	(0.271)
Age	1.330	1.104	1.231	0.984	1.035	0.624	1.590
	(0.365)	(0.264)	(0.409)	(0.328)	(0.317)	(0.228)	(0.451)
Militarism	1.057	0.438	1.630	0.338*	2.340	0.746	1.370
	(0.650)	(0.257)	(1.119)	(0.201)	(1.665)	(0.671)	(0.971)
Internationalism	0.640	0.606	0.406*	0.550	1.265	1.080	1.695
	(0.323)	(0.320)	(0.203)	(0.337)	(0.756)	(0.667)	(1.176)
Political Awareness	0.768	0.936	0.634	1.041	0.201***	1.199	0.402**
	(0.327)	(0.271)	(0.205)	(0.420)	(0.111)	(0.368)	(0.150)
Constant	3.208	0.156	0.059	0.024	4.217	0.043	0.001**
	(8.818)	(0.288)	(0.159)	(0.058)	(10.026)	(0.137)	(0.002)
Observations	70	77	67	62	58	53	71
Pseudo R-squared	0.267	0.273	0.292	0.175	0.337	0.180	0.333

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 27: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Republicans

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	13.217***	5.353***	13.230***	11.530***	35.402***	6.356**	5.711***
	(8.611)	(2.814)	(8.798)	(8.597)	(30.210)	(4.573)	(3.337)
Males	1.498	0.539	3.878**	5.102**	0.402	2.873	0.909
	(0.939)	(0.297)	(2.611)	(3.789)	(0.318)	(2.042)	(0.496)
Education	0.824	0.928	1.186	1.244	1.232	0.924	0.962
	(0.161)	(0.141)	(0.213)	(0.286)	(0.297)	(0.201)	(0.162)
Age	1.292	0.693*	0.902	0.711	1.041	1.569	0.626*
	(0.335)	(0.149)	(0.252)	(0.238)	(0.321)	(0.441)	(0.167)
Militarism	0.608	0.804	1.579	1.228	0.268*	0.579	1.271
	(0.411)	(0.381)	(0.856)	(0.839)	(0.205)	(0.462)	(0.751)
Internationalism	0.724	1.165	1.637	0.276*	2.061	0.528	0.693
	(0.348)	(0.544)	(0.693)	(0.193)	(1.411)	(0.295)	(0.335)
Political Awareness	0.790	0.574**	0.769	1.134	0.780	0.728	1.264
	(0.305)	(0.161)	(0.220)	(0.448)	(0.294)	(0.230)	(0.382)
Constant	0.111	0.702	0.029	0.033	0.041	0.045	5.033
	(0.276)	(1.146)	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.102)	(0.115)	(11.324)
Observations	68	91	75	65	65	63	79
Pseudo R-squared	0.227	0.184	0.228	0.337	0.410	0.196	0.176

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 28: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Republicans

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	8.121***	10.639***	1.118	5.091*	5.719***	6.147**	3.890**
	(5.302)	(6.363)	(0.724)	(4.545)	(3.730)	(5.183)	(2.160)
Males	0.884	0.433	2.787	0.799	1.729	2.860	0.715
	(0.577)	(0.267)	(1.843)	(0.591)	(1.035)	(2.342)	(0.381)
Education	0.694*	1.037	0.879	0.922	1.210	1.364	0.824
	(0.144)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.228)	(0.222)	(0.326)	(0.134)
Age	0.969	0.762	0.688	0.982	1.403	0.960	0.991
	(0.275)	(0.170)	(0.199)	(0.511)	(0.315)	(0.336)	(0.219)
Militarism	0.587	0.455	2.645	0.471	2.070	1.489	0.715
	(0.368)	(0.253)	(1.620)	(0.277)	(1.240)	(1.415)	(0.425)
Internationalism	1.021	0.569	0.680	1.953	1.509	0.572	0.375**
	(0.492)	(0.273)	(0.279)	(1.460)	(0.681)	(0.368)	(0.185)
Political Awareness	0.675	0.803	0.368***	0.449	0.430**	0.974	0.632
	(0.263)	(0.242)	(0.131)	(0.226)	(0.169)	(0.350)	(0.200)
Constant	1.738	0.020**	1.604	0.040	0.771	0.087	0.517
	(4.780)	(0.037)	(3.342)	(0.121)	(1.531)	(0.263)	(1.120)
Observations	64	88	65	60	68	55	78
Pseudo R-squared	0.195	0.264	0.180	0.176	0.191	0.163	0.169

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 29: Results for Aboria Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	9.607***	5.240***	10.956***	9.273***	5.105***	2.722***	2.952***
	(4.103)	(1.957)	(5.206)	(3.711)	(1.972)	(0.955)	(1.031)
Males	0.920	0.976	2.287*	1.800	0.769	2.403**	0.964
	(0.362)	(0.356)	(0.975)	(0.749)	(0.298)	(0.876)	(0.337)
Education	1.245*	0.988	0.785*	1.161	0.944	1.014	0.878
	(0.155)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.092)
Age	1.111	1.223	1.168	1.043	0.926	0.969	1.061
	(0.197)	(0.186)	(0.220)	(0.182)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.174)
Militarism	0.812	0.662	0.700	0.864	1.403	0.633	0.707
	(0.321)	(0.223)	(0.256)	(0.279)	(0.453)	(0.196)	(0.233)
Internationalism	0.976	0.815	1.382	0.780	1.345	1.180	0.855
	(0.288)	(0.244)	(0.388)	(0.244)	(0.386)	(0.303)	(0.240)
Political Awareness	0.726	0.606**	0.352***	0.694	0.538**	0.884	0.606**
	(0.199)	(0.135)	(0.095)	(0.174)	(0.138)	(0.190)	(0.125)
Constant	0.566	0.475	0.070*	0.415	0.373	0.089**	0.504
	(0.694)	(0.475)	(0.098)	(0.523)	(0.397)	(0.092)	(0.575)
Observations	147	159	146	149	146	160	155
Pseudo R-squared	0.208	0.159	0.255	0.229	0.150	0.0916	0.0922

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 30: Results for Venezuela Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	19.337***	4.197***	7.395***	4.135***	10.630***	4.961***	5.631***
	(11.155)	(1.625)	(3.238)	(1.521)	(4.993)	(1.934)	(2.418)
Males	1.424	1.380	1.936	1.852	1.356	1.477	1.420
	(0.627)	(0.512)	(0.800)	(0.729)	(0.587)	(0.567)	(0.576)
Education	1.131	0.919	0.753**	0.912	1.004	0.896	0.859
	(0.150)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.102)	(0.132)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Age	0.776	1.075	0.951	1.247	1.527**	1.096	0.954
	(0.150)	(0.157)	(0.169)	(0.209)	(0.304)	(0.179)	(0.170)
Militarism	1.042	1.599	0.858	1.079	1.889*	0.968	0.304***
	(0.474)	(0.510)	(0.309)	(0.321)	(0.702)	(0.328)	(0.119)
Internationalism	0.938	1.133	0.634*	0.954	0.718	1.079	1.143
	(0.320)	(0.326)	(0.174)	(0.280)	(0.230)	(0.289)	(0.365)
Political Awareness	1.022	0.495***	0.490***	0.653*	0.570**	0.575**	0.382***
	(0.304)	(0.110)	(0.121)	(0.147)	(0.156)	(0.132)	(0.097)
Constant	0.169	0.764	1.974	0.550	1.734	1.723	0.126
	(0.215)	(0.811)	(2.536)	(0.640)	(2.126)	(1.820)	(0.165)
Observations	162	163	150	153	145	166	159
Pseudo R-squared	0.283	0.136	0.213	0.126	0.261	0.152	0.229

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 31: Results for Cameroon Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	28.645***	13.891***	10.642***	8.845***	9.421***	13.957***	11.027***
	(12.663)	(6.168)	(4.767)	(3.529)	(3.915)	(6.184)	(4.795)
Males	2.174*	0.804	4.028***	1.336	0.853	1.704	2.620**
	(0.912)	(0.331)	(1.824)	(0.547)	(0.343)	(0.729)	(1.123)
Education	0.927	1.016	1.008	1.113	0.899	1.039	1.131
	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.115)	(0.135)	(0.141)
Age	1.122	1.067	1.095	1.042	0.874	0.972	1.070
	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.199)	(0.186)	(0.153)	(0.196)	(0.205)
Militarism	0.875	1.186	1.268	0.748	1.223	0.517*	0.672
	(0.359)	(0.438)	(0.469)	(0.230)	(0.419)	(0.191)	(0.264)
Internationalism	0.774	1.501	0.655	0.739	1.362	0.854	1.013
	(0.240)	(0.491)	(0.183)	(0.230)	(0.421)	(0.261)	(0.342)
Political Awareness	1.212	0.560**	0.996	1.022	0.676	1.150	0.459***
	(0.352)	(0.141)	(0.235)	(0.242)	(0.176)	(0.277)	(0.119)
Constant	0.320	0.201	0.148	0.095*	0.854	0.135	0.018***
	(0.393)	(0.234)	(0.200)	(0.118)	(0.946)	(0.165)	(0.025)
Observations	178	150	142	149	141	159	149
Pseudo R-squared	0.365	0.270	0.241	0.195	0.195	0.258	0.265

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 32: Results for the Trade War scenario Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	12.677***	5.770***	7.546***	5.890***	10.357***	7.820***	5.350***
	(5.196)	(2.165)	(3.063)	(2.255)	(4.180)	(2.947)	(2.039)
Males	1.081	1.540	1.842	1.122	0.503*	1.128	0.968
	(0.423)	(0.562)	(0.721)	(0.431)	(0.202)	(0.425)	(0.350)
Education	0.964	0.867	0.971	1.129	1.060	0.946	0.892
	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.109)	(0.099)
Age	0.895	0.843	0.997	1.012	0.946	1.121	0.722*
	(0.158)	(0.121)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.178)	(0.131)
Militarism	1.366	1.108	1.729	0.595	0.909	1.150	0.661
	(0.554)	(0.352)	(0.583)	(0.191)	(0.331)	(0.394)	(0.230)
Internationalism	0.547**	1.417	1.133	0.781	1.092	0.842	0.783
	(0.156)	(0.406)	(0.284)	(0.241)	(0.326)	(0.230)	(0.226)
Political Awareness	1.243	0.624**	0.736	1.348	0.949	0.829	1.088
	(0.322)	(0.140)	(0.166)	(0.291)	(0.218)	(0.192)	(0.225)
Constant	0.676	0.105**	0.022***	0.081**	0.397	0.059**	0.283
	(0.764)	(0.111)	(0.028)	(0.097)	(0.458)	(0.071)	(0.327)
Observations	166	171	162	159	155	176	162
Pseudo R-squared	0.241	0.144	0.169	0.139	0.213	0.181	0.136

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 33: Results for the Asian Disease Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	5.201***	7.339***	1.805*	4.216***	2.911***	5.929***	3.632***
	(1.878)	(2.845)	(0.644)	(2.106)	(1.043)	(2.326)	(1.231)
Males	1.139	1.302	1.757	1.826	1.318	0.886	1.370
	(0.419)	(0.489)	(0.638)	(0.924)	(0.474)	(0.338)	(0.473)
Education	0.830*	0.851	0.836*	0.876	1.062	1.062	0.897
	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.130)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.094)
Age	0.815	1.003	0.888	0.618*	1.055	0.929	0.961
	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.166)	(0.149)	(0.157)	(0.153)
Militarism	1.202	0.830	1.540	0.536*	1.533	0.885	1.003
	(0.429)	(0.281)	(0.497)	(0.200)	(0.489)	(0.297)	(0.327)
Internationalism	1.086	1.112	1.059	0.854	1.092	0.955	0.895
	(0.277)	(0.323)	(0.247)	(0.327)	(0.283)	(0.260)	(0.245)
Political Awareness	0.784	0.627**	0.676*	0.553*	0.693	0.960	0.748
	(0.200)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.183)	(0.167)	(0.228)	(0.155)
Constant	0.937	0.032***	4.295	0.512	0.237	0.166	0.200
	(1.042)	(0.035)	(4.884)	(0.791)	(0.249)	(0.187)	(0.225)
Observations	159	168	149	127	154	165	164
Pseudo R-squared	0.142	0.191	0.0705	0.187	0.0809	0.126	0.0899

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 34: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Liberals.

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	3.879**	2.225	55.045***	8.398***	6.000***	5.353***	2.698*
	(2.263)	(1.216)	(63.223)	(5.179)	(3.453)	(2.910)	(1.474)
Males	1.764	0.718	1.109	1.839	1.176	4.998***	1.858
	(1.003)	(0.357)	(0.752)	(1.184)	(0.642)	(2.710)	(1.049)
Education	1.193	1.051	0.963	1.047	1.171	0.877	0.849
	(0.201)	(0.153)	(0.226)	(0.168)	(0.222)	(0.147)	(0.135)
Age	1.100	0.784	1.281	0.984	0.798	1.186	0.774
	(0.313)	(0.167)	(0.404)	(0.232)	(0.199)	(0.296)	(0.212)
Militarism	1.153	0.714	1.013	1.713	1.258	0.471	0.965
	(0.761)	(0.341)	(0.622)	(0.904)	(0.662)	(0.217)	(0.512)
Internationalism	0.696	0.705	1.271	0.822	1.403	1.109	0.802
	(0.299)	(0.287)	(0.599)	(0.380)	(0.723)	(0.436)	(0.351)
Political Awareness	0.607	0.533**	0.156***	0.857	0.797	0.830	0.311***
	(0.199)	(0.154)	(0.108)	(0.238)	(0.257)	(0.275)	(0.117)
Constant	0.176	4.476	0.067	0.265	0.492	0.014***	0.445
	(0.310)	(6.390)	(0.133)	(0.546)	(0.808)	(0.021)	(0.761)
Observations	64	80	65	71	73	90	78
Pseudo R-squared	0.140	0.155	0.356	0.184	0.153	0.220	0.176

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 35: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Liberals.

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	9.063***	5.021**	28.106***	6.123***	5.939***	6.013***	5.814**
	(5.838)	(3.168)	(29.701)	(3.888)	(3.728)	(3.281)	(4.219)
Males	1.028	0.649	1.170	2.663	1.876	1.060	9.010***
	(0.613)	(0.361)	(0.888)	(1.884)	(1.073)	(0.535)	(7.088)
Education	1.124	1.017	0.911	1.201	0.955	0.941	1.046
	(0.195)	(0.161)	(0.204)	(0.213)	(0.177)	(0.148)	(0.219)
Age	0.814	1.000	0.515*	1.354	1.555	1.396	0.556*
	(0.240)	(0.229)	(0.185)	(0.379)	(0.427)	(0.347)	(0.186)
Militarism	1.274	2.188	1.695	1.640	1.295	0.910	0.245**
	(0.812)	(1.172)	(1.126)	(0.881)	(0.750)	(0.411)	(0.165)
Internationalism	0.966	1.247	0.662	1.286	0.601	1.341	1.825
	(0.438)	(0.548)	(0.346)	(0.638)	(0.348)	(0.495)	(1.072)
Political Awareness	0.746	0.337***	0.253**	0.511**	0.596	0.565*	0.125***
	(0.224)	(0.112)	(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.220)	(0.176)	(0.071)
Constant	1.121	4.275	5.717	0.015*	0.169	0.570	0.072
	(2.095)	(6.658)	(11.783)	(0.033)	(0.298)	(0.749)	(0.154)
Observations	78	76	66	71	71	93	83
Pseudo R-squared	0.234	0.239	0.320	0.242	0.205	0.170	0.430

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 36: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Liberals.

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	177.558***	5.244***	81.752***	15.223***	4.444***	30.592***	12.550***
	(195.233)	(3.094)	(84.492)	(10.972)	(2.431)	(20.825)	(8.092)
Males	4.950*	0.725	3.345	2.889	1.366	1.175	3.189*
	(4.332)	(0.378)	(2.772)	(2.044)	(0.712)	(0.718)	(1.998)
Education	0.576**	1.032	1.593	1.365	1.057	0.940	0.826
	(0.146)	(0.156)	(0.458)	(0.261)	(0.186)	(0.180)	(0.150)
Age	0.757	0.969	1.186	1.427	0.861	1.242	0.957
	(0.299)	(0.219)	(0.449)	(0.402)	(0.212)	(0.385)	(0.287)
Militarism	0.951	0.627	1.156	1.129	1.195	0.415*	0.458
	(0.804)	(0.314)	(0.842)	(0.613)	(0.631)	(0.216)	(0.294)
Internationalism	1.041	1.325	0.650	2.067	1.209	0.914	1.076
	(0.651)	(0.559)	(0.378)	(1.116)	(0.628)	(0.418)	(0.490)
Political Awareness	0.437*	0.641	0.647	0.717	0.871	1.316	0.537
	(0.207)	(0.196)	(0.404)	(0.238)	(0.281)	(0.483)	(0.206)
Constant	1.145	0.946	0.030	0.001***	0.617	0.063	0.045
	(2.953)	(1.449)	(0.071)	(0.002)	(0.988)	(0.108)	(0.087)
Observations	85	76	67	70	73	91	76
Pseudo R-squared	0.589	0.145	0.505	0.285	0.118	0.351	0.266

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 37: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Liberals

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	15.414***	2.473	31.516***	4.783**	13.405***	5.465***	8.227***
	(11.394)	(1.450)	(30.425)	(2.928)	(8.824)	(2.647)	(5.335)
Males	2.042	1.962	1.306	0.577	0.485	1.111	0.911
	(1.310)	(1.104)	(0.897)	(0.357)	(0.304)	(0.546)	(0.528)
Education	1.264	0.840	0.602**	1.069	1.132	0.820	0.723*
	(0.239)	(0.139)	(0.150)	(0.178)	(0.225)	(0.129)	(0.123)
Age	0.657	1.146	1.541	0.936	0.798	1.117	1.344
	(0.216)	(0.251)	(0.490)	(0.253)	(0.235)	(0.258)	(0.391)
Militarism	4.086*	0.512	2.187	0.336**	0.945	2.208*	0.317*
	(3.080)	(0.272)	(1.370)	(0.185)	(0.572)	(1.022)	(0.192)
Internationalism	0.344**	0.824	0.842	1.082	0.758	0.948	0.593
	(0.174)	(0.358)	(0.413)	(0.534)	(0.421)	(0.355)	(0.298)
Political Awareness	1.285	0.984	0.725	1.645*	1.029	0.887	1.083
	(0.410)	(0.316)	(0.377)	(0.469)	(0.353)	(0.267)	(0.376)
Constant	0.130	0.146	0.009**	0.087	0.217	0.159	0.109
	(0.243)	(0.220)	(0.019)	(0.182)	(0.401)	(0.222)	(0.207)
Observations	76	81	68	69	77	97	78
Pseudo R-squared	0.311	0.106	0.299	0.187	0.229	0.169	0.201

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 38: Results for Asian Disease based on the subset of Liberals

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	1.909	2.126	1.713	4.050*	3.797**	17.080***	4.693***
	(1.010)	(1.160)	(0.984)	(3.037)	(2.192)	(11.009)	(2.511)
Males	1.109	1.269	1.484	1.417	0.659	0.575	1.851
	(0.604)	(0.649)	(0.822)	(1.122)	(0.377)	(0.348)	(0.982)
Education	0.887	0.726**	0.854	0.728	0.983	0.964	1.018
	(0.143)	(0.114)	(0.138)	(0.165)	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.162)
Age	0.726	1.379	1.108	0.431**	0.944	0.976	1.151
	(0.215)	(0.299)	(0.235)	(0.179)	(0.212)	(0.285)	(0.310)
Militarism	0.441	0.889	1.221	0.680	1.093	0.905	1.019
	(0.273)	(0.446)	(0.574)	(0.410)	(0.598)	(0.442)	(0.566)
Internationalism	0.784	0.690	0.729	0.544	0.637	0.863	0.865
	(0.286)	(0.297)	(0.277)	(0.358)	(0.330)	(0.377)	(0.384)
Political Awareness	0.758	0.697	0.556	0.468*	0.704	0.912	0.942
	(0.225)	(0.207)	(0.255)	(0.189)	(0.229)	(0.346)	(0.288)
Constant	0.380	0.187	1.047	4.502	0.461	0.006**	0.098
	(0.614)	(0.265)	(1.534)	(10.604)	(0.749)	(0.013)	(0.172)
Observations	69	82	64	58	72	94	82
Pseudo R-squared	0.0909	0.135	0.0501	0.268	0.0868	0.311	0.142

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 39: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Conservatives

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	13.904***	2.917*	2.367	4.109**	20.728***	6.033**	2.084
	(10.761)	(1.771)	(1.409)	(2.674)	(21.460)	(5.323)	(1.192)
Males	1.043	1.495	2.822*	1.647	0.837	15.985**	0.516
	(0.898)	(0.943)	(1.730)	(1.027)	(0.760)	(19.450)	(0.297)
Education	1.159	1.097	0.618**	1.416*	0.846	2.135*	0.906
	(0.291)	(0.199)	(0.116)	(0.291)	(0.262)	(0.846)	(0.159)
Age	0.888	1.181	1.381	1.028	1.995	0.497	1.269
	(0.299)	(0.283)	(0.362)	(0.350)	(0.918)	(0.270)	(0.319)
Militarism	1.302	0.897	0.515	0.819	0.767	5.288	0.647
	(0.920)	(0.520)	(0.318)	(0.466)	(0.618)	(6.159)	(0.401)
Internationalism	1.410	2.263	0.608	1.023	1.658	0.613	0.907
	(0.925)	(1.242)	(0.259)	(0.555)	(1.051)	(0.425)	(0.505)
Political Awareness	1.181	0.544*	0.481**	0.395*	0.103***	0.494	0.541**
	(0.612)	(0.191)	(0.142)	(0.195)	(0.072)	(0.243)	(0.159)
Constant	0.011	0.310	0.246	0.461	0.031	0.034	0.940
	(0.043)	(0.586)	(0.541)	(1.014)	(0.083)	(0.100)	(2.372)
Observations	52	58	70	59	58	47	68
Pseudo R-squared	0.259	0.122	0.208	0.195	0.497	0.359	0.141

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 40: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Conservatives

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	38.874***	1.131	2.241	2.278	7.644**	20.729**	2.477
	(48.305)	(0.655)	(1.449)	(1.406)	(6.106)	(25.254)	(1.564)
Males	4.898	1.071	1.308	1.561	1.958	25.557**	1.277
	(5.339)	(0.637)	(0.843)	(0.876)	(1.392)	(34.605)	(0.821)
Education	0.674	0.909	0.532***	0.941	1.222	1.139	0.821
	(0.212)	(0.155)	(0.118)	(0.182)	(0.278)	(0.384)	(0.158)
Age	0.672	0.913	1.811**	0.681	2.126**	1.324	1.099
	(0.245)	(0.198)	(0.541)	(0.202)	(0.761)	(0.541)	(0.297)
Militarism	1.062	1.571	0.450	1.219	1.813	0.775	0.953
	(0.795)	(0.823)	(0.298)	(0.637)	(1.181)	(0.964)	(0.611)
Internationalism	0.585	1.076	0.301**	0.839	1.337	0.195	1.403
	(0.492)	(0.484)	(0.141)	(0.440)	(0.663)	(0.196)	(0.816)
Political Awareness	0.824	0.520**	0.676	0.458*	0.347**	0.286**	0.448**
	(0.411)	(0.165)	(0.215)	(0.199)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.141)
Constant	0.000**	4.324	1.047	0.970	0.294	0.061	0.009*
	(0.000)	(8.070)	(2.517)	(1.937)	(0.640)	(0.190)	(0.023)
Observations	58	65	70	62	61	47	66
Pseudo R-squared	0.449	0.0624	0.277	0.154	0.299	0.413	0.225

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 41: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Conservatives

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	16.258***	8.180***	4.872**	4.915**	14.370***	83.859***	8.555***
	(12.979)	(5.643)	(3.394)	(3.783)	(12.215)	(128.674)	(6.495)
Males	2.547	0.452	5.056**	0.762	0.887	66.848**	2.146
	(2.032)	(0.321)	(3.619)	(0.551)	(0.648)	(119.633)	(1.633)
Education	0.911	1.300	0.614**	1.404	0.733	3.859**	1.209
	(0.194)	(0.274)	(0.137)	(0.318)	(0.178)	(2.524)	(0.256)
Age	1.375	1.149	1.060	0.647	1.351	0.492	1.372
	(0.418)	(0.301)	(0.318)	(0.247)	(0.416)	(0.370)	(0.423)
Militarism	1.776	0.537	1.074	0.425	1.604	0.300	1.135
	(1.186)	(0.355)	(0.734)	(0.258)	(1.142)	(0.479)	(0.860)
Internationalism	0.371*	0.755	0.500	0.278*	1.310	0.357	2.909
	(0.217)	(0.426)	(0.229)	(0.192)	(0.727)	(0.338)	(2.087)
Political Awareness	1.761	0.867	0.579*	0.654	0.264***	1.451	0.291***
	(0.872)	(0.319)	(0.182)	(0.321)	(0.125)	(0.817)	(0.122)
Constant	9.284	0.026*	0.948	0.022	0.936	0.000**	0.001**
	(29.855)	(0.053)	(2.547)	(0.058)	(1.884)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Observations	61	57	66	63	56	46	62
Pseudo R-squared	0.273	0.229	0.259	0.296	0.310	0.530	0.343

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 42: Results for the Trade War scenarios based on the subset of Conservatives

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	32.482***	6.932***	6.544***	12.962***	21.307***	22.388***	3.803**
	(27.521)	(4.713)	(3.729)	(10.345)	(17.716)	(22.498)	(2.419)
Males	1.517	0.794	1.802	5.674**	0.464	2.384	0.859
	(1.275)	(0.524)	(1.014)	(4.221)	(0.338)	(2.038)	(0.527)
Education	0.775	0.845	1.183	1.194	1.021	0.678	0.808
	(0.195)	(0.167)	(0.190)	(0.280)	(0.241)	(0.184)	(0.146)
Age	1.161	0.587**	0.814	1.052	1.260	1.829*	0.359***
	(0.362)	(0.149)	(0.204)	(0.361)	(0.368)	(0.635)	(0.128)
Militarism	0.614	1.635	1.240	1.182	0.569	1.214	1.200
	(0.465)	(0.928)	(0.622)	(0.781)	(0.440)	(1.089)	(0.707)
Internationalism	1.301	2.439	1.239	0.479	0.825	0.200**	0.811
	(0.783)	(1.367)	(0.447)	(0.296)	(0.501)	(0.151)	(0.444)
Political Awareness	0.904	0.464**	0.810	1.098	1.170	0.649	0.994
	(0.431)	(0.170)	(0.218)	(0.467)	(0.531)	(0.286)	(0.292)
Constant	0.040	0.192	0.246	0.019	0.051	0.027	3.589
	(0.135)	(0.415)	(0.465)	(0.048)	(0.107)	(0.087)	(9.153)
Observations	61	66	78	66	63	55	70
Pseudo R-squared	0.367	0.236	0.141	0.327	0.357	0.367	0.215

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 43: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Conservatives

Baseline: Domain of Gains	(1) No Cues	(2) Dem A	(3) Dem B	(4) Rep A	(5) Rep B	(6) Group A	(7) Group B
Domain of Losses	8.133***	8.748***	0.990	10.995**	7.153***	8.046**	1.271
	(5.866)	(6.057)	(0.576)	(11.535)	(5.015)	(7.041)	(0.690)
Males	0.543	0.341	1.610	0.576	1.530	2.007	0.481
	(0.411)	(0.249)	(0.918)	(0.510)	(0.936)	(1.545)	(0.271)
Education	0.853	1.526**	0.800	0.974	0.804	0.845	1.104
	(0.172)	(0.316)	(0.118)	(0.416)	(0.133)	(0.264)	(0.205)
Age	1.040	0.875	0.739	0.976	1.429	0.943	0.888
	(0.326)	(0.215)	(0.185)	(0.546)	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.212)
Militarism	0.666	0.286*	1.845	0.466	2.540	1.971	0.702
	(0.461)	(0.197)	(0.997)	(0.320)	(1.723)	(1.661)	(0.408)
Internationalism	0.970	0.648	0.872	1.657	1.428	0.676	0.662
	(0.530)	(0.347)	(0.310)	(1.351)	(0.637)	(0.423)	(0.342)
Political Awareness	0.797	0.822	0.555**	0.748	0.375**	0.895	0.562*
	(0.376)	(0.317)	(0.162)	(0.566)	(0.148)	(0.371)	(0.169)
Constant	6.259	0.005**	4.413	0.001	0.137	0.514	0.493
	(20.619)	(0.012)	(8.487)	(0.007)	(0.236)	(1.434)	(1.142)
Observations	58	66	68	59	66	51	71
Pseudo R-squared	0.225	0.270	0.0942	0.265	0.184	0.198	0.136

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To evaluate the robustness of the findings, two individual-level characteristics are worth exploring. First, to check the possible alternative explanation that respondents were not paying proper attention to the treatments, including the cues, the study performs a test of the main effect only with respondents who have successfully passed the manipulation check. Tables 21-25 demonstrate that the results only for the respondents that have correctly answered the manipulation check remain consistent for the main effects of the frames and the cues.

Second, controlling for gender, there is evidence to suggest that males are, on average, more likely to support the risk-acceptant plan compared to females for two of the intervention scenarios: Venezuela and Cameroon ($p<0.05$). At the same time, similar to the Kemel and Paraschiv's (2018) findings there is no substantial difference between the relative number of females and males choosing to support the intervention in general or acting in the trade dispute scenario. Interestingly, controlling for race and ethnicity, the study reconfirms the finding by Boettcher (2004) that African Americans are more risk-averse relative to whites across the three intervention scenarios. African Americans are more risk averse than white respondents across Aboria, Venezuela, the trade disputes, and interestingly the scenario for intervention in Cameroon. The overwhelming support for the risk averse plans for intervention by the African American seen as more dovish (Nincic & Nincic, 2002) respondents in the sample further strengthen an earlier finding by Boettcher (2004) that Caucasians demonstrate significantly higher willingness to support riskier intervention than the latter even when African countries are the target.

Table 44: Experiment 1 Randomization Checks

	(1) Gains	(2) Dem-A	(3) Dem-B	(4) Rep-A	(5) Rep-B	(6) Rep-B	(7) Rep-B
Gender	1.235	1.311	1.110	0.997	0.641	0.955	0.854
	(0.279)	(0.424)	(0.367)	(0.314)	(0.216)	(0.308)	(0.279)
Ethnicity	1.126	0.795*	1.074	0.956	1.090	1.114	0.985
	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.122)
Education	1.136	0.860	1.359	0.820	0.768	1.103	1.310
	(0.226)	(0.238)	(0.394)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.316)	(0.383)
Age	1.013	1.289	0.948	1.173	1.390		0.843
	(0.323)	(0.519)	(0.531)	(0.523)	(0.537)		(0.373)
National Chauvinism	1.065	1.052	1.139	0.801	0.909	1.162	1.025
	(0.132)	(0.187)	(0.206)	(0.138)	(0.165)	(0.209)	(0.186)
Militarism	1.270	1.042	0.828	0.895	1.045	1.185	1.304
	(0.268)	(0.315)	(0.253)	(0.267)	(0.315)	(0.353)	(0.395)
Internationalism	1.115	0.939	1.274	0.785	1.165	1.464	0.767
	(0.189)	(0.225)	(0.319)	(0.185)	(0.295)	(0.364)	(0.183)
Political Engagement	1.112	0.835	0.763	0.777	1.289	1.210	1.355*
	(0.141)	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.258)	(0.204)	(0.218)
Constant	0.280	0.213	0.031**	0.579	0.734	0.059**	0.112*
	(0.252)	(0.268)	(0.042)	(0.711)	(0.935)	(0.073)	(0.147)
Observations	367	367	367	367	264	356	367
Pseudo R-squared	0.0123	0.0207	0.0158	0.0174	0.0238	0.0192	0.0264

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 45: Experiment 2 Randomization Checks

	(1) Gains	(2) Dem-A	(3) Dem-B	(4) Rep-A	(5) Rep-B	(6) Rep-B	(7) Rep-B
Gender	1.041	0.982	0.918	0.804	0.948	1.139	0.974
	(0.108)	(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.141)	(0.170)	(0.144)
Ethnicity	1.021	0.920**	1.026	1.002	0.961	1.037	1.062
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Education	0.993	0.968	0.972	0.987	0.904**	0.932	1.093**
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Age	1.055	1.055	1.128*	0.893*	0.950	1.005	0.873**
	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.057)
National Chauvinism	1.046	1.072	0.989	1.004	0.960	0.975	1.081
	(0.055)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.082)
Militarism	0.858	1.109	0.900	1.139	1.057	0.948	0.931
	(0.081)	(0.147)	(0.122)	(0.155)	(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.125)
Internationalism	1.020	0.925	0.907	0.902	0.990	1.205*	1.173
	(0.080)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.136)	(0.132)
Political Engagement	1.000	0.992	0.976	0.988	0.927	0.968	1.168**
	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.092)
Constant	0.645	0.218***	0.133***	0.299***	0.375**	0.138***	0.103***
	(0.199)	(0.093)	(0.059)	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.062)	(0.046)
Observations	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Pseudo R-squared	0.00248	0.00829	0.00616	0.00543	0.00641	0.00644	0.0127

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.5 Analysis of the Open Answers

As an additional robustness check for experiment one consisting of the student sample, all participants were asked to provide one written answer explaining why they have selected the given plan of actions. The student participants' open answer was based on the last scenario they have randomly received. The participants provide only one written answer. Conducting a simple content analysis, I found that the overwhelmingly students indicated that they were aware that the different plants of actions contain diverging amounts of risks. In general, the written answers of the student participants were in line with the expectation of prospect theory. For instance, the following answer summarizes the reasoning of that portion of participant who have decided to select the risk-averse plan of action "*I believe it's best to go with the guaranteed option. Especially when dealing with lives of people, you can't put them up for gamble/risks*." A frequent alternative reason for select the risk-averse option for conducting the humanitarian intervention clearly refers to the need to minimize American casualties "*Guaranteed US lives saved with a large number of the other lives saved. If we didn't even have to get involved in the first place, and we are and are saving 30,000 lives and keeping as many troops alive as possible is a win win*." Others referred to the trade dispute scenario and justified their decision to select the risk-averse plan by explaining that "*It offers a reasonable chance of creating more jobs than Plan A with little risk. Plan B and D are too risky*." And "*I feel that it has the most room for success with as little room for failure as*

possible. Some of the others had room for more success but could possibly have been detrimental to the economy so it's better to play it safe with little risk."

Other the other hand, as expected those selecting the risk-acceptant plans of actions justified their choice by stating that "*There is a high probability that the soldiers will return home safely, and I believe the 20% risk is worth the increased civilian lives that are saved*." An additional, frequently occurring reason for selecting the risk-acceptant plan of action is best represented by the following explanations provided by two participants "*Because the risk for US soldiers in plan B was slightly higher than plan A, but the risk for others was lower in the risk section. There is still a higher chance everyone will benefit, which plan A does not give us. That is, to say, if we even have to intervene in the first place*." And "*The possible benefit seems to outweigh the risk. 95% chance that all the troops are saved, and more citizens are saved is decent odds versus a 5% chance that both of those numbers end up lower*." Finally, turning to the classic Asian disease scenario using the traditional mathematically equivalent frames for the expected costs, the study again finds that respondents clearly understood the situation best demonstrated by the following written answers: "*With a 1/3 chance that no one dies and a 2/3 chance that a similar casualty to Plan A, it's a risk that could possibly ensure that no one dies"* And *"If there is a chance, even if it is very small, that more people will be saved, then I'd rather take my chances with that plan rather than being guaranteed that a set amount of people will die/survive."*

In conclusion, the participants' written answers in experiment one consistently demonstrates that they understand that the different plans of action presented to them are about risk and the expected costs measured in civilian, military lives, or lost jobs. Taken together, the written answers by the 387 student participants in experiment one and the post-treatment manipulation check for the large Mechanical Turk sample for experiment two strongly suggest that participants have understood

the treatments. Thus, confirming the validity of prospect theory's framing effects even when the costs are non-mathematically equivalent to better approximate the real-world crisis descriptions the public is exposed to together with endorsement cues from political parties and political like-minded social groups.

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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 3 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

B.1: Sample Characteristics

Table 46: India Sample 1 description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	51.5
	30-39	40.0
	40-49	6.2
	50-59	1.5
	60+	0.8
Ethnicity	Hindi	23.3
	Telegu	1.4
	Marathi	6.0
	Tamil	2.5
	English	35.2
	Malayalam	12.0
	Other	6.0
		13.6
Income	Less than 50,000[259]	19.1
	50,001-100,000	19.3
	100,001-150,000	14.9
	150,001-200,000	13.2
	200,001-250,000	9.1
	250,001-300,000	6.8

[259] The Income is measured in Indian Rupees.

	Over 300,001	17.5
Education	High School or Below	7.0
	Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree	40.0
	Graduate Degree	39.4
	Professional Degree	13.6
Political affiliation	Bharatiya Janata Party	55.1
	Indian National Congress	23.3
	National Democratic Alliance led by BJP	2.6
	United Progressive Alliance led by INC	1.4
	All India Trinamool Congress	0.4
	Bahujan Samaj Party	2.35
	Communist Party of India	2.35
	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	11.76
	Other	1.7
Religion	Hindu	76.4
	Muslim	7.16
	Christian	11.0
	Buddhist	0.2
	Not Religious	2
	Other	3.25

Gender	Male	75
	Female	25

Note: number of respondents = 559

Table 47: India Sample 2 description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	59.0
	30-39	33.0
	40-49	5.7
	50-59	1.5
	60+	0.9
Ethnicity	Hindi	12.7
	Telegu	6.0
	Marathi	1.9
	Tamil	46.6
	English	15.25
	Malayalam	5.0
	Other	12.45
Income	Up to 10,000[260]	11.0
	10,001-20,000	18.2
	20,001-50,000	23.3

[260] The Income is measured in Indian Rupees.

	50,001-100,000	19.0
	Over 100,000	28.6
Education	High School or Below	4.37
	Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree	42.1
	Graduate Degree	40.7
	Professional Degree	12.8
Political affiliation	Bharatiya Janata Party	47.0
	Indian National Congress	32.6
	National Democratic Alliance led by BJP	4.0
	United Progressive Alliance led by INC	2.4
	All India Trinamool Congress	2.13
	Bahujan Samaj Party	0.4
	Communist Party of India	2.84
	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	1.7
	Other	7.0
Religion	Hindu	77.5
	Muslim	6.0
	Christian	12.7
	Other	3.8
Gender	Male	67.2
	Female	32.8

Note: number of respondents = 1960

Table 48: Nigeria Sample description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	68.0
	30-39	21.8
	40-49	8.2
	50-59	1.3
	60+	0.6
Ethnicity	Hausa	5.3
	Urhobo	3.2
	Igbo	36.4
	Idoma	3.9
	Yoruba	23.1
	Itsekiri	0.5
	Efik	2.7
	Ikwere	1.3
	Ebira	0.4
	Awori	0.8
	Fulani	1.3
	Tapa	0.25
	Isoko	1.7
	Kalabari	0.13
	Ibibio	2.3
	Birom	0

	Kanuri	0.4
	Shuwa-Arab	0
	Tiv	1.2
	Jukun	0.4
	Nupe	0.1
	Gwari	1.0
	Ljaw	1.8
	Igala	1.2
	Edo	4.4
	Other	6.10
Education	No Formal Schooling	0
	Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)	0.6
	Some primary schooling	0.1
	Primary school completed	0.4
	Intermediate school or some secondary school / high school	2.2
	Secondary school / high school completed	16.3
	Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college	13.3
	Some university	
	University completed	26.0
		30.2
	Post-graduate	10.6

Political affiliation	All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	3.6
	All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	6.0
	All People's Party (APP)	2.2
	Conscience People's Congress (CPC)	1.4
	Labour Party (LP)	1.7
	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	47.7
	Other	37.4
Gender	Women	41.2
	Men	58.7

Note: number of respondents = 771

Experiments on Amazon's Mechanical Turk has not been without its critics. An important note is that there are several positives and negatives in using the online survey tool of Amazon's Mechanical Turk. First, the positive is that researchers can gather survey data from hundreds and thousands of online respondents with lower costs and for a shorter period than any other tool currently (Couper, 2011). The second positive is that in studies using Mechanical Turk the unrepresentativeness of the drawn samples can be decreased to a minimum by increasing the number of respondents from specific categories the researcher has detected to be underrepresented in the already collected portion of the sample. This possibility makes generalizable inferences more valid and reliable in comparison to solely observational studies (Berinsky et al., 2012; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015). For instance, Levay, Freese, and Druckman (2016) compare population-based samples and those drawn from the Mechanical Turk and find that by increasing the number of participants from the relevant and unrepresented religious, political, or ethno/religious group can significantly improve the level of representativeness of the sample and increase the validity of experimental scholars' inferences. Similarly, Paolacci,

Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) find that Mechanical Turk samples are on often more representative to the general population than all volunteer or student samples.[261]

Meanwhile, the Mechanical Turk has also received a large amount of criticism from the literature (Levay & Freese & Druckman, 2016). The fundamental drawbacks are those studies using it tend on average to gather samples that often can be slightly unrepresentative of countries population in terms of demographic and political variables and the possibility of fraudulent use by some workers (Gerber & Huber & Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Huber & Hill & Lenz, 2012; Huber & Paris, 2013; Leeper & Freese, & Druckman, 2015). Furthermore, scholars have focused attention on the possibility that Mechanical Turk's pay rates affect its workers (respondents) work quality. However, a study by Andersen and Lau (2018) addresses this criticism by present evidence from two different social science studies. Their results demonstrate that pay rates used in Mechanical Turk do not systematically affect the quality of respondents' work.[262]

Treatment Groups Experiment 1 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	163
Engage Win	164
Engage Lose	163
Engage Lose Less Casualties	164
Engage Win More Casualties	166
Backing Down Pakistan	163
Engage Win Pakistan	164
Engage Lose Pakistan	163
Engage Lose Less Casualties Pakistan	163
Engage Win More Casualties Pakistan	164

Treatment Groups – Experiment 2 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	85
Engage Win	86
Engage Lose	84

[261] Also see (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) for further evidence in support the notion.

[262] https://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2010/03/new-demographics-of-mechanical-turk.html For a more detailed investigation the global Mechanical Turk demographics see (Difallah & Filatova & Ipeirotis, 2018

Engage Lose Less Casualties	85
Engage Win More Casualties	85

Treatment groups – Experiment 3 Nigeria

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	151
Engage Win	155
Engage Lose	152
Engage Win More Casualties	87
Engage Lose Less Casualties	87

Treatment groups – Experiment 4 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	134
Backing Down – BJP supports the Leader's decision	140
Backing Down – INC supports Leader's decision	136
Engage and Win	139
Engage and Win – BJP supports the Leader's decision	137
Engage and Win – INC supports the Leader's decision	139

Treatment groups – Experiment 5 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	134
Backing Down - Social Group Opposes	140
Backing Down - Social Group Supports	136
Backing Down - Bipartisan Supports	139

Engage Win	137
Engage Win – Social Group Opposes	139
Engage Win – Social Group Supports	135
Engage Win – Bipartisan Support	137
Engage Lose	141
Engage Lose – Social Group Opposes	136
Engage Lose – Social Group Supports	138
Engage Lose – Bipartisan Support	133
Stay Out	135
Stay Out – Social Group Opposes	134
Stay Out – Social Group Supports	140
Stay Out - Bipartisan Support	141

B.2 Experiment 1 India

Table 49: Experimental Results (Logit). Dependent Variable: Leader Approval Baseline: Backing Down

Baseline: Backing Down	India1: Hypothetical Country (Model 1)	India1: Pakistan (Model 2)	India2: Hypothetical Country (Model 3)	India2: China (Model 4)	Nigeria: Hypothetical Country (Model 5)
Engage Win	3.620***	1.794	4.970***	5.686***	3.215***
	(1.609)	(0.761)	(2.325)	(2.541)	(0.993)
Engage Lose	0.925	1.007	1.257	1.338	1.497
	(0.313)	(0.381)	(0.472)	(0.486)	(0.487)
Engage Win More Casualties	1.156	0.947	2.267**	4.227***	1.520
	(0.414)	(0.346)	(0.907)	(1.758)	(0.542)
Engage Lose Less Casualties	1.744	1.063	4.394***	4.852***	0.846
	(0.675)	(0.409)	(1.955)	(2.054)	(0.354)
Militarism	0.999	0.683	1.932***	1.612**	1.706***
	(0.272)	(0.181)	(0.376)	(0.301)	(0.267)
Internationalism	0.726*	0.688**	1.085	1.039	0.604***
	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.252)	(0.228)	(0.101)
Age	0.740**	0.783*	1.233	1.564***	1.257*
	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.200)	(0.262)	(0.165)
Gender	2.004***	0.855	1.065	2.174**	1.272
	(0.537)	(0.208)	(0.329)	(0.706)	(0.243)
Education	0.862	0.953	1.221	1.163	0.939
	(0.121)	(0.131)	(0.189)	(0.176)	(0.062)
Income	0.628***	0.817**	1.017	1.031	1.529***
	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.188)
Constant	52.564***	41.357***	0.158	0.034**	0.090***
	(56.382)	(41.231)	(0.222)	(0.045)	(0.055)
Observations	847	867	412	426	624
Pseudo R-squared	0.119	0.0545	0.109	0.120	0.0937

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 50: Experimental Results (Logit). Dependent Variable: Leader Reputation Baseline: Backing Down

Baseline: Backing Down	India1: Hypothetical Country (Model 1)	India1: Pakistan (Model 2)	India2: Hypothetical Country (Model 3)	India2: China (Model 4)	Nigeria: Hypothetical Country (Model 5)
Engage Win	3.461***	1.664	4.697***	0.637	2.045***
	(1.601)	(0.797)	(2.039)	(0.233)	(0.552)
Engage Lose	1.684	0.560	1.612	0.511*	1.182
	(0.694)	(0.216)	(0.608)	(0.189)	(0.303)
Engage Win More Casualties	2.110*	1.008	5.056***	0.766	0.968
	(0.940)	(0.419)	(2.150)	(0.284)	(0.301)
Engage Lose Less Casualties	1.153	0.815	4.788***	0.849	1.387
	(0.434)	(0.337)	(2.050)	(0.321)	(0.441)
Militarism	0.750	0.705	2.025***	0.856	1.245
	(0.223)	(0.199)	(0.383)	(0.136)	(0.177)
Internationalism	0.502***	0.477***	1.647**	1.179	0.814
	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.382)	(0.222)	(0.127)
Age	0.734**	0.689***	1.326*	0.684***	0.952
	(0.108)	(0.098)	(0.212)	(0.093)	(0.120)
Gender	1.093	0.877	1.203	1.510	1.032
	(0.297)	(0.231)	(0.375)	(0.390)	(0.182)
Education	1.202	1.062	0.975	0.875	0.914
	(0.181)	(0.148)	(0.157)	(0.117)	(0.056)
Income	0.667***	0.888	1.041	1.003	1.073
	(0.073)	(0.085)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.123)
Constant	10.797**	23.569***	0.179	4.692	1.926
	(11.945)	(24.229)	(0.261)	(5.686)	(1.074)
Observations	799	826	400	393	623
Pseudo R-squared	0.123	0.0976	0.143	0.0331	0.0405

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 51: Experiment 1 Main Effects Approval, Reputation, Vote (Logit)

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Reputation	(3) Vote
Target Country Complies	1.873**	2.015**	1.879
	(0.561)	(0.685)	(0.882)
Engage Win the Engagement	2.434***	2.671***	2.000
	(0.791)	(0.990)	(0.905)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.833	0.812	1.139
	(0.228)	(0.251)	(0.487)
Engage Win with more Casualties	0.918	1.341	1.085
	(0.254)	(0.440)	(0.442)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	1.480	0.925	1.093
	(0.441)	(0.288)	(0.465)
Militarism	1.752***	2.455***	2.322***
	(0.286)	(0.439)	(0.638)
Nationalism	1.339***	1.365***	1.164
	(0.148)	(0.165)	(0.188)
Political Awareness	1.449***	1.767***	1.701***
	(0.168)	(0.227)	(0.295)
Internationalism	0.910	1.105	1.166
	(0.131)	(0.172)	(0.268)
Party Affiliation	2.445***	2.440***	2.634***
	(0.255)	(0.283)	(0.371)
Left-Right Political Views	1.019	1.108**	1.228***

	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.086)
Constant	9.910***	2.285	3.294
	(8.344)	(1.982)	(3.662)
Observations	1,645	1,564	832
Pseudo R-squared	0.202	0.261	0.317

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1[263]

Table 52: Experiment 1 Country A Main Effects (Logit)

[263] All the regression models for Experiment 1 control for: Income, Education, Gender and Age.

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Reputation	(3) Vote
Target Country Complies	2.667**	2.428**	2.531
	(1.148)	(1.083)	(1.728)
Engage Win the Engagement	3.964***	3.494**	3.247*
	(1.932)	(1.785)	(2.288)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.939	1.723	2.180
	(0.346)	(0.770)	(1.435)
Engage Win with more Casualties	1.075	2.007	0.855
	(0.420)	(0.968)	(0.536)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	1.842	1.071	0.764
	(0.774)	(0.446)	(0.465)
Income	0.645***	0.693***	0.690**
	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.106)
Education	0.892	1.152	0.834
	(0.133)	(0.189)	(0.209)
Gender	2.172***	0.963	0.934
	(0.634)	(0.062)	(0.108)

Age	0.769*	0.739*	0.845
	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.224)
Militarism	1.824***	2.262***	1.764
	(0.421)	(0.570)	(0.670)
Nationalism	1.322*	1.350*	1.104
	(0.209)	(0.233)	(0.239)
Political Engagement	1.403**	1.712***	2.182***
	(0.234)	(0.313)	(0.548)
Internationalism	0.865	1.169	1.210
	(0.182)	(0.261)	(0.382)
Party Affiliation	2.320***	2.290***	3.017***
	(0.333)	(0.369)	(0.705)
Left-Right Political Views	0.955	0.978	1.100
	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.105)
Constant	9.224*	4.062	7.068
	(11.234)	(5.218)	(13.406)
Observations	810	771	408
Pseudo R-squared	0.224	0.250	0.355

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 53: Experiment 1 Pakistan Main Effects (Logit)

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Reputation	(3) Vote
Target Country Complies	1.466	1.798	1.509
	(0.642)	(0.989)	(0.990)
Engage Win the Engagement	1.595	2.138	1.443
	(0.716)	(1.218)	(0.956)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.743	0.339**	0.556
	(0.313)	(0.159)	(0.333)
Engage Win with more Casualties	0.745	0.800	1.143
	(0.300)	(0.389)	(0.691)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	1.228	0.813	1.390
	(0.535)	(0.403)	(0.875)
Income	0.821*	0.971	1.045
	(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.157)
Education	0.810	0.945	0.715
	(0.121)	(0.151)	(0.161)
Gender	0.913	0.973	1.488
	(0.249)	(0.307)	(0.648)

Age	0.869	0.755	0.885
	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.194)
Militarism	1.786**	2.977***	3.488***
	(0.422)	(0.791)	(1.292)
Nationalism	1.317*	1.441**	1.188
	(0.212)	(0.255)	(0.271)
Political Engagement	1.493**	1.830***	1.609**
	(0.248)	(0.351)	(0.379)
Internationalism	0.927	1.106	1.124
	(0.189)	(0.251)	(0.327)
Party Affiliation	2.645***	2.724***	2.740***
	(0.415)	(0.480)	(0.598)
Left-Right Political Views	1.102	1.284***	1.322***
	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.127)
Constant	9.256*	1.146	1.055
	(11.012)	(1.453)	(1.749)
Observations	835	793	424
Pseudo R-squared	0.206	0.315	0.328

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 54: Experiment 1 Subset Non-Tamils (Logit)

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Reputation	(3) Vote
Target Country Complies	1.891	1.179	1.730
	(0.764)	(0.537)	(0.961)
Engage Win the Engagement	4.135***	4.090***	1.885
	(1.930)	(2.202)	(1.019)
Engage Lose the Engagement	1.165	1.301	0.806
	(0.434)	(0.606)	(0.416)
Engage Win with more Casualties	1.224	1.636	1.242
	(0.459)	(0.753)	(0.654)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	1.346	0.940	1.188
	(0.548)	(0.434)	(0.667)
Income	0.787**	0.904	0.875

	(0.084)	(0.106)	(0.113)
Education	0.687***	0.873	0.773
	(0.098)	(0.141)	(0.147)
Gender	1.749*	0.933	0.954
	(0.516)	(0.094)	(0.040)
Age	0.987	0.845	0.840
	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.160)
Militarism	1.429	2.265***	2.129**
	(0.315)	(0.571)	(0.649)
Nationalism	1.110	1.137	1.189
	(0.161)	(0.187)	(0.214)
Political Engagement	1.501***	2.422***	1.608**
	(0.236)	(0.470)	(0.331)
Internationalism	1.241	1.490*	1.348
	(0.235)	(0.319)	(0.363)
Party Affiliation	2.045***	2.496***	2.683***
	(0.287)	(0.411)	(0.502)
Left-Right Political Views	1.143**	1.253***	1.312***
	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.101)

Constant	10.138**	2.345	2.253
	(11.605)	(2.951)	(3.237)
Observations	915	856	593
Pseudo R-squared	0.197	0.332	0.343

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 55: Experiment 1 Subset Hindu (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Reputation	Vote
Target Country Complies	1.983*	2.712*	1.709
	(0.756)	(1.493)	(0.920)
Engage Win the Engagement	3.024***	1.869	2.540
	(1.256)	(0.882)	(1.454)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.843	0.531	1.943
	(0.276)	(0.206)	(1.012)

Engage Win with more Casualties	1.107	1.204	1.693
	(0.389)	(0.544)	(0.909)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	2.426**	0.994	1.835
	(1.003)	(0.429)	(0.957)
Income	0.717***	0.896	0.776*
	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.107)
Education	0.801	0.941	0.771
	(0.108)	(0.141)	(0.158)
Gender	1.718**	1.374	1.687
	(0.453)	(0.404)	(0.683)
Age	0.797	0.744*	0.854
	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.172)
Militarism	1.740***	2.503***	1.731*
	(0.359)	(0.575)	(0.537)
Nationalism	1.465**	1.234	1.318
	(0.217)	(0.201)	(0.257)
Political Engagement	1.368**	1.810***	1.473*
	(0.207)	(0.309)	(0.315)
Internationalism	1.028	1.313	1.260

	(0.194)	(0.265)	(0.333)
Party Affiliation	2.314***	2.063***	2.703***
	(0.303)	(0.307)	(0.517)
Left-Right Political Views	0.951	1.029	1.145
	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.099)
Constant	24.619***	7.780*	3.187
	(26.619)	(9.528)	(5.055)
Observations	1,281	1,234	646
Pseudo R-squared	0.196	0.206	0.269

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 56: Experiment 1 Manipulation Check Pass (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Reputation	Vote
Target Country Complies	1.980	2.934**	1.747

	(0.830)	(1.423)	(1.035)
Engage Win the Engagement	1.717	2.425*	1.300
	(0.710)	(1.117)	(0.721)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.701	0.946	1.330
	(0.265)	(0.407)	(0.774)
Engage Win with more Casualties	0.831	1.609	1.014
	(0.310)	(0.706)	(0.541)
Engage Lose with less Casualties	1.072	1.409	1.023
	(0.422)	(0.617)	(0.560)
Income	0.685***	0.764**	0.800*
	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.100)
Education	0.789*	0.936	0.652**
	(0.105)	(0.143)	(0.135)
Gender	1.098	0.911	2.032*
	(0.283)	(0.267)	(0.795)
Age	0.984	0.720**	0.985
	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.190)
Militarism	2.037***	2.385***	2.651***
	(0.425)	(0.562)	(0.818)

Nationalism	1.257	1.680***	1.067
	(0.176)	(0.278)	(0.206)
Political Engagement	1.712***	1.635***	2.105***
	(0.261)	(0.300)	(0.438)
Internationalism	1.194	1.612**	1.232
	(0.216)	(0.331)	(0.326)
Party Affiliation	2.049***	2.085***	2.429***
	(0.279)	(0.332)	(0.466)
Left-Right Political Views	1.145**	1.275***	1.263***
	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.098)
Constant	21.079***	4.700	5.013
	(23.060)	(5.735)	(7.992)
Observations	1,264	1,211	662
Pseudo R-squared	0.246	0.330	0.359

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.3 Experiment 2 India

Table 57: Experimental Results (Logit). Dependent variable: Leader Approval

	Model 1 India1: Hypothetical Country	Model 2 India2: Hypothetical Country	Model 3 India 2: Pakistan	Model 4 India3: Hypothetical Country	Model 5 India3: China	Model 6 Nigeria: Hypothetical Country
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Engage Win	3.012***	1.357***	0.652	1.717***	1.651***	1.184***
	(0.548)	(0.447)	(0.430)	(0.439)	(0.410)	(0.307)
Engage Lose	1.513***	0.035	-0.064	0.291	0.337	0.419
	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.380)	(0.353)	(0.341)	(0.324)
Engage Win More Casualties	NA	0.200	-0.116	0.812**	1.311***	0.428

		(0.365)	(0.368)	(0.372)	(0.381)	(0.355)
Engage Lose Less Casualties	NA	0.712*	0.088	1.548***	1.519**	-0.135
		(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.422)	(0.394)	(0.417)
Militarism	0.279***	0.279***	0.230***	0.172***	0.113**	0.120***
	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.040)
Internationalism	NA	0.008	0.156**	0.053	0.041	-0.017
		(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.046)
Age	-0.160	-0.331**	-0.273*	0.090	0.350**	0.203
	(0.184)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.129)
Gender	0.145	0.680**	-0.164	-0.023	0.579**	0.175
	(0.325)	(0.273)	(0.246)	(0.285)	(0.291)	(0.188)

Education	-0.287*	-0.120	-0.062	0.127	0.074	-0.057
	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.147)	(0.139)	(0.065)
Income	-0.294***	-0.529***	-0.262***	0.015	0.039*	0.438***
	(0.065)	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.122)
Constant	1.526	1.796	1.063	-2.955**	-4.051**	-3.223***
	(1.337)	(1.305)	(1.240)	(1.408)	(1.306)	(0.822)
N	468	848	867	450	465	624
Log Likelihood	-172.192	-257.636	-269.665	-216.736	-236.874	-359.456
AIC	360.384	539.272	563.330	457.472	497.748	742.912

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

B.4 Experiment 3 Nigeria

Table 58: Experiment 3 Main Effects

Baseline Backing Down	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Engage Win the Engagement	1.959***	-1.401**	1.214**
	(0.548)	(0.599)	(0.534)
Engage Lose the Engagement	0.594	-0.428	0.514
	(0.537)	(0.587)	(0.523)
Engage Win with More Casualties	-0.399	0.377	-0.0664
	(0.624)	(0.682)	(0.607)
Engage Lose with Less Casualties	-0.443	0.0980	-0.370
	(0.634)	(0.693)	(0.616)
Militarism	0.743***	0.171	0.202
	(0.275)	(0.301)	(0.268)
Political Awareness	-0.204	-0.183	0.0560
	(0.236)	(0.258)	(0.230)
Hawkishness	0.165	0.289	-0.270
	(0.290)	(0.316)	(0.282)
Internationalism	-1.534***	1.070***	-0.973***
	(0.354)	(0.387)	(0.344)
Economics Approval	0.254	-0.211	0.603***
	(0.177)	(0.193)	(0.172)
Religiosity	0.159**	0.0454	0.0377
	(0.0737)	(0.0805)	(0.0717)
Age	0.711**	-0.292	0.850***

	(0.295)	(0.323)	(0.287)
Gender	-0.521	0.430	-0.383
	(0.400)	(0.437)	(0.389)
Education	-0.000557	0.160	0.0231
	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.129)
Occupation	0.196	-0.462*	0.0354
	(0.255)	(0.279)	(0.248)
Constant	1.178	5.341***	1.210
	(1.516)	(1.657)	(1.475)
Observations	269	269	269
R-squared	0.177	0.105	0.137

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 59: Robustness Check Experiment 3 Main Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Backing Down	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Militarism	-0.0271	-0.0276	0.117***	-0.0315
	(0.0370)	(0.0379)	(0.0315)	(0.0310)
Political Awareness	0.00220	0.0407	-0.0217	-0.0226
	(0.0324)	(0.0332)	(0.0276)	(0.0271)
Hawkishness	-0.0403	-0.0716*	0.0961***	-0.0209
	(0.0391)	(0.0401)	(0.0332)	(0.0327)
Internationalism	0.0692	-0.0288	0.00979	-0.0158

	(0.0486)	(0.0498)	(0.0413)	(0.0406)
Economics Approval	0.00296	0.0159	-0.0402*	0.0221
	(0.0242)	(0.0248)	(0.0206)	(0.0202)
Religiosity	0.00146	0.0123	0.00328	-0.00627
	(0.0101)	(0.0104)	(0.00860)	(0.00846)
Age	-0.0409	-0.0330	0.118***	0.0692**
	(0.0390)	(0.0400)	(0.0331)	(0.0326)
Gender	-0.0527	-0.0258	0.0850*	0.0713
	(0.0544)	(0.0557)	(0.0462)	(0.0455)
Education	0.0195	-0.0102	0.00267	0.000575
	(0.0182)	(0.0186)	(0.0154)	(0.0152)
Occupation	-0.0198	-0.0304	0.000228	0.0160
	(0.0351)	(0.0360)	(0.0298)	(0.0294)
Constant	0.217	0.305	-0.124	-0.0728
	(0.207)	(0.212)	(0.176)	(0.173)
Observations	269	269	269	269
R-squared	0.029	0.038	0.148	0.053

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 60: Experimental Results in LOGIT for Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Dependent variable: Leader Approval - - Subset of Respondents who have correctly answered the post-treatment manipulation check.

India1: Hypothe	India2: Hypotheti	India 2:	India3: Hypotheti	India 3: China	Nigeria: Hypotheti

	tical Country	cal Country	Pakistan	cal Country		cal Country
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Compliance	NA	0.853	0.140	3.137***	1.899***	1.682**
		(0.542)	(0.540)	(0.675)	(0.495)	(0.798)
Engage Win	3.073***	0.870	0.334	2.559***	2.261***	1.861**
	(0.641)	(0.549)	(0.554)	(0.571)	(0.559)	(0.843)
Engage Lose	1.462***	-0.192	0.177	0.767*	0.479	1.117
	(0.405)	(0.453)	(0.573)	(0.440)	(0.423)	(0.820)
Engage Win More Casualties	NA	0.182	-0.398	1.447***	1.641***	0.334
		(0.506)	(0.491)	(0.446)	(0.457)	(0.870)
Engage Lose Less Casualties	NA	0.348	-0.269	2.134***	1.758***	0.297
		(0.500)	(0.520)	(0.500)	(0.469)	(0.895)

Militarism	0.337***	0.348***	0.268***	0.208***	0.131**	-0.075
	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.097)
Internationalism	NA	0.028	0.250***	0.054	0.054	0.064
		(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.114)
Age	-0.267	-0.288*	-0.190	0.155	0.370**	0.510*
	(0.224)	(0.169)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.297)
Gender	0.415	0.649*	-0.444	0.152	0.656*	0.441
	(0.413)	(0.361)	(0.315)	(0.378)	(0.386)	(0.447)
Education	-0.227	-0.104	-0.125	0.188	0.051	-0.180
	(0.198)	(0.181)	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.141)
Income	-0.315***	-0.645***	-0.400***	0.022	0.043	0.159

	(0.081)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.286)
Constant	0.630	1.953	1.706	-4.838**	-4.588**	-1.628
	(1.646)	(1.725)	(1.624)	(1.984)	(1.806)	(1.697)
N	363	658	668	326	334	123
Log Likelihood	-124.645	-161.460	-162.997	-146.534	-158.029	-72.653
AIC	265.291	346.921	349.995	317.067	340.058	169.307

B.5 Experiment 4 India

Table 61: Experiment 4 Main Effects

Baseline: Back Down	(Model 1) Approval	(Model 2) Voting	(Model 3) Reputation of the Country[264]	(Model 4) Reputation of the Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.153	1.205	3.774	6.380
	(0.216)	(0.241)	(3.868)	(3.971)
Engage and Lose	4.111***	2.307***	8.026**	7.402**
	(0.929)	(0.489)	(3.400)	(3.490)
Engage and Win	10.737***	4.918***	16.162***	14.452***
	(3.175)	(1.229)	(3.827)	(3.929)
Party Affiliation	1.151	1.256**	1.914	-0.039
	(0.121)	(0.127)	(1.548)	(1.589)
Prime Minister Approval	1.112	1.282***	3.320***	3.320**
	(0.095)	(0.104)	(1.258)	(1.292)
Militarism	1.352**	1.640***	3.849*	6.718***
	(0.171)	(0.211)	(2.007)	(2.061)

[264] The Coefficient Plots for the reputation of the country and the prime minister are attached to the appendix.

Political Awareness	2.108***	2.195***	2.621*	2.744*
	(0.221)	(0.225)	(1.381)	(1.418)
Trust in the Government	1.359***	1.485***	5.689***	7.682***
	(0.152)	(0.164)	(1.806)	(1.854)
Constant	2.715	0.883	41.731***	50.921***
	(2.026)	(0.632)	(10.929)	(11.220)
Observations	1,745	1,685	441	441
Pseudo R-squared	0.241	0.259		
R-squared			0.220	0.251

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1[265]

Table 62: Experiment 4 Main Effects Subset Non-Tamils

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister	(5) Protest
Stay Out	1.151	1.668**	7.092*	9.058**	1.443
	(0.267)	(0.426)	(4.140)	(4.306)	(0.367)
Engage and Lose	6.446***	3.425***	8.338**	8.584**	1.356
	(1.752)	(0.864)	(3.667)	(3.814)	(0.329)

[265] All the regression models for Experiment 2 control for: Income, Education, Gender and Age.

Engage and Win	25.549***	14.176***	16.994***	14.940***	1.235
	(10.892)	(5.128)	(4.089)	(4.253)	(0.307)
Group Oppose	1.528	1.093	4.773	3.811	0.594**
	(0.397)	(0.289)	(3.774)	(3.925)	(0.139)
Group Endorse	2.888***	1.608*	5.345	0.588	0.884
	(0.813)	(0.454)	(3.690)	(3.838)	(0.215)
Elite Endorse	2.443***	1.375	4.182	-0.084	0.896
	(0.677)	(0.376)	(3.590)	(3.734)	(0.219)
Party Affiliation	1.222	1.433***	1.505	-0.889	0.935
	(0.165)	(0.187)	(1.650)	(1.716)	(0.121)
Prime Minister Approval	1.031	1.314***	3.412**	3.439**	0.732***
	(0.108)	(0.133)	(1.323)	(1.376)	(0.071)
Militarism	1.098	1.487**	3.692*	6.739***	1.069
	(0.166)	(0.231)	(2.148)	(2.234)	(0.153)
Political Engagement	2.366***	2.045***	2.992**	2.789*	3.555***
	(0.313)	(0.266)	(1.493)	(1.553)	(0.404)
Trust in the Government	1.506***	1.375**	6.091***	7.813***	1.118
	(0.217)	(0.194)	(1.977)	(2.056)	(0.152)
Constant	0.553	0.147**	43.439***	51.664***	65.269***
	(0.523)	(0.130)	(11.749)	(12.221)	(55.329)
Observations	990	928	381	381	944
Pseudo R-squared	0.281	0.282			0.341
R-squared			0.230	0.256	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 63: Experiment 4 Main Effects Subset Hindu

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister	(5) Protest
Stay Out	0.906	0.934	1.656	3.578	1.332
	(0.202)	(0.220)	(4.517)	(4.761)	(0.311)
Engage and Lose	6.022***	2.313***	5.047	3.306	1.137
	(1.840)	(0.602)	(3.992)	(4.208)	(0.261)
Engage and Win	14.933***	4.369***	16.492***	13.948***	0.892
	(5.762)	(1.283)	(4.373)	(4.609)	(0.199)
Group Oppose	1.762**	1.606*	4.271	0.394	0.877
	(0.439)	(0.392)	(3.901)	(4.112)	(0.191)
Group Endorse	3.307***	2.383***	3.435	1.586	0.939
	(0.942)	(0.629)	(4.136)	(4.360)	(0.209)
Elite Endorse	3.225***	2.113***	2.173	-2.850	1.382
	(0.903)	(0.544)	(3.903)	(4.114)	(0.324)
Party Affiliation	1.094	1.100	-0.345	-2.616	0.780**
	(0.153)	(0.140)	(1.820)	(1.919)	(0.095)
Prime Minister Approval	1.241**	1.196*	1.889	2.670*	0.829**
	(0.131)	(0.117)	(1.367)	(1.441)	(0.075)
Militarism	1.574***	1.880***	4.027*	6.245**	1.543***
	(0.259)	(0.295)	(2.364)	(2.492)	(0.221)
Political Engagement	2.358***	2.230***	0.313	1.816	3.435***
	(0.307)	(0.273)	(1.609)	(1.696)	(0.356)
Trust in the Government	1.042	1.271*	7.086***	8.360***	0.960
	(0.151)	(0.174)	(2.109)	(2.223)	(0.126)
Constant	4.651	3.008	52.058***	58.725***	103.499***
	(4.383)	(2.702)	(12.514)	(13.190)	(84.525)
Observations	1,347	1,323	324	324	1,293

Pseudo R-squared	0.279	0.205			0.358
R-squared			0.189	0.204	

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 64: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Pass

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Reputation	Prime Minister	Protest
Stay Out	1.240	1.216	1.640	2.416	1.091
	(0.274)	(0.291)	(4.481)	(4.613)	(0.247)
Engage and Lose	4.160***	2.325***	6.244	5.660	1.060
	(1.093)	(0.584)	(3.982)	(4.100)	(0.237)
Engage and Win	9.628***	4.274***	15.155***	11.786**	0.886
	(3.245)	(1.243)	(4.487)	(4.620)	(0.203)
Group Oppose	1.432	1.373	5.355	2.478	0.989
	(0.349)	(0.330)	(3.819)	(3.932)	(0.218)
Group Endorse	2.235***	2.404***	4.534	1.263	1.027
	(0.576)	(0.629)	(3.904)	(4.019)	(0.229)
Elite Endorse	2.671***	2.096***	4.306	0.861	1.175
	(0.710)	(0.545)	(3.735)	(3.846)	(0.266)
Party Affiliation	1.259*	1.278**	1.171	-0.438	0.888
	(0.153)	(0.151)	(1.740)	(1.792)	(0.096)
Prime Minister Approval	1.063	1.221**	2.123	1.324	0.833**
	(0.109)	(0.120)	(1.486)	(1.530)	(0.075)
Militarism	1.465**	1.686***	3.301	5.264**	1.402**
	(0.221)	(0.257)	(2.435)	(2.507)	(0.192)
Political Engagement	2.013***	2.071***	2.719*	2.566	3.783***

	(0.248)	(0.253)	(1.572)	(1.619)	(0.399)
Trust in the Government	1.336**	1.559***	8.131***	10.723***	0.853
	(0.180)	(0.211)	(2.192)	(2.257)	(0.106)
Constant	2.116	1.091	45.362***	58.992***	51.882***
	(1.875)	(0.929)	(13.007)	(13.392)	(41.426)
Observations	1,393	1,366	338	338	1,368
Pseudo R-squared	0.247	0.281			0.354
R-squared			0.239	0.259	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 65: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Non-Tamils Pass

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister	(5) Protest
Stay Out	1.221	1.535	5.903	6.386	1.375
	(0.311)	(0.429)	(4.426)	(4.611)	(0.392)
Engage and Lose	5.739***	3.539***	6.715*	7.134*	1.194
	(1.679)	(0.992)	(3.986)	(4.153)	(0.322)
Engage and Win	19.719***	12.132***	14.571***	11.885**	1.227
	(8.585)	(4.567)	(4.409)	(4.594)	(0.347)
Group Oppose	1.500	0.986	5.781	5.691	0.578**
	(0.423)	(0.280)	(3.933)	(4.098)	(0.152)
Group Endorse	3.114***	1.828*	4.966	1.764	0.896
	(0.957)	(0.565)	(3.863)	(4.025)	(0.242)
Elite Endorse	2.563***	1.452	3.614	0.640	0.863
	(0.765)	(0.434)	(3.751)	(3.908)	(0.233)

Party Affiliation	1.222	1.494***	1.806	-0.640	1.079
	(0.176)	(0.212)	(1.719)	(1.792)	(0.152)
Prime Minister Approval	1.006	1.307**	3.456**	2.970**	0.730***
	(0.119)	(0.149)	(1.378)	(1.436)	(0.081)
Militarism	1.157	1.417**	3.222	6.711***	1.146
	(0.189)	(0.240)	(2.229)	(2.322)	(0.183)
Political Engagement	2.273***	2.067***	2.635*	2.060	4.127***
	(0.324)	(0.295)	(1.566)	(1.632)	(0.537)
Trust in the Government	1.478**	1.394**	6.097***	8.240***	0.911
	(0.239)	(0.224)	(2.115)	(2.204)	(0.141)
Constant	0.663	0.200	42.848***	55.064***	51.175***
	(0.702)	(0.198)	(12.320)	(12.838)	(49.099)
Observations	864	822	345	345	827
Pseudo R-squared	0.271	0.302			0.372
R-squared			0.225	0.251	

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 66: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Hindu Pass

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Reputation	Prime Minister	Protest
Stay Out	0.959	0.896	1.683	0.607	1.545
	(0.256)	(0.255)	(5.149)	(5.449)	(0.427)
Engage and Lose	6.397***	2.600***	4.599	3.008	1.258
	(2.357)	(0.824)	(4.607)	(4.876)	(0.335)
Engage and Win	16.583***	4.497***	18.451***	13.034**	0.966

	(7.872)	(1.592)	(5.070)	(5.366)	(0.252)
Group Oppose	1.600	1.628*	7.130*	2.615	1.019
	(0.477)	(0.472)	(4.246)	(4.494)	(0.264)
Group Endorse	3.054***	2.555***	5.504	5.047	0.969
	(1.023)	(0.804)	(4.700)	(4.975)	(0.253)
Elite Endorse	3.646***	2.447***	3.710	-0.427	1.365
	(1.266)	(0.777)	(4.328)	(4.581)	(0.372)
Party Affiliation	1.117	1.047	0.194	-2.318	0.834
	(0.185)	(0.160)	(1.999)	(2.115)	(0.115)
Prime Minister Approval	1.173	1.119	0.480	0.721	0.835*
	(0.155)	(0.137)	(1.616)	(1.710)	(0.091)
Militarism	1.783***	2.291***	6.855**	7.143**	1.638***
	(0.353)	(0.431)	(2.914)	(3.084)	(0.276)
Political Engagement	2.302***	2.149***	0.365	1.648	3.781***
	(0.367)	(0.323)	(1.856)	(1.965)	(0.475)
Trust in the Government	1.132	1.317	7.450***	9.284***	0.854
	(0.203)	(0.229)	(2.525)	(2.672)	(0.135)
Constant	3.783	2.890	49.210***	62.620***	56.963***
	(4.366)	(3.132)	(14.501)	(15.348)	(55.779)
Observations	1,079	1,065	249	249	1,047
Pseudo R-squared	0.293	0.235			0.383
R-squared			0.211	0.197	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 67: Experiment Main Effects 4 Subset No Cue

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Reputation	Prime Minister	Protest
Stay Out	0.769	1.151	-6.226	-0.759	0.714
	(0.266)	(0.428)	(7.262)	(7.263)	(0.255)
Engage and Fail	3.786***	4.805***	4.626	7.821	1.011
	(1.562)	(2.059)	(5.242)	(5.242)	(0.387)
Engage and Win	19.724***	4.695***	22.898***	20.514***	0.786
	(11.558)	(1.998)	(6.842)	(6.843)	(0.288)
Party Affiliation	1.148	1.119	3.291	1.707	0.923
	(0.238)	(0.229)	(2.133)	(2.134)	(0.173)
Prime Minister Approval	1.115	1.473**	1.024	1.775	0.670***
	(0.183)	(0.237)	(1.681)	(1.681)	(0.102)
Militarism	0.945	1.299	5.610**	7.989***	1.385
	(0.215)	(0.306)	(2.742)	(2.743)	(0.309)
Political Engagement	2.267***	2.367***	3.712*	3.277*	2.527***
	(0.448)	(0.472)	(1.892)	(1.892)	(0.435)
Trust in the Government	1.334	1.263	7.078***	8.421***	0.937
	(0.306)	(0.277)	(2.621)	(2.621)	(0.195)
Constant	11.513*	1.293	30.338**	33.756**	364.098***
	(15.201)	(1.727)	(14.818)	(14.819)	(462.054)
Observations	449	425	206	206	435
Pseudo R-squared	0.292	0.299			0.266
R-squared			0.306	0.335	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 68: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Social Group Oppose

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister	(5) Protest
Stay Out	1.014	1.008	-2.926	-4.778	1.162
	(0.465)	(0.479)	(8.531)	(8.506)	(0.461)
Engage and Fail	3.088**	1.297	1.364	-5.348	1.052
	(1.586)	(0.619)	(8.017)	(7.993)	(0.420)
Engage and Win	10.987***	4.534**	-1.806	-1.404	0.800
	(8.966)	(2.846)	(8.557)	(8.532)	(0.311)
Party Affiliation	0.990	1.266	8.164*	7.759*	0.688*
	(0.257)	(0.299)	(4.093)	(4.080)	(0.137)
Prime Minister Approval	1.038	1.307	2.945	0.173	0.833
	(0.231)	(0.265)	(3.300)	(3.290)	(0.132)
Militarism	1.866**	1.597	-2.382	4.539	1.216
	(0.581)	(0.496)	(5.334)	(5.318)	(0.287)
Political Engagement	2.331***	2.643***	-6.028	-6.988*	3.721***
	(0.685)	(0.691)	(3.720)	(3.709)	(0.714)
Trust in the Government	1.575	1.595*	10.482**	14.086***	0.867
	(0.441)	(0.418)	(4.553)	(4.539)	(0.189)
Constant	60.802**	4.819	81.428***	102.737***	88.830***
	(110.456)	(8.519)	(26.845)	(26.765)	(127.199)
Observations	428	421	76	76	422
Pseudo R-squared	0.295	0.281			0.338
R-squared			0.363	0.457	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 69: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Social Group Endorse

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister	(5) Protest
Stay Out	2.045*	1.950*	10.212	22.572**	1.434
	(0.806)	(0.785)	(8.736)	(8.550)	(0.540)
Engage and Fail	3.612***	1.794	3.418	14.542	1.279
	(1.582)	(0.726)	(9.415)	(9.215)	(0.485)
Engage and Win	4.765***	7.340***	12.796	16.673*	0.919
	(2.238)	(4.101)	(8.582)	(8.399)	(0.351)
Party Affiliation	1.622**	1.277	-3.879	-10.727**	0.897
	(0.306)	(0.250)	(4.293)	(4.201)	(0.158)
Prime Minister Approval	1.261	1.304*	1.799	2.125	0.883
	(0.194)	(0.201)	(3.926)	(3.842)	(0.129)
Militarism	1.604**	1.753**	7.528	14.241**	1.726**
	(0.374)	(0.434)	(5.780)	(5.658)	(0.391)
Political Engagement	2.269***	2.141***	-1.179	0.909	3.417***
	(0.441)	(0.408)	(3.662)	(3.584)	(0.564)
Trust in the Government	1.014	1.616**	9.832*	12.310**	0.957
	(0.202)	(0.332)	(5.194)	(5.084)	(0.188)
Constant	1.184	0.913	90.644**	97.417***	62.172***
	(1.753)	(1.228)	(36.429)	(35.655)	(84.971)
Observations	435	430	76	76	438
Pseudo R-squared	0.192	0.250			0.355
R-squared			0.359	0.444	

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 70: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Elite Endorse

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.634	0.935	5.899	5.191
	(0.664)	(0.399)	(8.464)	(9.470)
Engage and Fail	13.586***	2.539*	16.931*	7.648
	(8.697)	(1.218)	(8.513)	(9.525)
Engage and Win	27.104***	3.748***	13.730	6.332
	(21.483)	(1.886)	(8.572)	(9.591)
Party Affiliation	0.847	1.366	-2.182	-2.527
	(0.207)	(0.288)	(4.145)	(4.638)
Prime Minister Approval	1.207	1.172	7.408*	7.046
	(0.230)	(0.203)	(3.833)	(4.289)
Militarism	1.337	2.278***	4.190	1.290
	(0.417)	(0.687)	(4.935)	(5.521)
Political Engagement	1.952***	1.754***	9.095**	7.263*
	(0.447)	(0.378)	(3.814)	(4.268)
Trust in the Government	1.822**	1.497*	-5.706	-2.137
	(0.459)	(0.349)	(4.917)	(5.502)
Constant	0.610	0.812	16.543	40.962
	(0.950)	(1.110)	(23.988)	(26.840)
Observations	433	409	83	83
Pseudo R-squared	0.279	0.228		
R-squared			0.261	0.211

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 71: Experiment 4 Subset BJP Party Main Effects

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.003	0.891	6.594	9.330*
	(0.268)	(0.244)	(4.970)	(5.076)
Engage and Fail	8.991***	3.330***	8.221*	11.402**
	(3.586)	(1.088)	(4.360)	(4.453)
Engage and Win	12.524***	4.462***	15.283***	14.072***
	(5.437)	(1.577)	(4.846)	(4.949)
Party Affiliation	2.104**	1.585	3.620	-1.035
	(0.658)	(0.462)	(4.461)	(4.556)
Prime Minister Approval	2.697***	2.172**	6.987	5.677
	(0.883)	(0.674)	(4.241)	(4.331)
Militarism	2.782***	2.736***	0.398	-3.975
	(0.940)	(0.903)	(4.385)	(4.478)
Political Engagement	1.116	1.117	2.518*	2.949*
	(0.148)	(0.138)	(1.514)	(1.546)
Trust in the Government	1.141	2.033***	2.129	4.016
Baseline: Back Down	(0.223)	(0.385)	(2.538)	(2.592)
	2.762***	2.383***	2.002	3.039
Stay Out	(0.456)	(0.359)	(1.818)	(1.856)
	0.968	0.952	7.583***	8.740***
	(0.187)	(0.177)	(2.601)	(2.657)
Constant	5.184	4.667	57.010***	51.382***
	(5.670)	(4.961)	(14.821)	(15.136)

Observations	1,035	1,020	251	251
Pseudo R-squared	0.286	0.197		
R-squared			0.218	0.255

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 72: Experiment 4 Subset INC Party Main Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.615	1.769	8.924	12.515
	(0.637)	(0.788)	(8.782)	(9.037)
Engage and Lose	3.829***	1.942	6.735	5.360
	(1.768)	(0.893)	(7.555)	(7.774)
Engage and Win	4.496***	4.952***	13.537	10.758
	(2.219)	(2.605)	(9.186)	(9.453)
Group Oppose	0.884	1.009	17.629**	21.979**
	(0.369)	(0.472)	(8.410)	(8.654)
Group Endorse	2.067	1.449	0.579	-8.015
	(0.938)	(0.673)	(8.253)	(8.492)
Elite Endorse	3.377***	2.187	14.499*	5.706
	(1.577)	(1.056)	(7.782)	(8.008)
Party Affiliation	1.168	1.499**	0.170	2.162
	(0.204)	(0.272)	(3.397)	(3.496)
Prime Minister Approval	1.524*	1.211	-2.262	0.819
	(0.359)	(0.317)	(4.252)	(4.376)

Militarism	2.030***	2.419***	3.999	6.345*
	(0.419)	(0.516)	(3.488)	(3.589)
Political Engagement	2.176***	2.202***	2.936	3.556
	(0.468)	(0.473)	(3.950)	(4.065)
Constant	1.153	1.677	49.863**	49.135**
	(1.662)	(2.469)	(21.695)	(22.325)
Observations	409	394	97	97
Pseudo R-squared	0.260	0.371		
R-squared			0.195	0.254

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.6 Experiment 5 India

Table 73: Experiment 5 Main Effects

Baseline: Back Down	(Model 1) Approval	(Model 2) Voting	(Model 3) Reputation of the Country[266]	(Model 4) Reputation of the Prime Minister
Engage	14.150***	4.382***	15.279***	12.815***
	(5.433)	(1.242)	(4.216)	(4.487)
Party Affiliation	0.969	1.066	2.145	-1.311
	(0.141)	(0.148)	(2.806)	(2.987)
Prime Minister Approval	1.032	1.309**	2.644	2.217
	(0.120)	(0.147)	(2.021)	(2.152)
Militarism	1.265	1.386*	1.364	4.570
	(0.213)	(0.243)	(3.400)	(3.619)
Nationalism	0.855	0.620***	3.409	3.503
	(0.107)	(0.084)	(2.450)	(2.608)

[266] The Coefficient Plots for the reputation of the country and the prime minister are attached to the appendix.

Political Awareness	2.179***	2.108***	-5.884**	-4.311
	(0.301)	(0.285)	(2.539)	(2.703)
Trust in the Government	1.619***	2.018***	8.967***	10.929***
	(0.251)	(0.308)	(2.850)	(3.034)
Constant	15.459***	6.059*	76.454***	83.680***
	(15.006)	(5.789)	(17.329)	(18.447)
Observations	1,117	1,081	195	195
Pseudo R-squared	0.243	0.256		
R-squared			0.306	0.288

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 74: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage	38.381***	9.844***	23.143*	17.711
	(29.550)	(5.911)	(12.021)	(13.605)

Age	0.449**	0.514**	-1.608	0.257
	(0.157)	(0.174)	(10.632)	(12.032)
Gender	1.727	1.234	-13.818	-4.385
	(1.003)	(0.696)	(15.490)	(17.531)
Education	1.270	0.843	-0.800	0.283
	(0.367)	(0.259)	(6.673)	(7.552)
Income	0.703***	0.903	-0.262	-1.599
	(0.089)	(0.113)	(2.905)	(3.288)
Party Affiliation	0.861	1.311	3.571	7.978
	(0.312)	(0.446)	(12.871)	(14.567)
Prime Minister Approval	0.661	0.878	5.895	7.122
	(0.193)	(0.250)	(6.931)	(7.844)
Militarism	1.835	2.417**	5.006	-2.314
	(0.750)	(1.049)	(11.529)	(13.047)
Nationalism	0.616*	0.536*	7.060	1.752
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(6.994)	(7.916)
Political Awareness	1.914**	2.113**	-5.090	0.802
	(0.628)	(0.671)	(8.428)	(9.538)
Trust in the Government	3.525***	2.529***	3.884	4.914

	(1.445)	(0.906)	(9.240)	(10.457)
Constant	45.634*	48.054*	43.052	19.960
	(103.552)	(112.002)	(69.459)	(78.608)
Observations	232	213	36	36
Pseudo R-squared	0.401	0.336		
R-squared			0.453	0.371

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 75: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage	10.311***	3.488***	12.175***	11.016**
	(4.611)	(1.097)	(4.543)	(4.765)
Age	0.933	0.889	-5.051**	-5.156*
	(0.139)	(0.135)	(2.499)	(2.621)

Gender	1.599	1.281	-1.110	-3.120
	(0.472)	(0.356)	(4.688)	(4.916)
Education	0.901	0.986	-4.157*	-3.497
	(0.124)	(0.132)	(2.205)	(2.312)
Income	0.838***	0.805***	1.710*	1.986*
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.991)	(1.039)
Party Affiliation	1.017	1.064	2.245	-2.676
	(0.163)	(0.165)	(2.939)	(3.082)
Prime Minister Approval	1.103	1.406***	1.332	1.220
	(0.142)	(0.176)	(2.221)	(2.329)
Militarism	1.144	1.227	0.788	5.803
	(0.216)	(0.241)	(3.731)	(3.913)
Nationalism	0.895	0.633***	2.724	4.130
	(0.129)	(0.095)	(2.691)	(2.821)
Political Awareness	2.262***	2.158***	-5.912**	-5.198*
	(0.351)	(0.324)	(2.710)	(2.842)
Trust in the Government	1.472**	1.958***	10.703***	11.784***
	(0.255)	(0.337)	(3.177)	(3.332)
Constant	11.683**	4.000	80.872***	92.212***

	(12.854)	(4.235)	(18.039)	(18.917)
Observations	885	868	159	159
Pseudo R-squared	0.213	0.249		
R-squared			0.290	0.291

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 76: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Non-Tamils

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage	1,505.164***	293.542***	15.488	12.076
	(2,749.238)	(458.220)	(17.552)	(19.123)
Age	0.185**	0.258**	-8.524	-2.453
	(0.126)	(0.154)	(16.980)	(18.500)
Gender	2.547	1.949	-12.584	-5.577
	(2.416)	(1.987)	(19.952)	(21.737)
Education	1.637	1.079	0.132	0.233

	(0.769)	(0.564)	(8.833)	(9.623)
Income	0.498***	0.734	-1.405	-2.306
	(0.120)	(0.157)	(4.355)	(4.745)
Party Affiliation	0.334	0.862	0.265	-6.656
	(0.245)	(0.532)	(18.312)	(19.951)
Prime Minister Approval	0.555	0.738	10.477	12.899
	(0.285)	(0.364)	(10.922)	(11.900)
Militarism	1.725	1.560	-2.491	-13.291
	(1.075)	(1.095)	(17.956)	(19.563)
Nationalism	0.332**	0.524	7.086	3.258
	(0.159)	(0.266)	(8.654)	(9.428)
Political Awareness	7.708***	16.905***	-3.415	2.350
	(5.824)	(14.205)	(10.437)	(11.372)
Trust in the Government	15.783***	10.181***	5.115	10.612
	(14.028)	(8.170)	(12.289)	(13.389)
Constant	6,622.835*	1,024.931	49.289	48.878
	(30,266.420)	(5,035.159)	(96.043)	(104.640)
Observations	134	119	29	29

Pseudo R-squared	0.639	0.601		
R-squared			0.404	0.356

Standard Error in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 77: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Hindu

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage	74.160***	38.380***	39.265***	33.192**
	(85.635)	(41.050)	(11.182)	(13.277)
Age	0.376**	0.298**	7.036	9.119
	(0.166)	(0.152)	(9.662)	(11.472)
Gender	1.438	0.989	7.883	15.274
	(1.075)	(0.863)	(16.870)	(20.031)
Education	1.065	0.876	-3.723	-0.510
	(0.386)	(0.362)	(5.779)	(6.861)
Income	0.751*	0.744	-2.059	-4.207
	(0.128)	(0.154)	(2.980)	(3.538)

Party Affiliation	0.673	0.820	25.796	28.239
	(0.386)	(0.497)	(14.868)	(17.654)
Prime Minister Approval	0.564	0.508	6.607	6.741
	(0.227)	(0.243)	(6.861)	(8.146)
Militarism	2.329	5.461***	3.823	-2.845
	(1.234)	(3.526)	(10.345)	(12.284)
Nationalism	0.817	1.003	5.978	3.217
	(0.322)	(0.485)	(6.900)	(8.193)
Political Awareness	2.290*	2.168	-5.797	0.223
	(1.002)	(1.046)	(7.868)	(9.342)
Trust in the Government	2.166	2.753	-5.077	-3.599
	(1.231)	(1.723)	(9.107)	(10.813)
Constant	803.572**	9,663.915**	-42.661	-64.186
	(2,686.301)	(38,712.506)	(68.489)	(81.323)
Observations	170	155	26	26
Pseudo R-squared	0.472	0.482		
R-squared			0.755	0.660

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 78: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Manipulation Check Pass

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	30.090***	9.787***	16.326	0.135
	(25.703)	(7.448)	(16.226)	(16.747)
Age	0.400**	0.354**	-10.636	-5.699
	(0.160)	(0.154)	(12.768)	(13.178)
Gender	1.478	1.095	2.228	5.850
	(0.987)	(0.736)	(17.400)	(17.958)
Education	1.266	0.840	3.760	6.599
	(0.429)	(0.322)	(6.495)	(6.703)
Income	0.725**	0.898	2.598	2.024
	(0.111)	(0.147)	(3.131)	(3.231)
Party Affiliation	0.929	1.091	18.433	19.716
	(0.367)	(0.436)	(15.802)	(16.309)
Prime Minister Approval	0.705	0.919	16.437*	23.650**

	(0.231)	(0.304)	(8.761)	(9.042)
Militarism	2.021	4.441***	14.380	11.524
	(0.912)	(2.402)	(13.065)	(13.485)
Nationalism	0.556*	0.512	18.234*	20.282**
	(0.184)	(0.210)	(8.854)	(9.138)
Political Awareness	1.948*	1.646	4.468	16.394*
	(0.727)	(0.617)	(8.791)	(9.073)
Trust in the Government	2.959**	2.807**	-15.136	-23.062*
	(1.437)	(1.348)	(11.736)	(12.112)
Constant	39.581	158.335*	-73.016	-114.919
	(103.854)	(460.002)	(74.711)	(77.108)
Observations	190	176	27	27
Pseudo R-squared	0.395	0.378		
R-squared			0.666	0.661

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 79: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Non-Tamils

Baseline: Back Down	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	11.370***	6.587***	12.895***	12.779**
	(6.180)	(2.991)	(4.723)	(4.935)
Age	0.986	1.028	-4.395*	-5.022*
	(0.173)	(0.200)	(2.622)	(2.739)
Gender	1.756	1.644	-0.282	-4.565
	(0.668)	(0.673)	(5.005)	(5.229)
Education	0.975	0.899	-4.761*	-4.166
	(0.159)	(0.160)	(2.427)	(2.536)
Income	0.860**	0.820***	1.073	1.699
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(1.067)	(1.114)
Party Affiliation	1.091	1.118	3.196	-2.007
	(0.222)	(0.238)	(3.116)	(3.256)
Prime Minister Approval	1.063	1.353*	1.249	0.767
	(0.163)	(0.216)	(2.395)	(2.502)
Militarism	0.795	1.109	0.699	6.464
	(0.177)	(0.268)	(3.920)	(4.096)

Nationalism	0.940	0.709*	3.096	4.751
	(0.156)	(0.135)	(2.775)	(2.900)
Political Awareness	2.364***	2.021***	-6.432**	-5.600*
	(0.473)	(0.413)	(2.898)	(3.028)
Trust in the Government	1.477*	2.094***	10.510***	11.369***
	(0.312)	(0.478)	(3.441)	(3.595)
Constant	4.153	3.176	82.219***	97.857***
	(5.269)	(4.409)	(19.678)	(20.560)
Observations	485	451	138	138
Pseudo R-squared	0.199	0.256		
R-squared			0.304	0.309

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 80: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Hindu

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister

Engage	10.326***	4.150***	10.729**	9.434*
	(5.588)	(1.599)	(5.049)	(5.215)
Age	1.025	1.046	-3.671	-3.935
	(0.180)	(0.187)	(2.954)	(3.051)
Gender	1.243	1.168	-0.958	-1.979
	(0.420)	(0.370)	(5.160)	(5.330)
Education	0.900	0.845	-2.893	-2.521
	(0.150)	(0.139)	(2.437)	(2.517)
Income	0.847**	0.838***	1.212	1.584
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(1.069)	(1.104)
Party Affiliation	0.962	0.886	-0.442	-4.418
	(0.206)	(0.176)	(3.346)	(3.456)
Prime Minister Approval	1.207	1.528***	0.593	0.248
	(0.186)	(0.230)	(2.446)	(2.526)
Militarism	1.073	1.273	-0.918	5.425
	(0.249)	(0.297)	(4.439)	(4.585)
Nationalism	0.912	0.554***	4.230	5.823*
	(0.165)	(0.104)	(3.121)	(3.223)

Political Awareness	2.858***	2.491***	-7.118**	-6.437**
	(0.539)	(0.453)	(3.010)	(3.108)
Trust in the Government	1.061	1.587**	7.226*	7.558*
	(0.230)	(0.338)	(3.787)	(3.911)
Constant	12.790**	10.761*	83.237***	94.068***
	(16.580)	(13.596)	(19.442)	(20.081)
Observations	683	690	122	122
Pseudo R-squared	0.200	0.217		
R-squared			0.164	0.180

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 81: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Manipulation Check Pass

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline: Back Down	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage	14.970***	3.822***	12.961***	13.898***
	(8.176)	(1.422)	(4.888)	(5.065)

Age	0.889	0.849	-5.187*	-7.460**
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(2.885)	(2.990)
Gender	1.401	1.188	-1.628	-4.412
	(0.493)	(0.393)	(4.947)	(5.125)
Education	0.872	1.058	-2.040	-2.482
	(0.135)	(0.153)	(2.274)	(2.356)
Income	0.799***	0.772***	1.912*	2.482**
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(1.112)	(1.152)
Party Affiliation	0.969	1.018	2.492	-3.309
	(0.179)	(0.182)	(3.096)	(3.208)
Prime Minister Approval	1.029	1.196	1.054	0.910
	(0.152)	(0.174)	(2.383)	(2.469)
Militarism	1.165	1.372	-0.183	6.771
	(0.252)	(0.314)	(4.437)	(4.597)
Nationalism	0.916	0.606***	4.918*	5.682*
	(0.147)	(0.103)	(2.877)	(2.981)
Political Awareness	2.314***	2.123***	-6.692**	-6.400**
	(0.416)	(0.368)	(2.870)	(2.974)
Trust in the Government	1.563**	2.168***	10.779***	10.591***

	(0.311)	(0.434)	(3.347)	(3.468)
Constant	29.702***	7.153	69.428***	91.910***
	(37.525)	(8.705)	(18.586)	(19.259)
Observations	702	697	125	125
Pseudo R-squared	0.255	0.269		
R-squared			0.313	0.339

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.7 Questionaire and Vignettes

Experiment 1 India

Pre-treatment questions

Q How old are you?

- ○ 18-29
- ○ 30-39
- ○ 40-49
- ○ 50-59
- ○ 60+

Q What is your gender?

- ○ Male
- ○ Female
- ○ Other

Q What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ○ No formal school education
- ○ Primary
- ○ Lower secondary
- ○ Secondary
- ○ High School Degree
- ○ University Degree (Bachelor's Degree)
- ○ Graduate Degree
- ○ Professional Degree

Q Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country’s economy? This question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say," below as a sign that you are paying attention".

- ○ Strongly Disagree
- ○ Somewhat Disagree
- ○ Slightly Disagree
- ○ Prefer Not To Say
- ○ Slightly Agree
- ○ Somewhat Agree
- ○ Strongly Agree

Q On what language do you communicate at home?

- ○ Hindi
- ○ Bengali
- ○ Telugu
- ○ Marathi
- ○ Tamil
- ○ English
- ○ Gujarati
- ○ Urdu

- ○ Kannada
- ○ Odia
- ○ Malayalam
- ○ Punjabi
- ○ Sanskrit
- ○ Other

Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime minister? 1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.

- ○ Not at all
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ Moderately
- ○ Very Much
- ○ Very Strongly

Q Could you indicate your annual income

- ○ Up to 50,000 Rupees
- ○ 50,001 to 100,000 Rupees
- ○ 100,001 to 150,000 Rupees
- ○ 150,001 to 200,000 Rupees
- ○ 200,001 to 250,000 Rupees
- ○ 250,001 to 300,000 Rupees
- ○ Over 300,000 Rupees

Q With which organized religion do you most identity with?

- ○ Hindu

- ○ Muslim
- ○ Christian
- ○ Sikhism
- ○ Buddhism
- ○ Jainism
- ○ Zoroastrianism
- ○ Not Religious
- ○ Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion
- ○ Other
- ○ Hard to answer/refused

Q Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?

- ○ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ Indian National Congress (INC)
- ○ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- ○ All India Trinamool Congress
- ○ Bahujan Samaj Party
- ○ Communist Party of India

- ○ Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- ○ Other

Q For which party did you vote in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections?

- ○ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ Indian National Congress (INC)
- ○ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- ○ All India Trinamool Congress
- ○ Bahujan Samaj Party
- ○ Communist Party of India
- ○ Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- ○ Other
- ○ I did not vote
- ○ Prefer not to answer

Q How would you describe your political views? In a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates the left, and 10 indicates the right.

- ○ 1
- ○ 2

- ○ 3
- ○ 4
- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ 7
- ○ 8
- ○ 9
- ○ 10

Q Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

	Never (1)	One Time (2)	Sometimes (3)	Several Times (4)	On a Regular Basis (5)
Voting	○	○	○	○	○
Organize to solve a community problem	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted a government official	○	○	○	○	○
Participated in a political protest	○	○	○	○	○
Participated in a political gathering or rally.	○	○	○	○	○
Worked for a political campaign	○	○	○	○	○
Donate money to a political campaign	○	○	○	○	○

Served in a community board	○	○	○	○	○

Q How closely you follow national politics?

- ○ Very closely
- ○ Closely
- ○ Somewhat Closely
- ○ Not too closely
- ○ Not at all

Q How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?

- ○ Very closely
- ○ Closely
- ○ Somewhat Closely
- ○ Not too closely
- ○ Not at all

Instructions

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and international politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

Q The best way a state can ensure its national security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.

- ○ Strongly disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Strongly agree

Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Indians and not get involved in other nations' conflicts.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India is militarily capable to safeguard its national interests?

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India should act unilaterally against any threat to its vital national interests?

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Instructions

(Administered to all respondents)

The following text concerns the decision of India's leaders when faced with foreign threats and security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian prime ministers have chosen to take, and we will ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.

Vignette 1: Pakistan No Comply - Back Down

Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to

attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. Indian prime minister decided not to mobilize the army and continue with other diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.

To Summarize:

- Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators.
- The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- Indian prime minister decided not to mobilize the army and continue with other diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.

Vignette 2: Pakistan No Comply PM Win

Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the

LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 350 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators.
- The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 2 km. In the operation, India lost 40 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 350.

Vignette 3: Pakistan No Comply PM Loss

Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the

LOC. However, Pakistan retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the LOC. During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 40 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators.
- The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked but Pakistan retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across the LOC. In the operation, India lost 350 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 40.

Vignette 4: Pakistan No Comply PM Win Reversed Casualties

Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the

LOC and pushed back the Pakistani military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 40 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators.
- The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 2 km. In the operation, India lost 350 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 40.

Vignette 5: Pakistan No Comply PM Loss Reversed Casualties

Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along LOC. However, Pakistan retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the LOC. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 350 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators.
- The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked but Pakistan retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across LOC. In the operation, India lost 40 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 350.

Vignette 6: Country A No Comply PM Back Down

A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy around and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of

the country and mobilize the military. In response to that, the Indian prime minister decided not to mobilize the army, but to continue with diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully.

To Summarize:

- A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.
- The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- In response to that the Indian prime minister suspended his plan to attack in reaction to the country's compliance.

Vignette 7: Country A No Comply PM Win

A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country's

military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 350 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.
- The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country's military by 2 km. In the operation, India lost 40 of its soldiers while the opposing country lost 350.

Vignette 8: Country A No Comply PM Loss T10

A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked the country along the border. However, the country's armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border.

During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 40 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy around.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.
- The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked the country along the border, but the country's armed forces retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across the border. In the operation, India lost 350 soldiers while the opposing country lost 40.

Vignette 9: Country A No Comply PM Win Reversed Casualties

A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country's

military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 40 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.
- The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country's military by 2 km. In the operation, India lost 350 of its soldiers while the opposing country lost 40.

Vignette 10: Country A No Comply PM Loss Reversed Casualties

A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked the country along the border. However, the country's armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities, while the opposite country suffered 350 fatalities.

To Summarize:

- A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police convoy around.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.
- The country's prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.
- The Indian Army attacked the country along the border, but the country's armed forces retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across the border. In the operation, India lost 40 soldiers while the opposing country lost 350.

Post-Treatment Questions

Next, you will be presented with a series of questions about the situation you just read.
Please answer to the best of your ability.

Q Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the Indian prime minister handled the situation?

○ Strongly Approve

○ Approve

○ Neither

○ Disapprove

○ Strongly Disapprove

[The question below was presented only to the respondent receiving the Scenarios with Pakistan as the opposing country]

Q As a result of the prime minister's actions against Pakistan, how likely are you to vote for him?

- ○ Very likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ No change in my intentions to vote
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Very Unlikely

[The question below was presented only to the respondent receiving the Hypothetical Scenarios with Country A]

Q As a result of the prime minister's actions against Country A how likely are you to vote for him?

- ○ Very likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ No change in my intentions to vote
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Very Unlikely

Q As a result of the prime minister's actions against the aggressor country, how likely are you to vote for him?

- ○ Very Likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ No Change in my intentions to vote for him
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Very Unlikely

Q Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, and 100= I felt that emotion very strongly

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
										0

Anger ()

Hatred ()

Contempt ()

Disgust ()

Fear ()

Disappointment ()

Shame ()

Sadness ()

Compassion ()

Relief ()

Admiration ()

Joy ()

Pride ()

[The following questions were presented in a random order.]

Q Enhancing the government's ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help prevent future attacks of this kind.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q What do you think the prime minister's actions did to India's reputation as a global powerhouse?

- ○ Highly improved
- ○ Improved
- ○ Neither improved nor damaged
- ○ Damaged
- ○ Highly Damaged

Q It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc.) on captured soldiers in order to obtain information about future attacks.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly Disagree

Q Did the Indian prime minister use the army?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Q Did the text mention casualties?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Experiment 2 India

Pre-treatment questions

Q How old are you?

- ○ 18-29
- ○ 30-39
- ○ 40-49
- ○ 50-59
- ○ 60+

Q What is your gender?

- ○ Male
- ○ Female
- ○ Other

Q What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ○ No formal School Education
- ○ Primary
- ○ Lower Secondary
- ○ Secondary
- ○ High School Degree
- ○ University Degree Bachelor Degree
- ○ Graduate Degree
- ○ Professional Degree

Q Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the COVID-19 pandemic? This question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say," below as a sign that you are paying attention".

- ○ Strongly Disagree
- ○ Somewhat Disagree
- ○ Slightly Disagree
- ○ Prefer Not To Say
- ○ Slightly Agree
- ○ Somewhat Agree
- ○ Strongly Agree

Q In what language do you communicate at home?

- Hindi
- Bengali
- Telugu
- Marathi
- Tamil
- Other
- English
- Gujarati
- Urdu
- Kannada
- Odia
- Malayalam
- Punjabi
- Sanskrit

Q To what extent can you say that the current economic situation in your country is Good or Bad. Please note that 1 = very bad and 7 indicates very good.

- 1 - Very Good
- 2

- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very Bad

Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime minister? 1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.

- Not at all
- Somewhat
- Moderately
- Very Much
- Very Strongly

Q What is your main occupation?

- Never had a job
- Student
- Housewife / homemaker
- Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry

- ○ Trader / hawker / vendor
- ○ Retail / Shop
- ○ Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled manufacturing worker)
- ○ Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, mechanic, machinist or skilled manufacturing worker)
- ○ Clerical or secretarial
- ○ Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager
- ○ Security services (police, army, private security)
- ○ Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer)
- ○ Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, engineer, accountant, professor, senior-level government officer)
- ○ Other

Q With which organized religion do you most identify with?

- ○ Hindu
- ○ Muslim
- ○ Christian
- ○ Sikhism
- ○ Buddhism

- ○ Jainism
- ○ Zoroastrianism
- ○ Not Religious
- ○ Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion
- ○ Other
- ○ Hard to answer/Prefer not to answer

Q How important is religion in your life?

Please indicate the importance of religion in your life on a scale of 1-10, 1 not at all important and 10 indicates very important.

- ○ 1 - Not at all important
- ○ 2
- ○ 3
- ○ 4
- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ 7
- ○ 8
- ○ 9
- ○ 10 - Very Important

Q Among the political parties listed here, which party, if any, do you feel closest to?

- ○ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ Indian National Congress (INC)
- ○ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- ○ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- ○ All India Trinamool Congress
- ○ Bahujan Samaj Party
- ○ Communist Party of India
- ○ Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- ○ Other

Q Considering the party you selected in the question above, please indicate the amount of support for it on a scale from 1 to 10. 1 Indicates low support 10 indicates high level of support.

- ○ 1 - Low support
- ○ 2
- ○ 3
- ○ 4
- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ 7
- ○ 8
- ○ 9
- ○ 10 - High level of support

Q Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

	Never	One Time	Sometimes	Several Times	On a regular basis
Voting	○	○	○	○	○
Participated in a demonstration or protest march	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted a government official	○	○	○	○	○
Joined others in your community to request action from government	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper	○	○	○	○	○

How closely do you follow national politics?	○	○	○	○	○
How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?	○	○	○	○	○

Instructions

(Administered to all Respondents)

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and India's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

Q The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international threats such as terrorist groups and countries.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- ○ Strongly disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Strongly agree

Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national security interests of your country.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India needs to cooperate more with its partners in Asia and the United Nations in settling international disputes.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India needs to play an active role in solving conflicts in Asia.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q India should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Indians and not get involved in other nations' conflicts.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

Vignette 1: Backing Down India

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region of part of another country that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send the Indian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's military forces.

After a few days, India's prime minister decided to back down and did not send the army against the aggressor country even though they continued to invade.

Vignette 2: Engage Win India

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.

Vignette 3: Engage Lose India

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the

attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

A few days after the invasion, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat and engage the aggressor country by sending the army against it, however, the military operation largely ended in failure for the Indian army.

Vignette 4: Engage Win but more Casualties for India.

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade. India's army attacked along the border region and pushed back the country's military by 2 km. However, during the operation, India suffered 300 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 80 fatalities.

Vignette 5: Engage Lose but less Casualties for India.

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade. However, the country's armed

forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border. During the operation, India suffered 80 fatalities, while the opposite country suffered 300 fatalities.

Post treatment questions

Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way India's prime minister handled the crisis?

Please indicate your approval or disapproval on a 1-11 scale. 1 indicates Strongly Disapprove, while 11 indicates Strongly Approve.

	1 - Strongly Disapprove	2	3	4	5	6 - Neither Disapprove or Approve	7	8	9	10	11 - Strongly Approve
Select your answer	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q The prime minister's handling of the crisis damaged or improved India's reputation?
Please select your answer on a 1-11 scale. 1 indicates Damaged, while 11 indicates Improved.

	1 - Damaged	2	3	4	5	6 - Neither Damaged nor Improved	7	8	9	10	11 - Improved
Select your answer	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q Based on the prime minister's handling of the crisis how likely is that you are going to vote for him or her in the next elections?

Use the 1-11 scale; 1 indicates Very Unlikely; 11 indicates Highly Likely.

	1 - Very Unlikely	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11 Highly Likely
Select your answer	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q If the aggressor country is China, then how would you answer the same questions?

	1 - Strongly Disagree	2	3	4	5	6 - Neither Disagree nor Agree	7	8	9	10	11 - Strongly Agree
Do you approve or disapprove of the way India's prime minister handled the crisis?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The prime minister's actions during the crisis damaged India's reputation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Based on the prime minister's handling of the crisis I will vote for him	○		○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○

Q Did the text mention casualties or fatalities?

○ Yes

○ No

Experiment 3 Nigeria

Pre-treatment questions

Q How old are you?

- ○ 18-29
- ○ 30-39
- ○ 40-49
- ○ 50-59
- ○ 60+

Q What is your gender?

- ○ Male
- ○ Female
- ○ Other

Q What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ○ No formal schooling
- ○ Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)
- ○ Some primary schooling
- ○ Primary school completed
- ○ Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school
- ○ Secondary school / high school completed

- ○ Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college
- ○ Some university
- ○ University completed
- ○ Post-graduate

Q Which ethnic groups do you belong to? Mark the space or spaces which apply to you.

- Hausa
- Urhobo
- Igbo
- Idoma
- Yoruba
- Itsekiri
- Efik
- Ikwere
- Ebira
- Awori
- Fulani
- Tapa
- Isoko
- Kalabari
- Ibibio
- Birom
- Kanuri
- Shuwa-Arab
- Tiv
- Jukun

- ○ Nupe
- ○ Gwari
- ○ Ijaw
- ○ Igala
- ○ Edo
- ○ Other

Q To what extent can you say that the current economic situation in your country is Good or Bad. Please note that 1 = very bad and 7 indicates very good.

- ○ Very Bad 1
- ○ 2
- ○ 3
- ○ 4
- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ Very Good 7

Q What is your main occupation?

- ○ Never had a job
- ○ Student
- ○ Housewife / homemaker
- ○ Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry
- ○ Trader / hawker / vendor
- ○ Retail / Shop
- ○ Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled manufacturing worker)
- ○ Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, mechanic, machinist or skilled manufacturing worker)
- ○ Clerical or secretarial
- ○ Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager
- ○ Security services (police, army, private security)
- ○ Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer)
- ○ Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, engineer, accountant, professor, senior-level government officer)
- ○ Other

Q With which organized religion do you most identify with?

- ○ Christianity in general
- ○ Christianity - Pentecostal/Charismatic
- ○ Christianity - Anglican
- ○ Christianity - Methodist
- ○ Christianity - Catholic
- ○ Christianity – Non-denonational
- ○ Muslim
- ○ Traditional
- ○ Agnosticism
- ○ None/Non-religious
- ○ Other
- ○ Prefer not answer

Q How important is religion in your life?

Please indicate the importance of religion in your life on a scale of 1-10, 1 indicates not at all important and 10 indicates very important.

- ○ 1 - Not at all important
- ○ 2
- ○ 3
- ○ 4

- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ 7
- ○ 8
- ○ 9
- ○ 10 - Very important

Q Among the political parties listed here, which party, if any, do you feel closest to?

- ○ All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)
- ○ All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)
- ○ All People's Party (APP)
- ○ African Renaissance Party (ARP)
- ○ Conscience People's Congress (CPC)
- ○ Community Party of Nigeria (CPN)
- ○ Democratic Alternative (DA)
- ○ Democratic People's Party (DPP)
- ○ Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM)
- ○ Fresh Democratic Party (FDP)
- ○ Labour Party (LP)
- ○ Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)
- ○ National Conscience Party (NCP)
- ○ New Democrats (ND)
- ○ People's Democratic Party (PDP)
- ○ Progressive People's Alliance (PPA)
- ○ People's Progressive Party (PPP)
- ○ People's Redemption Party (PRP)
- ○ People's Salvation Party (PSP)
- ○ Social Democratic Mega Party

- ○ United Nigeria People's Party
- ○ Other

Q Considering the party you selected in the question above, please indicate the amount of support for it on a scale from 1 to 10. 1 Indicates low support 10 indicates high level of support.

- ○ 1 - Low Support
- ○ 2
- ○ 3
- ○ 4
- ○ 5
- ○ 6
- ○ 7
- ○ 8
- ○ 9
- ○ 10 - High Support

Q Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

	Never	One Time	Sometimes	Several Times	On a regular basis
Voting	○	○	○	○	○
Participated in a demonstration or protest march	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted a government official	○	○	○	○	○
Joined others in your community to request action from government	○	○	○	○	○
Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper	○	○	○	○	○

How closely do you follow national politics?	○	○	○	○	○
How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?	○	○	○	○	○

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and Nigeria's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which ranges from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

Q The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international threats such as terrorist groups and countries.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- ○ Strongly disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Strongly agree

Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national security interests of your country.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q Indicate your views on the following issues: Seven (7) indicates strongly agree, and one (1) indicates strongly disagree.

	1 Strongly Disagree (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)	6 (6)	7 Strongly Agree (7)
In general, international organizations (e.g. the African Union) are ineffective because they lack the power necessary to change the behavior of powerful states	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
States are generally not trustworthy: they will attempt to use force to achieve what they want if they have the chance	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

The use of threat of nuclear weapons is a necessary instrument to survive as a state	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
It is important to teach children how to defend themselves physically if necessary	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Everybody thinks of themselves first, so I will have to protect myself and my family before I consider others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

The worst way for us to keep peace is by trying to work out agreements at the bargaining table rather than by having a very strong military so other countries won't attack us.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q Nigeria needs to cooperate more with the African Union and United Nations in settling international disputes.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q Nigeria needs to play an active role in solving conflicts in Africa.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q Nigeria should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Nigerians and not get involved in other nations' conflicts.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Vignette 1: Back Down

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region of part of another country that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the

attacking country continued to invade, he would send the Nigerian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's military forces.

- After a few days, Nigeria's president decided to back down and did not send the army against the aggressor country even though they continued to invade.

Vignette 2: Engage

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

- After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.

Vignette 3: Engage Lose

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

- A few days after the invasion, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat and engage the aggressor country by sending the army against it, however, the military operation largely ended in failure for the Nigerian army.

Vignette 4: Engage Win but more Casualties for Nigeria.

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

- After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.
- Nigeria's army attacked along the border region and pushed back the country's military by 2 km. However, during the operation, Nigeria suffered 350 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 40 fatalities.

Vignette 5: Engage Lose but less Casualties for Nigeria

The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately engage to push out the attacking country's forces.

- After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat by deploying the army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.

However, the country's armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Nigerian military by 2 km across the border. During the operation, Nigeria suffered 40 fatalities, while the opposite country suffered 350 fatalities.

Post-treatment questions

Q Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the three statements below using a 1-11 scale, 1 indicates you Strongly Disagree, while 11 indicates you Strongly Agree.

	1 - Strongly Disagree (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)	6 - Neither Disagree nor Agree (6)	7 (7)	8 (8)	9 (9)	10 (10)	11 - Strongly Agree (11)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nigeria's president handled the crisis?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The president's actions during the crisis damaged Nigeria's reputation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Based on the president's handling of the crisis I will vote for him	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q60 Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the Nigerian president. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, and 100 indicates you felt that emotion very strongly.

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Anger ()											
Disappointment ()											
Pride ()											
Admiration ()											

Q Did the text you just read mention the army

- Yes
- No

Experiments 4

[Demographic questions]

1.How old are you?

- 18-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60+

2. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No formal school education
- Primary
- Lower secondary
- Secondary
- High School Degree
- University Degree (Bachelor's Degree)
- Graduate Degree
- Professional Degree

4. Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country's economy? If you are reading this question carefully, you need to click the neither agree nor disagree option.[267]

[267] All Indian respondent who did not select the correct answer were not allowed to finalize the survey. Using this measure allow me to largely control for the Indian Mechanical Turk respondents' attentiveness and English language proficiency.

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Slightly Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Slightly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

5.On what language do you communicate at home?[268]

- Hindi
- Bengali
- Telugu
- Marathi
- Tamil
- Other

6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime minister? 1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.

- Not at all
- Somewhat
- Moderately
- Very Much
- Very Strongly

[268] http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx

6.Could you indicate your annual income?[269]

- Up to 10,000 Indian Rupees
- 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees
- 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees
- 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees
- Over 100,000 Indian Rupees

7.What is your religion?

- Hindu
- Muslim
- Christian
- Sikhism
- Buddhism
- Jainism
- Zoroastrianism
- Not Religious
- Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion
- Other
- Hard to answer/refused

8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

[269] https://www.statista.com/statistics/653897/average-monthly-household-income-india/

- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party
- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other

9. For which party did you vote?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party
- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other
- I did not vote
- Prefer not to answer

11. Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

Voting

Organize to solve a community problem

Contacted a government official

Participated in a political protest

Participated in a political gathering or rally.

Worked for a political campaign

Donate money to a political campaign

Served in a community board

- Never
- One time
- Sometimes
- Several times
- On a regular basis[270]

12.How closely you follow national politics?

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

[270] Verba et al (1993)

[Level of Military assertiveness]

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and India's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Level of Ethno-Nationalism]

17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Indian culture						
Ethnicity						
Religion						
Language						

[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.]

For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.

	0	1	2	3	4	5

Prime Minister						
The national government						
Political Parties						
Parliament						
The army						

[271]

Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very big problem for the country.[272]

Lack of Employment Opportunities	0-100
Rising Prices	0-100
Corrupt Government Officials	0-100
Terrorism	0-100
Crime	0-100
China	0-100
Pakistan	0-100
USA	0-100
Corrupt Businesspeople	0-100
Gap between the Rich and the Poor	0-100
Poor Quality Schools	0-100

[271] An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012)
[272] **https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/** Note that the question on China, Pakistan, and US are added by the author.

People Leaving India for Jobs in Other Countries	0-100
Air Pollution	0-100
Health Care	0-100
Communal Relations	0-100

[Introduction]

The following text concerns the decision of India's leaders when faced with foreign threats and security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian prime ministers have chosen to take, and we will ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.

Engage Success Foreign Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Cue Right

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border. The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Cue Left

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border. The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

The Indian National Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

Backing Down Foreign Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade. The Indian prime minister ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Cue Support Right

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation

Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Cue Support Left

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

The Indian National Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister's handling of the situation.

Stay Out Foreign Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade.

The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

Stay Out Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade.

The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Stay Out Foreign Country Social Cue Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade.

The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Stay Out Foreign Country Elite Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the

prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade.

The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Engage Failure Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack. The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Engage Failure Foreign Country Social Cue Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Engage Failure Foreign Country Elite Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

[Dependent variables.]
Please answer the following questions.

24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister handled the situation?

- Strongly Approve
- Approve
- Neither
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

25: As a result of the prime minister's actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?

- Very likely
- Likely
- No change in my intentions to vote
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:
1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly

	1	2	3	4	5
Anger					
Hatred					
Contempt					
Disgust					
Fear					
Disappointment					
Shame					
Sadness					
Compassion					
Relief					
Admiration					
Joy					
Pride					

[The remaining questions will be presented in a random order.]

30: "Enhancing the government's ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help prevent future attacks of this kind."

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

31. What do you think the prime minister's actions did to India's reputation?

- Highly improved
- Improved
- Neither improved nor damaged
- Damaged
- Highly Damaged

32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future attacks.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

33. Some of your friends are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime minister has handled the security crisis. How likely you are to join this protest?

- Very likely

- Likely
- No opinion
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?[273]

- Yes
- No

35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army?

- Yes
- No

Experiment 5 India

[Demographic questions]

1.How old are you?

- 18-29
- 30-39

[273] The last two question will serve as manipulation checks.

- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60+

2. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No formal school education
- Primary
- Lower secondary
- Secondary
- High School Degree
- University Degree (Bachelor's Degree)
- Graduate Degree
- Professional Degree

4. Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country's economy? If you are reading this question carefully, you need to click the neither agree nor disagree option.[274]

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Slightly Disagree

[274] All Indian respondent who did not select the correct answer were not allowed to finalize the survey. Using this measure allow me to largely control for the Indian Mechanical Turk respondents' attentiveness and English language proficiency.

- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Slightly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

5.On what language do you communicate at home?[275]

- Hindi
- Bengali
- Telugu
- Marathi
- Tamil
- Other

6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime minister? 1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.

- Not at all
- Somewhat
- Moderately
- Very Much
- Very Strongly

6.Could you indicate your annual income?[276]

[275] http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx
[276] https://www.statista.com/statistics/653897/average-monthly-household-income-india/

- Up to 10,000 Indian Rupees
- 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees
- 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees
- 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees
- Over 100,000 Indian Rupees

7.What is your religion?

- Hindu
- Muslim
- Christian
- Sikhism
- Buddhism
- Jainism
- Zoroastrianism
- Not Religious
- Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion
- Other
- Hard to answer/refused

8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party

- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other

9. For which party did you vote?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party
- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other
- I did not vote
- Prefer not to answer

11. Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

Voting

Organize to solve a community problem

Contacted a government official

Participated in a political protest

Participated in a political gathering or rally.

Worked for a political campaign

Donate money to a political campaign

Served in a community board

- Never
- One time
- Sometimes
- Several times
- On a regular basis[277]

12.How closely you follow national politics?

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?

- Very Closely
- Closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

[Level of Military assertiveness]

[277] Verba et al (1993)

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and India's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Level of Ethno-Nationalism]

17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Indian culture						
Ethnicity						
Religion						
Language						

[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.]

For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Prime Minister						
The national government						

Political Parties						
Parliament						
The army						

[278]

Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very big problem for the country.[279]

Lack of Employment Opportunities	0-100
Rising Prices	0-100
Corrupt Government Officials	0-100
Terrorism	0-100
Crime	0-100
China	0-100
Pakistan	0-100
USA	0-100
Corrupt Businesspeople	0-100
Gap between the Rich and the Poor	0-100
Poor Quality Schools	0-100
People Leaving India for Jobs in Other Countries	0-100
Air Pollution	0-100
Health Care	0-100

[278] An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012)
[279] **https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/** Note that the question on China, Pakistan, and US are added by the author.

Communal Relations	0-100

[Introduction]

The following text concerns the decision of India's leaders when faced with foreign threats and security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian prime ministers have chosen to take, and we will ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.

Backing Down Foreign Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

Backing Down Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Backing Down Foreign Country Social Cue Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage and stay out of the conflict.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Engage Success Foreing Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

Engage Success Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack. The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Engage Success Foreign Country Social Cue Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Support

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

To summarize
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack. The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country's military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along the border.

There is broad support for the prime minister's actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Engage Failure Foreign Country No Cue

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking country's forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

To summarize

A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a border with India.

The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.

The prime minister sent the military to the region.

The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage its forces.

The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.

[Dependent variables.]
Please answer the following questions.

24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister handled the situation?

- Strongly Approve
- Approve
- Neither
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

25: As a result of the prime minister's actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?

- Very likely
- Likely
- No change in my intentions to vote
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:
1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly

	1	2	3	4	5
➢ Anger					
➢ Hatred					
➢ Contempt					
➢ Disgust					
➢ Fear					
➢ Disappointment					
➢ Shame					
➢ Sadness					
➢ Compassion					
➢ Relief					
➢ Admiration					
➢ Joy					
➢ Pride					

[The remaining questions will be presented in a random order.]

30: "Enhancing the government's ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help prevent future attacks of this kind."

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

31. What do you think the prime minister's actions did to India's reputation?

- Highly improved

- Improved
- Neither improved nor damaged
- Damaged
- Highly Damaged

32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future attacks.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

33. Some of your friends are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime minister has handled the security crisis. How likely you are to join this protest?

- Very likely
- Likely
- No opinion
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?[280]

- Yes
- No

[280] The last two question will serve as manipulation checks.

35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army?

- Yes
- No

APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

C.1 Sample, Covariates, and Randomization Checks

Table 82: India Experiment 1 Sample description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	52
	30-39	40.1
	40-49	5.8
	50-59	1.6
	60+	0.8
Ethnicity	Hindi	18.6
	Telegu	5
	Bengali	1.1
	Marathi	2.24
	Tamil	49.8
	English	4.3
	Malayalam	3.3
	Other	15.6
Education	No formal School Education	0.3
	Primary	0.5
	Lower Secondary	0.44
	Secondary	0.65
	High School Degree	4.7
	University Degree (Undergraduate)	41
	Graduate Degree	39.5
	Professional Degree	13
Political affiliation	Bharatiya Janata Party	54.25
	Indian National Congress	24.6
	National Democratic Alliance led by BJP	2.6
	United Progressive Alliance led by INC	1.3
	All India Trinamool Congress	1.4
	Bahujan Samaj Party	0.55
	Communist Party of India	2.6
	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	2
	Other	10.6

Gender	Women	30
	Men	70

Note: number of respondents = 1834

Table 83: India Experiment 2 Sample description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	51.84
	30-39	40
	40-49	5.8
	50-59	1.6
	60+	0.8
Ethnicity	Hindi	18.6
	Telegu	1
	Bengali	6
	Marathi	2
	Tamil	51
	English	15
	Malayalam	2.8
	Other	3.6
Education	No formal School Education	0.25
	Primary	0.6
	Lower Secondary	0.4
	Secondary	0.9
	High School Degree	5
	University Degree (Undergraduate)	41
	Graduate Degree	38.7
	Professional Degree	13.1
Political affiliation	Bharatiya Janata Party	54.7
	Indian National Congress	24.1
	National Democratic Alliance led by BJP	2.6
	United Progressive Alliance led by INC	1.4

	All India Trinamool Congress	1.6
	Bahujan Samaj Party	0.5
	Communist Party of India	2.6
	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	2
	Other	10.5
Gender	Women	30.8
	Men	69.2

Note: number of respondents = 1660

Table 84: Nigeria Experiment 3 Sample description

Variables	Values	Percentages
Age	18-29	65
	30-39	24.2
	40-49	8.7
	50-59	1.31
	60+	0.7
Ethnicity	Hausa	4.15
	Urhobo	4
	Igbo	40.1
	Idoma	2.8
	Yoruba	18.6
	Efik	3.3
	Kanuri	2.6
	Others	24.45
Education	No Formal Schooling	0.7

	Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)	0.5
	Some primary schooling	0.2
	Primary school completed	0.2
	Intermediate school or some secondary school / high school	2.6
	Secondary school / high school completed	16.6
	Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college	12.2
	Some university	24.9
	University completed	31
	Post-graduate	11.2
Political affiliation	All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	3.6
	All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	6.0
	All People's Party (APP)	2.2
	Conscience People's Congress (CPC)	1.4
	Labour Party (LP)	1.7
	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	47.7
	Other	37.4
Gender	Women	41.2
	Men	58.7

Note: number of respondents = 458

C.2 List of Treatments

Treatment groups – Experiment 1 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	134
Backing Down – BJP supports the Leader's decision	140
Backing Down – INC supports Leader's decision	136
Engage and Win	139
Engage and Win – BJP supports the Leader's decision	137
Engage and Win – INC supports the Leader's decision	139

Treatment groups – Experiment 2 India

Treatment Group	**Number of Respondents**
Backing Down	134
Backing Down - Social Group Opposes	140
Backing Down - Social Group Supports	136
Backing Down - Bipartisan Supports	139
Engage Win	137
Engage Win – Social Group Opposes	139
Engage Win – Social Group Supports	135
Engage Win – Bipartisan Support	137
Engage Lose	141
Engage Lose – Social Group Opposes	136
Engage Lose – Social Group Supports	138
Engage Lose – Bipartisan Support	133
Stay Out	135
Stay Out – Social Group Opposes	134
Stay Out – Social Group Supports	140

Stay Out - Bipartisan Support	141

Treatment groups – Experiment 3 Nigeria

Treatment Group	Number of Respondents
Backing Down	151
Engage Win	155
Engage Lose	152

Table 85: Randomization Checks Main Effects

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.023	1.129	1.006
	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.100)
Gender	1.046	1.170	0.946
	(0.141)	(0.178)	(0.148)
Education	1.082	1.029	0.976
	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.071)
Income	1.055*	0.977	1.037
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Party Affiliation	0.900	1.186*	1.005
	(0.071)	(0.111)	(0.092)
Prime Minister Approval	1.034	0.991	1.011
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Militarism	1.273**	0.912	1.011
	(0.147)	(0.118)	(0.133)
Nationalism	0.923	0.879	0.981
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.097)
Political Engagement	1.119	1.054	1.025
	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.088)
Trust in the Government	0.872	0.839*	1.061
	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.116)
Constant	0.217***	0.102***	0.252**
	(0.115)	(0.063)	(0.151)
Observations	1,307	1,307	1,307
Pseudo R-squared	0.00951	0.0111	0.00178

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 86: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.159	1.077	0.971
	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.135)
Gender	0.943	1.295	0.967
	(0.151)	(0.235)	(0.176)
Education	1.103	1.128	0.969
	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.084)
Income	0.994	0.961	1.047
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Party Affiliation	0.869	1.226*	0.965
	(0.078)	(0.135)	(0.099)
Prime Minister Approval	1.085	1.015	0.991
	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.089)
Militarism	1.138	0.827	1.011
	(0.167)	(0.138)	(0.167)
Nationalism	0.909	0.939	0.926
	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.115)
Political Engagement	1.108	1.026	1.013
	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.109)
Trust in the Government	0.878	0.846	1.041
	(0.100)	(0.110)	(0.135)
Constant	0.212**	0.048***	0.335
	(0.137)	(0.037)	(0.238)
Observations	886	886	886
Pseudo R-squared	0.00857	0.0138	0.00186

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 87: Randomization Checks Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.075	1.271**	1.089
	(0.115)	(0.151)	(0.133)
Gender	1.079	1.191	1.048
	(0.202)	(0.256)	(0.227)
Education	1.056	0.888	0.989
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Income	1.045	1.011	1.041
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Party Affiliation	0.922	1.294*	0.857
	(0.105)	(0.180)	(0.113)
Prime Minister Approval	1.058	0.983	1.080
	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.110)
Militarism	1.283*	1.119	0.824
	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.138)
Nationalism	1.015	0.880	1.050
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.128)
Political Engagement	1.129	1.087	1.108
	(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.130)
Trust in the Government	0.802*	0.722**	1.068
	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.152)
Constant	0.217**	0.154**	0.206*
	(0.155)	(0.126)	(0.167)
Observations	723	723	723
Pseudo R-squared	0.0101	0.0256	0.00795

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 88: Randomization Checks Hindu

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.007	0.954	0.998
	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Gender	1.128	1.359*	0.875
	(0.176)	(0.233)	(0.159)

Education	1.078	1.003	1.033
	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.092)
Income	1.089**	0.995	1.038
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Party Affiliation	0.982	1.118	1.124
	(0.095)	(0.125)	(0.130)
Prime Minister Approval	0.995	0.980	0.946
	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Militarism	1.206	0.960	0.868
	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.134)
Nationalism	0.923	0.913	0.968
	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.118)
Political Engagement	1.169*	1.000	0.980
	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.098)
Trust in the Government	0.858	0.818	1.240
	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.173)
Constant	0.162***	0.152***	0.179**
	(0.103)	(0.108)	(0.129)
Observations	975	975	975
Pseudo R-squared	0.0105	0.0114	0.00749

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 89: Randomization Checks BJP Support

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	0.956	1.061	1.079
	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Gender	1.092	1.412*	0.843
	(0.196)	(0.273)	(0.175)
Education	1.118	1.075	0.983
	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.105)
Income	1.170***	0.993	1.063
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Prime Minister Approval	1.044	1.005	0.998
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Militarism	0.918	0.914	0.761
	(0.147)	(0.162)	(0.135)
Nationalism	0.867	0.804	0.987
	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.138)

Political Engagement	1.292**	1.038	1.089
	(0.137)	(0.122)	(0.127)
Trust in the Government	0.719**	0.742*	1.109
	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.186)
Constant	0.098***	0.104***	0.244*
	(0.075)	(0.086)	(0.205)
Observations	760	760	760
Pseudo R-squared	0.0280	0.0224	0.00898

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 90: Randomization Checks INC Support

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.057	1.423*	0.728
	(0.188)	(0.292)	(0.171)
Gender	0.726	0.818	1.231
	(0.193)	(0.270)	(0.380)
Education	1.027	0.983	1.026
	(0.111)	(0.125)	(0.135)
Income	0.925	1.075	1.084
	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Prime Minister Approval	0.917	1.066	1.023
	(0.123)	(0.174)	(0.161)
Militarism	1.754**	1.083	1.583*
	(0.394)	(0.285)	(0.419)
Nationalism	0.992	0.845	0.971
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.184)
Political Engagement	1.017	1.204	1.049
	(0.161)	(0.238)	(0.201)
Trust in the Government	0.914	0.893	0.878
	(0.161)	(0.189)	(0.182)
Constant	1.051	0.112*	0.172
	(0.981)	(0.128)	(0.202)
Observations	314	314	314
Pseudo R-squared	0.0243	0.0205	0.0228

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 91: Randomization Checks BJP Support Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.084	1.187	1.213
	(0.126)	(0.153)	(0.162)
Gender	1.181	1.522*	0.966
	(0.245)	(0.350)	(0.241)
Education	1.135	0.882	0.958
	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.114)
Income	1.067	0.996	1.043
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Prime Minister Approval	1.094	0.995	1.127
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.131)
Militarism	1.193	1.224	0.817
	(0.198)	(0.232)	(0.159)
Nationalism	0.958	0.859	1.037
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.148)
Political Engagement	1.155	1.004	1.255*
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.170)
Trust in the Government	0.812	0.784	1.066
	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.183)
Constant	0.101***	0.185*	0.162*
	(0.089)	(0.179)	(0.165)
Observations	590	590	590
Pseudo R-squared	0.0128	0.0220	0.0148

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 92: Randomization Checks INC Support Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.213	1.414**	1.019
	(0.171)	(0.223)	(0.173)
Gender	0.822	0.945	0.967
	(0.207)	(0.277)	(0.284)

Education	1.191	0.945	0.955
	(0.135)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Income	0.969	0.952	0.982
	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Prime Minister Approval	1.062	1.066	0.984
	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.132)
Militarism	1.193	1.173	0.912
	(0.237)	(0.268)	(0.211)
Nationalism	0.962	0.827	1.225
	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.207)
Political Engagement	1.147	1.099	1.017
	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.168)
Trust in the Government	0.885	0.718*	1.094
	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.214)
Constant	0.179*	0.131*	0.533
	(0.167)	(0.137)	(0.547)
Observations	390	390	390
Pseudo R-squared	0.0153	0.0304	0.0100

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 93: Randomization Checks Main Effects

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.163*	0.959	0.941
	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.094)
Gender	1.009	1.044	0.901
	(0.136)	(0.162)	(0.141)
Education	1.039	0.941	1.069
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.088)
Income	0.983	0.999	1.020
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Party Affiliation	0.932	0.984	0.960
	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.085)
Prime Minister Approval	0.983	1.144*	0.881*
	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.064)
Militarism	0.982	0.880	1.064

	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.133)
Nationalism	1.081	1.006	1.090
	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.105)
Political Engagement	0.885*	0.962	0.909
	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.076)
Trust in the Government	0.982	0.800**	1.097
	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.117)
Constant	0.345*	0.240**	0.320*
	(0.192)	(0.154)	(0.205)
Observations	1,312	1,312	1,312
Pseudo R-squared	0.00648	0.00796	0.00514

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 94: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.152	0.951	0.917
	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.103)
Gender	1.034	1.165	0.898
	(0.158)	(0.202)	(0.160)
Education	1.072	0.945	1.199*
	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.113)
Income	1.006	0.977	1.027
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Party Affiliation	0.900	0.990	0.942
	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.092)
Prime Minister Approval	1.027	1.199**	0.839**
	(0.075)	(0.102)	(0.070)
Militarism	1.029	0.796	1.173
	(0.127)	(0.110)	(0.168)
Nationalism	1.059	0.957	1.083
	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.117)
Political Engagement	0.911	0.908	0.884
	(0.078)	(0.089)	(0.086)
Trust in the Government	0.952	0.874	1.065
	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.130)
Constant	0.240**	0.194**	0.191**

	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Observations	1,034	1,034	1,034
Pseudo R-squared	0.00655	0.0110	0.0123

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 95: Randomization Checks Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.111	1.036	0.862
	(0.118)	(0.126)	(0.109)
Gender	1.246	1.176	0.978
	(0.238)	(0.257)	(0.218)
Education	1.169	0.887	1.154
	(0.113)	(0.096)	(0.127)
Income	0.972	0.983	1.036
	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Party Affiliation	0.981	1.041	0.908
	(0.113)	(0.140)	(0.119)
Prime Minister Approval	0.934	1.167	0.913
	(0.082)	(0.120)	(0.092)
Militarism	0.896	0.853	1.126
	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.180)
Nationalism	1.062	0.969	0.993
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.119)
Political Engagement	0.934	1.000	0.877
	(0.097)	(0.119)	(0.104)
Trust in the Government	0.955	0.768*	1.155
	(0.119)	(0.110)	(0.168)
Constant	0.143**	0.235*	0.190*
	(0.112)	(0.205)	(0.169)
Observations	719	719	719
Pseudo R-squared	0.0106	0.0116	0.00824

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 96: Randomization Checks Hindu

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.193*	0.978	0.982
	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.112)
Gender	0.950	0.998	0.788
	(0.150)	(0.185)	(0.146)
Education	1.025	0.939	1.100
	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.107)
Income	0.986	1.027	1.004
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Party Affiliation	1.016	1.055	0.986
	(0.097)	(0.120)	(0.106)
Prime Minister Approval	0.980	1.110	0.926
	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.078)
Militarism	0.964	0.756*	1.104
	(0.121)	(0.108)	(0.161)
Nationalism	1.111	1.073	1.072
	(0.110)	(0.122)	(0.123)
Political Engagement	0.912	0.979	0.917
	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.087)
Trust in the Government	0.913	0.793*	1.081
	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.145)
Constant	0.309*	0.197**	0.245*
	(0.203)	(0.152)	(0.184)
Observations	992	992	992
Pseudo R-squared	0.00699	0.0111	0.00499

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 97: Randomization Checks BJP Support

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.241*	0.967	1.083
	(0.138)	(0.128)	(0.137)

Gender	1.058	0.838	0.921
	(0.188)	(0.174)	(0.189)
Education	1.074	0.987	1.123
	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.128)
Income	0.996	0.984	1.014
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Prime Minister Approval	0.965	1.078	0.903
	(0.082)	(0.107)	(0.087)
Militarism	0.840	0.796	1.064
	(0.128)	(0.138)	(0.188)
Nationalism	1.117	1.093	0.999
	(0.136)	(0.150)	(0.138)
Political Engagement	0.912	0.995	0.897
	(0.088)	(0.111)	(0.098)
Trust in the Government	1.004	0.736*	1.176
	(0.146)	(0.120)	(0.198)
Constant	0.196**	0.303	0.148**
	(0.147)	(0.261)	(0.127)
Observations	775	775	775
Pseudo R-squared	0.0107	0.00936	0.00642

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 98: Randomization Checks INC Support

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.007	0.948	0.605**
	(0.177)	(0.194)	(0.142)
Gender	0.991	1.430	0.992
	(0.264)	(0.423)	(0.304)
Education	0.934	0.945	1.025
	(0.120)	(0.136)	(0.161)
Income	1.022	0.972	1.047
	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.085)
Prime Minister Approval	0.756**	1.032	0.758*
	(0.103)	(0.158)	(0.117)
Militarism	1.313	0.971	0.873
	(0.283)	(0.232)	(0.210)

Nationalism	0.947	0.920	1.425*
	(0.162)	(0.174)	(0.284)
Political Engagement	0.856	0.942	1.111
	(0.133)	(0.170)	(0.201)
Trust in the Government	1.214	0.841	0.993
	(0.209)	(0.161)	(0.192)
Constant	1.723	0.245	0.929
	(1.750)	(0.286)	(1.104)
Observations	312	312	312
Pseudo R-squared	0.0187	0.0146	0.0405

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 99: Randomization Checks BJP Support Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.145	1.099	0.927
	(0.133)	(0.146)	(0.128)
Gender	1.103	1.084	1.120
	(0.230)	(0.262)	(0.268)
Education	1.220*	0.844	1.235*
	(0.135)	(0.104)	(0.157)
Income	0.988	0.989	1.024
	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Prime Minister Approval	0.910	1.135	0.934
	(0.086)	(0.128)	(0.102)
Militarism	0.803	0.924	1.025
	(0.126)	(0.165)	(0.186)
Nationalism	1.085	1.034	0.963
	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.132)
Political Engagement	0.989	0.904	0.886
	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.117)
Trust in the Government	0.941	0.765*	1.140
	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.187)
Constant	0.120**	0.373	0.067***
	(0.104)	(0.360)	(0.067)
Observations	591	591	591

Pseudo R-squared	0.0143	0.0139	0.00891

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 100: Randomization Checks INC Support Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down	(1) Engage	(2) BJP Support	(3) INC Support
Age	1.147	0.904	0.880
	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.152)
Gender	1.272	1.023	1.044
	(0.313)	(0.303)	(0.306)
Education	1.247*	1.008	1.083
	(0.164)	(0.152)	(0.162)
Income	0.984	0.971	1.002
	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.069)
Prime Minister Approval	0.916	1.118	0.841
	(0.103)	(0.150)	(0.112)
Militarism	1.008	0.826	0.854
	(0.186)	(0.179)	(0.190)
Nationalism	1.087	1.040	1.100
	(0.160)	(0.176)	(0.200)
Political Engagement	0.932	0.985	1.007
	(0.132)	(0.164)	(0.171)
Trust in the Government	0.933	0.755	1.295
	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.254)
Constant	0.089**	0.184	0.293
	(0.092)	(0.217)	(0.347)
Observations	389	389	389
Pseudo R-squared	0.0149	0.0127	0.0118

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 101: Randomization Checks Main Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)

	Engage Win	Engage Lose	Backing Down
Militarism	-0.0790	0.122	-0.0446
	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.162)
Political Engagement	0.112	-0.00435	-0.110
	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Party Affiliation	-0.00519	-0.00600	0.0114
	(0.0143)	(0.0140)	(0.0143)
Age Categorical	-0.296*	0.110	0.173
	(0.178)	(0.169)	(0.169)
Education	0.0944	0.00973	-0.0934
	(0.0838)	(0.0790)	(0.0768)
Leader Approval	-0.0827	-0.00930	0.0850
	(0.0908)	(0.0889)	(0.0858)
Income	0.0884	-0.0678	-0.0244
	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.150)
Constant	-0.868	-0.674	-0.615
	(0.743)	(0.715)	(0.705)
Observations	397	397	397

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 102: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Checks

	(1) Engage Win	(2) Engage Lose	(3) Backing Down
Militarism	-0.0835	0.179	-0.0904
	(0.198)	(0.205)	(0.192)
Political Engagement	0.0469	0.144	-0.182
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.159)
Party Affiliation	-0.00492	-0.00933	0.0165
	(0.0174)	(0.0166)	(0.0172)
Age Categorical	-0.268	0.245	-0.00599
	(0.205)	(0.193)	(0.192)
Education	0.191*	-0.0915	-0.0601
	(0.111)	(0.0943)	(0.0918)
Leader Approval	-0.219*	0.0303	0.144

	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.105)
Income	-0.146	-0.0973	0.210
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.184)
Constant	-1.065	-0.111	-1.160
	(0.963)	(0.860)	(0.856)
Observations	261	261	261

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 103: Randomization check among the followers of Nigeria's current ruling party

	(1) Engage Win	(2) Engage Lose	(3) Backing Down
Militarism	-0.0489	0.174	-0.142
	(0.226)	(0.218)	(0.222)
Political Engagement	0.202	-0.0722	-0.135
	(0.180)	(0.176)	(0.186)
Age Categorical	-0.400	0.0389	0.345
	(0.280)	(0.266)	(0.270)
Education	0.126	0.0705	-0.192
	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.133)
Leader Approval	-0.00813	0.0680	-0.0754
	(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.167)
Income	0.163	-0.161	0.00253
	(0.220)	(0.213)	(0.225)
Constant	-1.542	-0.964	0.378
	(1.081)	(1.012)	(1.028)
Observations	209	209	209

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.3 Tables with Results

Table 104: Main Effects No Cues

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(India 1Approval) Model 1	(India 1 Vote) Model 2	(India 2 Approval) Model 3	(India 2 Vote) Model 4	(Nigeria 3 Approval) Model 5	(Nigeria 3 Vote) Model 6
Engage Win	2.168*	0.961	6.761***	6.875***	3.056***	2.477***
	(0.981)	(0.465)	(3.760)	(3.626)	(0.965)	(0.859)
Engage Lose	NA	NA	1.630	4.183***	2.690***	1.566
			(0.665)	(1.914)	(0.856)	(0.561)
Stay Out Attempt Negotiations	NA	NA	0.838	1.150	NA	NA
			(0.313)	(0.469)		
Militarism	1.239	1.229	1.375	2.213***	1.128	1.220
	(0.525)	(0.582)	(0.343)	(0.604)	(0.210)	(0.265)
Political Awareness	1.675**	1.845**	1.791***	2.381***	0.892	0.607***
	(0.441)	(0.557)	(0.317)	(0.480)	(0.129)	(0.109)
Party Affiliation	0.992	1.363	1.215	1.284	0.989	0.978
	(0.279)	(0.394)	(0.230)	(0.252)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Age	0.836	0.889	0.765	1.103	1.027	1.005
	(0.260)	(0.276)	(0.137)	(0.246)	(0.192)	(0.211)
Education	1.043	1.409	1.089	1.009	1.054	0.904
	(0.241)	(0.333)	(0.181)	(0.194)	(0.092)	(0.086)
Prime Minister Approval	2.042***	2.539***	1.391**	1.835***	1.263**	1.102
	(0.414)	(0.585)	(0.194)	(0.285)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Income	1.028	0.828	0.784***	0.842**	1.027	1.616**
	(0.111)	(0.096)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.171)	(0.315)

Constant	0.541	0.064	2.259	0.396	0.100***	0.273
	(0.955)	(0.115)	(2.743)	(0.550)	(0.081)	(0.238)
Observations	219	209	437	424	361	311
Pseudo R-squared	0.175	0.257	0.211	0.294	0.0529	0.0667

Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 105: Main Effects Manipulation Check No Cue

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(India 1Approval) Model 1	(India 1 Vote) Model 2	(India 2 Approval) Model 3	(India 2 Vote) Model 4	(Nigeria 3 Approval) Model 5	(Nigeria 3 Vote) Model 6
Engage Win	2.771*	0.549	10.080***	5.545***	2.364**	1.806
	(1.660)	(0.379)	(7.828)	(3.423)	(0.922)	(0.752)
Engage Lose	NA	NA	1.737	9.827***	2.918***	1.498
			(0.998)	(6.644)	(1.107)	(0.628)
Stay Out Attempt Negotiations	NA	NA	1.007	1.656	NA	NA
			(0.510)	(0.847)		
Militarism	2.978*	2.425	1.358	3.470***	1.221	1.415
	(1.716)	(1.488)	(0.526)	(1.276)	(0.274)	(0.368)
Political Awareness	1.424	1.671	2.326***	3.343***	0.980	0.662*
	(0.514)	(0.742)	(0.579)	(0.936)	(0.177)	(0.142)
Party Affiliation	0.974	1.124	1.290	1.010	0.996	0.982
	(0.346)	(0.430)	(0.328)	(0.257)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age	0.902	0.635	0.727	1.134	1.071	0.948
	(0.443)	(0.308)	(0.193)	(0.420)	(0.225)	(0.222)
Education	1.138	1.319	0.892	0.637	1.115	0.919

	(0.335)	(0.414)	(0.232)	(0.201)	(0.122)	(0.108)
Prime Minister Approval	2.684***	3.262***	1.274	1.762***	1.298**	1.026
	(0.797)	(1.226)	(0.244)	(0.350)	(0.153)	(0.137)
Income	0.902	0.709*	0.669***	1.020	1.052	1.692**
	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.073)	(0.114)	(0.221)	(0.402)
Constant	0.178	0.336	23.251*	7.469	0.046***	0.269
	(0.392)	(0.777)	(43.865)	(16.110)	(0.047)	(0.286)
Observations	151	149	306	304	242	218
Pseudo R-squared	0.266	0.314	0.302	0.329	0.0577	0.0574

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 106: Rebels Main Effects BJP Endorsement

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage and Win	1.490	1.271	10.242	10.468
	(0.734)	(0.661)	(9.303)	(9.968)
Party Affiliation	1.102	0.943	14.985**	11.986*
	(0.330)	(0.312)	(6.356)	(6.810)
Prime Minister Approval	1.296	2.525***	3.090	10.046*
	(0.334)	(0.723)	(5.135)	(5.502)
Militarism	1.252	2.450**	-1.714	-4.094
	(0.491)	(1.056)	(7.680)	(8.229)
Trust in the government	1.428	1.540	8.881	6.778
	(0.471)	(0.531)	(5.715)	(6.123)
Constant	25.289	7.943	35.848	32.356

	(52.472)	(18.266)	(35.036)	(37.540)
Observations	219	203	36	36
R-squared			0.662	0.677
Pseudo R-squared	0.169	0.331		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 107: Rebels Main Effects INC Endorsement

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Approval	Voting	Country	Prime Minister
Engage and Win	3.717***	2.899**	8.967	10.253
	(1.708)	(1.359)	(9.179)	(9.114)
Party Affiliation	0.805	1.537	-1.089	-1.689
	(0.249)	(0.469)	(6.417)	(6.371)
Prime Minister Approval	1.540*	1.274	-4.291	-0.361
	(0.359)	(0.322)	(4.810)	(4.776)
Militarism	1.285	1.330	11.806	9.321
	(0.433)	(0.458)	(7.558)	(7.504)
Trust in the government	1.167	1.754	21.049***	20.268***
	(0.412)	(0.609)	(6.798)	(6.749)
Constant	1.676	5.383	106.329***	104.791***
	(3.159)	(9.517)	(31.287)	(31.064)
Observations	217	202	37	37
R-squared			0.409	0.452
Pseudo R-squared	0.189	0.227		

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 108: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Manipulation Checks

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.275***	2.027**	9.416	7.994
	(0.705)	(0.633)	(5.911)	(5.735)
BJP Endorse	1.528	1.231	-2.099	1.722
	(0.554)	(0.470)	(6.858)	(6.653)
INC Endorse	0.687	0.544*	1.539	3.607
	(0.204)	(0.170)	(6.960)	(6.752)
Party Affiliation	1.147	1.587***	8.715**	6.789*
	(0.172)	(0.243)	(3.536)	(3.431)
Prime Minister Approval	1.286**	1.228	-5.502*	-0.300
	(0.159)	(0.155)	(3.214)	(3.118)
Militarism	1.421*	1.802***	13.252**	11.687**
	(0.290)	(0.390)	(5.324)	(5.165)
Trust in the Government	1.281	1.673***	5.924	9.035**
	(0.212)	(0.291)	(3.808)	(3.694)
Constant	17.719***	6.946*	65.660***	57.531**
	(18.582)	(7.143)	(24.355)	(23.628)
Observations	748	728	109	109
Pseudo R-squared	0.180	0.250		
R-squared			0.227	0.313

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 109: Experiment 1 Main Effects – Support for the Leader in Domestic Security Crises Among Non-Tamils

Baseline: Back Down[281]	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.827***	1.731*	7.552	6.546
	(0.865)	(0.531)	(5.137)	(4.894)
BJP Endorse	1.110	1.019	-5.187	-5.005
	(0.353)	(0.358)	(5.970)	(5.687)
INC Endorse	0.759	0.736	0.834	-0.624
	(0.238)	(0.245)	(6.158)	(5.866)
Party Affiliation	1.180	1.383*	7.679**	5.582*
	(0.189)	(0.231)	(3.263)	(3.109)
Prime Minister Approval	1.249*	1.486***	-1.142	2.201
	(0.151)	(0.184)	(2.360)	(2.248)
Militarism	1.133	1.741***	7.350*	6.879*
	(0.216)	(0.366)	(4.044)	(3.852)
Trust in the Government	1.371*	1.633***	7.741**	10.689***
	(0.228)	(0.287)	(3.126)	(2.978)
Constant	2.318	0.925	72.188***	72.924***
	(2.289)	(0.938)	(19.342)	(18.426)
Observations	601	547	166	166
Pseudo R-squared	0.129	0.220		
R-squared			0.200	0.319

Standard Errors in parentheses

[281] Table 2 presents the result from a subset of the sample excluding the Tamils respondents.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 110: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Non-Tamils Manipulation Checks

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	4.138***	2.390**	13.833**	11.818**
	(1.659)	(0.894)	(5.710)	(5.521)
BJP Endorse	1.510	0.887	-9.932	-6.369
	(0.610)	(0.366)	(6.535)	(6.319)
INC Endorse	0.634	0.522*	-1.864	0.911
	(0.232)	(0.201)	(6.824)	(6.598)
Party Affiliation	1.130	1.546**	10.647***	8.895**
	(0.208)	(0.291)	(3.522)	(3.405)
Prime Minister Approval	1.255	1.461***	-1.446	2.057
	(0.178)	(0.210)	(2.802)	(2.710)
Militarism	1.353	1.684**	7.409	5.326
	(0.306)	(0.410)	(4.490)	(4.341)
Trust in the Government	1.166	1.586**	4.687	7.728**
	(0.230)	(0.319)	(3.475)	(3.360)
Constant	7.784*	1.148	67.290***	66.087***
	(9.492)	(1.350)	(22.113)	(21.380)
Observations	465	432	135	135
Pseudo R-squared	0.162	0.259		
R-squared			0.255	0.350

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 111: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Hindu

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.347***	2.149***	2.989	3.670
	(0.663)	(0.636)	(5.344)	(5.310)
BJP Endorse	1.297	1.534	7.389	3.717
	(0.399)	(0.529)	(6.248)	(6.209)
INC Endorse	0.553**	0.695	2.187	0.696
	(0.152)	(0.208)	(5.910)	(5.873)
Party Affiliation	1.109	1.279	3.001	1.545
	(0.172)	(0.200)	(3.501)	(3.479)
Prime Minister Approval	1.239*	1.363**	1.205	3.074
	(0.144)	(0.165)	(2.477)	(2.462)
Militarism	1.197	1.813***	0.277	-0.805
	(0.227)	(0.373)	(4.469)	(4.441)
Trust in the Government	1.345*	1.852***	9.733***	8.833**
	(0.228)	(0.347)	(3.463)	(3.442)
Constant	15.996***	7.718*	83.473***	88.599***
	(15.729)	(8.132)	(19.931)	(19.806)
Observations	824	799	136	136
Pseudo R-squared	0.123	0.205		
R-squared			0.158	0.192

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 112: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Hindu Manipulation Checks

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.090**	2.626**	2.069	4.971
	(0.742)	(1.060)	(6.572)	(6.818)
BJP Endorse	1.604	2.152	4.073	4.547
	(0.691)	(1.115)	(8.157)	(8.462)
INC Endorse	0.482**	0.544*	1.376	5.869
	(0.164)	(0.200)	(7.379)	(7.655)
Party Affiliation	1.002	1.557**	4.658	2.493
	(0.203)	(0.304)	(3.965)	(4.113)
Prime Minister Approval	1.209	1.129	-4.565	-0.502
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(3.770)	(3.911)
Militarism	1.294	1.878**	5.735	2.588
	(0.336)	(0.516)	(6.596)	(6.842)
Trust in the Government	1.228	1.694**	6.813	5.419
	(0.275)	(0.416)	(4.723)	(4.900)
Constant	108.177***	16.097**	70.701***	61.766**
	(147.114)	(21.943)	(25.142)	(26.082)
Observations	555	551	77	77
Pseudo R-squared	0.160	0.218		
R-squared			0.144	0.149

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 113: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels BJP Supporters

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.180**	2.165**	0.651	0.576
	(0.728)	(0.796)	(5.670)	(5.705)
BJP Endorse	1.012	1.095	13.922**	10.158
	(0.363)	(0.438)	(6.867)	(6.910)
INC Endorse	0.644	0.717	0.878	-2.059
	(0.219)	(0.261)	(6.658)	(6.699)
Party Affiliation	1.214	1.334*	3.923	4.917*
	(0.181)	(0.206)	(2.808)	(2.825)
Prime Minister Approval	1.197	1.670*	-2.450	-0.348
	(0.285)	(0.441)	(5.139)	(5.171)
Militarism	1.633**	1.533*	8.332*	9.099**
	(0.356)	(0.361)	(4.259)	(4.286)
Constant	4.781	5.275	80.676***	97.778***
	(5.649)	(6.932)	(25.681)	(25.840)
Observations	654	642	109	109
Pseudo R-squared	0.130	0.142		
R-squared			0.144	0.184

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 114: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels INC Supporters

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.540**	1.163	20.633*	22.309**
	(1.206)	(0.624)	(11.601)	(9.608)
BJP Endorse	1.475	5.428**	-22.248	-26.291**
	(0.792)	(4.187)	(14.650)	(12.133)
INC Endorse	2.034	1.421	2.187	0.292

	(1.171)	(0.885)	(11.848)	(9.812)
Party Affiliation	1.879***	2.056***	-10.002*	-11.168**
	(0.373)	(0.449)	(5.715)	(4.733)
Prime Minister Approval	1.506	2.670***	14.947*	13.183**
	(0.428)	(0.959)	(7.602)	(6.296)
Militarism	1.636**	2.259***	12.457**	14.556***
	(0.395)	(0.609)	(5.887)	(4.876)
Constant	13.967*	20.061*	166.085***	163.663***
	(21.170)	(34.813)	(35.676)	(29.546)
Observations	257	244	37	37
Pseudo R-squared	0.269	0.480		
R-squared			0.600	0.685

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 115: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels BJP Supporters Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	3.630***	1.569	9.046	6.618
	(1.327)	(0.516)	(5.524)	(5.308)
BJP Endorse	1.035	0.919	-4.029	-3.330
	(0.366)	(0.338)	(6.356)	(6.107)
INC Endorse	0.700	0.836	-1.289	-1.355
	(0.260)	(0.317)	(6.611)	(6.353)
Party Affiliation	1.211	1.576***	2.495	4.923*
	(0.162)	(0.213)	(2.658)	(2.554)
Prime Minister Approval	1.116	1.886***	5.645	5.379
	(0.247)	(0.459)	(4.559)	(4.381)
Militarism	1.565**	1.795***	5.020	8.767***
	(0.305)	(0.361)	(3.439)	(3.304)
Constant	3.840	0.577	65.246***	73.177***
	(4.555)	(0.681)	(22.187)	(21.319)
Observations	497	467	143	143
Pseudo R-squared	0.137	0.213		
R-squared			0.128	0.261

Standard Errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 116: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels INC Supporters Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country[282]	(4) Prime Minister
Engage	2.738**	1.648	18.309***	13.933**
	(1.218)	(0.721)	(6.493)	(6.224)
BJP Endorse	1.388	1.018	-13.810*	-8.485
	(0.632)	(0.496)	(7.570)	(7.256)
INC Endorse	1.711	0.943	-9.278	-5.159
	(0.864)	(0.475)	(7.588)	(7.273)
Party Affiliation	1.602***	2.040***	1.870	4.089
	(0.258)	(0.350)	(3.011)	(2.886)
Prime Minister Approval	1.209	1.780**	8.574*	6.379
	(0.317)	(0.510)	(4.957)	(4.751)
Militarism	1.364	1.676**	5.051	7.772**
	(0.327)	(0.411)	(3.932)	(3.768)
Constant	10.713*	1.380	93.480***	93.364***
	(15.194)	(1.944)	(23.246)	(22.281)
Observations	326	299	111	111
Pseudo R-squared	0.219	0.323		
R-squared			0.249	0.331

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[282] Across the tables models 3 and 4 rely on OLS as the reputation of the prime minister and that of the country were measured on a standard 0-100 feeling thermometer

Table 117: Main Effects Experiment 2 - Support for the Prime Minister in Domestic Security Crises Among Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	0.991	0.842	-3.718	-9.616*
	(0.358)	(0.354)	(5.216)	(5.359)
Engage and Lose	3.720***	3.440***	4.198	0.119
	(1.477)	(1.486)	(4.356)	(4.475)
Engage and Win	9.268***	6.862***	8.246	7.257
	(4.849)	(3.619)	(5.251)	(5.394)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	3.768***	1.998**	5.099	5.489
	(1.219)	(0.656)	(3.411)	(3.504)
Party Affiliation	1.129	1.596**	2.406	3.368*
	(0.228)	(0.315)	(1.875)	(1.927)
Prime Minister Approval	1.358*	1.481**	3.367**	3.008**
	(0.228)	(0.270)	(1.482)	(1.522)
Militarism	1.251	1.565*	6.948***	8.393***
	(0.290)	(0.409)	(2.535)	(2.604)
Trust in the Government	1.647**	2.276***	11.907***	9.459***
	(0.376)	(0.529)	(2.360)	(2.425)
Constant	1.400	0.853	38.074***	24.326*
	(1.914)	(1.298)	(12.418)	(12.758)
Observations	514	491	251	251
Pseudo R-squared	0.256	0.390		
R-squared			0.391	0.349

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 118: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations	0.988	1.819	-5.811	-15.401***
	(0.415)	(0.748)	(5.956)	(5.851)
Engage and Lose	1.875	2.971***	0.742	-3.982
	(0.844)	(1.230)	(4.894)	(4.808)
Engage and Win	2.775**	2.582**	2.136	0.326
	(1.349)	(1.099)	(5.999)	(5.893)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	2.617***	1.811*	3.677	4.099
	(0.885)	(0.558)	(3.782)	(3.715)
Party Affiliation	1.273	1.298	-0.120	3.480*
	(0.252)	(0.230)	(2.014)	(1.978)
Prime Minister Approval	1.287	1.414**	1.985	2.263
	(0.230)	(0.227)	(1.740)	(1.710)
Militarism	0.620	1.589*	6.709**	5.326*
	(0.184)	(0.427)	(3.043)	(2.990)
Trust in the Government	2.382***	2.206***	12.931***	9.523***
	(0.581)	(0.490)	(2.727)	(2.680)
Constant	19.705*	2.628	54.384***	37.763***
	(30.501)	(3.809)	(14.204)	(13.955)
Observations	611	605	189	189
Pseudo R-squared	0.283	0.291		
R-squared			0.353	0.360

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 119: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Manipulation Check Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	0.957	0.853	-3.230	-12.591**
	(0.409)	(0.416)	(5.869)	(5.995)
Engage and Lose	3.835***	3.422**	5.136	-1.895
	(1.831)	(1.705)	(4.750)	(4.852)
Engage and Win	9.058***	4.451***	6.933	5.144
	(5.438)	(2.557)	(5.917)	(6.044)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	4.947***	2.396**	3.980	4.315
	(2.005)	(0.930)	(3.726)	(3.806)
Party Affiliation	1.095	1.825***	1.674	3.084
	(0.258)	(0.413)	(1.963)	(2.006)
Prime Minister Approval	1.248	1.330	2.524	2.751*
	(0.251)	(0.281)	(1.579)	(1.613)
Militarism	0.957	1.564	7.131**	6.973**
	(0.267)	(0.476)	(2.779)	(2.838)
Trust in the Government	2.450***	2.739***	12.370***	8.882***
	(0.688)	(0.746)	(2.546)	(2.601)
Constant	5.152	1.047	27.967**	19.231
	(8.942)	(1.891)	(13.167)	(13.450)
Observations	421	412	208	208
Pseudo R-squared	0.318	0.422		
R-squared			0.373	0.351

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 120: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Hindu

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.035	1.046	-5.952	-12.153**
	(0.380)	(0.426)	(5.229)	(5.134)
Engage and Lose	1.571	2.368**	2.915	1.411
	(0.610)	(1.004)	(4.610)	(4.526)
Engage and Win	2.857**	2.320*	5.144	3.558
	(1.302)	(1.013)	(5.524)	(5.424)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	2.225***	1.341	4.339	6.407*
	(0.660)	(0.408)	(3.698)	(3.631)
Party Affiliation	1.194	1.100	-0.795	1.678
	(0.227)	(0.222)	(2.062)	(2.025)
Prime Minister Approval	1.354*	1.419**	3.430**	2.839*
	(0.212)	(0.238)	(1.488)	(1.461)
Militarism	0.985	1.787**	4.651*	7.258***
	(0.241)	(0.448)	(2.625)	(2.577)
Trust in the Government	1.472*	2.127***	13.283***	13.202***
	(0.317)	(0.466)	(2.418)	(2.373)
Constant	4.199	18.764*	64.312***	50.371***
	(5.666)	(28.432)	(13.123)	(12.883)
Observations	671	649	219	219
Pseudo R-squared	0.153	0.237		
R-squared			0.359	0.384

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 121: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Hindu Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	0.952	1.603	-8.654	-19.265***
	(0.465)	(0.818)	(6.430)	(6.070)
Engage and Lose	1.935	3.844**	0.554	-4.471
	(1.113)	(2.219)	(5.731)	(5.410)
Engage and Win	3.899**	2.607*	1.371	1.663
	(2.570)	(1.434)	(6.917)	(6.529)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	2.244**	2.081*	3.992	4.644
	(0.915)	(0.835)	(4.412)	(4.165)
Party Affiliation	1.283	0.999	-0.984	3.053
	(0.338)	(0.271)	(2.413)	(2.277)
Prime Minister Approval	1.103	1.289	2.007	1.599
	(0.236)	(0.272)	(1.878)	(1.773)
Militarism	0.450*	1.353	4.395	5.320
	(0.186)	(0.512)	(3.474)	(3.280)
Trust in the Government	2.072**	1.769*	10.947***	9.661***
	(0.654)	(0.516)	(3.262)	(3.079)
Constant	48.902**	14.637	71.273***	58.199***
	(95.362)	(29.193)	(15.501)	(14.632)
Observations	470	461	146	146
Pseudo R-squared	0.251	0.200		
R-squared			0.270	0.321

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 122: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects No Cue

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	0.906	1.440	-11.096*	-20.878***
	(0.342)	(0.624)	(5.980)	(6.084)
Engage and Lose	1.833	5.499***	7.261	-0.307
	(0.767)	(2.725)	(4.540)	(4.620)
Engage and Win	6.776***	8.070***	13.765**	6.482
	(3.771)	(4.526)	(6.122)	(6.228)
Party Affiliation	1.145	1.181	0.221	2.355
	(0.225)	(0.250)	(1.877)	(1.910)
Prime Minister Approval	1.152	1.225	2.533*	1.963
	(0.196)	(0.227)	(1.510)	(1.536)
Militarism	1.322	2.129***	7.809***	9.736***
	(0.334)	(0.622)	(2.529)	(2.573)
Trust in the Government	1.563*	2.631***	15.172***	12.914***
	(0.361)	(0.660)	(2.510)	(2.554)
Constant	2.427	1.260	49.503***	40.213***
	(3.288)	(1.957)	(12.737)	(12.959)
Observations	433	419	207	207
Pseudo R-squared	0.221	0.342		
R-squared			0.480	0.464

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 123: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects BJP Supporters

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.247	1.169	-8.149	-14.426**
	(0.569)	(0.540)	(5.977)	(5.842)
Engage and Lose	3.213**	8.598***	3.967	0.651
	(1.796)	(5.990)	(5.097)	(4.982)
Engage and Win	7.183***	4.341**	7.923	0.241
	(4.588)	(2.599)	(6.191)	(6.051)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	3.340***	2.089*	3.712	4.244
	(1.368)	(0.843)	(4.065)	(3.973)
Party Affiliation	1.156	1.191	1.905	3.623**
	(0.238)	(0.236)	(1.646)	(1.609)
Prime Minister Approval	1.101	1.763*	7.053**	7.561***
	(0.362)	(0.595)	(2.882)	(2.817)
Trust in the Government	1.089	2.313***	11.516***	9.566***
	(0.344)	(0.658)	(3.220)	(3.147)
Constant	3.166	2.144	72.563***	63.866***
	(5.340)	(3.896)	(15.413)	(15.064)
Observations	513	496	172	172
Pseudo R-squared	0.230	0.230		
R-squared			0.298	0.310

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 124: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects INC Supporters

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	3.431	6.721**	15.281	1.320
	(2.609)	(5.793)	(11.910)	(13.202)
Engage and Lose	24.278***	3.377	15.773*	-3.544
	(23.245)	(2.586)	(9.344)	(10.358)
Engage and Win	19.002***	9.140***	9.510	6.252
	(17.437)	(7.546)	(10.320)	(11.440)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	3.443*	1.672	12.599*	1.989
	(2.279)	(0.957)	(7.415)	(8.220)
Party Affiliation	2.294**	2.350**	7.597**	1.164
	(0.850)	(0.841)	(3.568)	(3.955)
Prime Minister Approval	0.895	3.034**	1.871	7.566
	(0.399)	(1.522)	(5.735)	(6.357)
Trust in the Government	4.466***	3.572***	5.241	0.231
	(2.107)	(1.495)	(4.244)	(4.705)
Constant	0.227	0.383	25.700	26.104
	(0.542)	(0.883)	(20.435)	(22.652)
Observations	209	210	61	61
Pseudo R-squared	0.473	0.557		
R-squared			0.543	0.389

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 125: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects BJP Supporters Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.255	0.806	-3.667	-8.993
	(0.522)	(0.373)	(5.488)	(5.712)
Engage and Lose	6.943***	5.939***	8.873*	3.478
	(3.380)	(3.103)	(4.563)	(4.750)
Engage and Win	26.951***	6.654***	11.129**	8.910
	(19.385)	(3.897)	(5.587)	(5.815)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	5.945***	2.648**	5.506	4.347
	(2.484)	(1.039)	(3.700)	(3.852)
Party Affiliation	1.414*	1.520**	2.987*	3.112*
	(0.282)	(0.307)	(1.551)	(1.615)
Prime Minister Approval	1.135	1.782**	8.527***	8.598***
	(0.305)	(0.500)	(2.631)	(2.738)
Trust in the Government	2.406***	2.936***	11.657***	9.356***
	(0.652)	(0.780)	(2.404)	(2.502)
Constant	2.592	1.326	44.840***	36.292***
	(4.185)	(2.338)	(12.454)	(12.963)
Observations	439	425	219	219
Pseudo R-squared	0.360	0.401		
R-squared			0.378	0.326

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 126: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects INC Supporters Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Country	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.380	1.040	5.366	-1.052
	(0.751)	(0.647)	(7.583)	(7.937)
Engage and Lose	7.673***	2.853*	12.021**	7.355
	(4.491)	(1.655)	(6.013)	(6.294)
Engage and Win	19.116***	3.501*	16.456**	21.507***
	(15.125)	(2.306)	(7.467)	(7.816)
Bipartisan Elite Endorse	4.846***	1.713	3.144	-3.285
	(2.628)	(0.780)	(4.804)	(5.029)
Prime Minister Approval	1.357	1.267	5.028***	4.381**
	(0.343)	(0.305)	(1.919)	(2.009)
Militarism	1.193	1.858*	5.076	6.866**
	(0.387)	(0.671)	(3.300)	(3.454)
Trust in the Government	2.777***	3.418***	11.430***	7.477**
	(0.954)	(1.166)	(2.843)	(2.976)
Constant	1.828	10.053	19.864	21.089
	(3.631)	(21.522)	(14.450)	(15.126)
Observations	277	276	141	141
Pseudo R-squared	0.373	0.482		
R-squared			0.468	0.416

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 127: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.237	1.272	4.134	4.917
	(0.688)	(0.675)	(8.771)	(8.700)
Engage and Lose	1.685	1.032	-0.678	3.636
	(0.905)	(0.506)	(8.823)	(8.752)
Engage and Win	2.192	1.268	1.970	8.265
	(1.238)	(0.629)	(8.309)	(8.242)
Party Affiliation	0.953	1.178	-1.793	-0.781
	(0.260)	(0.268)	(4.237)	(4.203)
Prime Minister Approval	1.721**	1.768***	7.596**	7.727**
	(0.406)	(0.366)	(3.457)	(3.429)
Militarism	0.729	1.804**	-2.779	-5.781
	(0.251)	(0.538)	(6.265)	(6.215)
Trust in the Government	2.125**	2.067***	9.780**	8.006*
	(0.646)	(0.544)	(4.699)	(4.661)
Constant	71.400**	7.371	38.634	-0.780
	(140.181)	(12.602)	(25.502)	(25.298)
Observations	432	421	79	79
Pseudo R-squared	0.267	0.356		
R-squared			0.341	0.314

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 128: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.041	0.590	0.260	-6.681
	(0.529)	(0.354)	(6.801)	(7.073)
Engage and Lose	3.447**	1.341	3.927	-0.467
	(1.846)	(0.735)	(5.406)	(5.621)
Engage and Win	14.916***	2.825	10.545	10.974
	(11.428)	(1.820)	(6.692)	(6.959)
Party Affiliation	1.143	1.875**	0.180	2.670
	(0.308)	(0.488)	(2.355)	(2.449)
Prime Minister Approval	1.646**	1.521*	6.683***	5.991***
	(0.398)	(0.368)	(1.908)	(1.985)
Militarism	0.985	1.380	3.921	3.662
	(0.301)	(0.465)	(3.144)	(3.269)
Trust in the Government	1.871**	2.470***	9.519***	6.920**
	(0.551)	(0.767)	(2.978)	(3.097)
Constant	6.976	1.779	21.985	11.983
	(13.396)	(3.598)	(15.004)	(15.603)
Observations	328	321	151	151
Pseudo R-squared	0.317	0.450		
R-squared			0.419	0.374

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 129: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	0.767	0.706	-7.090	-7.358
	(0.286)	(0.284)	(8.441)	(7.553)
Engage and Lose	0.930	0.774	-10.160	-6.797
	(0.350)	(0.306)	(9.128)	(8.168)
Engage and Win	1.697	2.054*	-2.163	-7.264
	(0.683)	(0.889)	(8.605)	(7.699)
Party Affiliation	1.498**	1.967***	7.067	8.115**
	(0.268)	(0.359)	(4.317)	(3.863)
Prime minister Approval	1.225	1.493***	3.764	5.333*
	(0.170)	(0.210)	(3.409)	(3.050)
Militarism	1.211	1.741**	3.859	3.467
	(0.293)	(0.470)	(5.288)	(4.731)
Political Engagement	2.300***	2.348***	2.019	1.333
	(0.413)	(0.438)	(3.688)	(3.300)
Trust in the Government	1.189	1.218	7.734*	10.986***
	(0.223)	(0.228)	(4.154)	(3.717)
Constant	1.066	0.360	67.746**	54.188**
	(1.212)	(0.429)	(29.458)	(26.359)
Observations	414	420	81	81
R-squared			0.414	0.570
Pseudo R-squared	0.201	0.286		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 130: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Support

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	2.942**	3.218**	1.776	3.999
	(1.262)	(1.602)	(8.293)	(8.131)
Engage and Lose	3.182***	1.727	2.735	3.878
	(1.340)	(0.793)	(8.141)	(7.983)
Engage and Win	8.263***	3.847***	20.358**	19.787**
	(4.293)	(1.961)	(8.472)	(8.308)
Party Affiliation	1.302	1.092	4.251	2.738
	(0.260)	(0.244)	(4.532)	(4.444)
Prime minister Approval	1.448**	1.392*	0.687	2.817
	(0.241)	(0.259)	(3.650)	(3.579)
Militarism	1.305	2.215***	-0.487	0.426
	(0.353)	(0.680)	(5.395)	(5.290)
Political Engagement	1.338	1.475*	-3.137	-3.591
	(0.269)	(0.331)	(3.704)	(3.632)
Trust in the Government	1.612**	2.932***	13.294**	11.515*
	(0.370)	(0.791)	(6.198)	(6.077)
Constant	3.219	28.204**	8.562	-5.497
	(4.694)	(46.073)	(38.105)	(37.364)
Observations	449	420	81	81
R-squared			0.317	0.346
Pseudo R-squared	0.220	0.355		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 131: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.249	0.878	-3.927	-7.352
	(0.420)	(0.351)	(5.428)	(5.452)
Engage and Lose	2.394***	1.592	1.097	2.876
	(0.808)	(0.625)	(4.422)	(4.442)
Engage and Win	7.745***	2.536**	8.905*	8.398
	(3.375)	(1.093)	(5.106)	(5.129)
Party Affiliation	1.093	1.871***	2.847	2.530
	(0.188)	(0.337)	(2.130)	(2.139)
Prime minister Approval	1.431***	1.584***	5.285***	4.938***
	(0.193)	(0.236)	(1.754)	(1.761)
Militarism	1.198	1.634**	2.168	2.610
	(0.245)	(0.387)	(2.777)	(2.789)
Political Engagement	1.770***	1.546**	1.458	1.947
	(0.296)	(0.287)	(1.949)	(1.958)
Trust in the Government	1.364*	1.847***	7.141***	8.127***
	(0.248)	(0.363)	(2.521)	(2.532)
Constant	3.269	0.467	36.087**	22.314
	(3.873)	(0.626)	(14.269)	(14.333)
Observations	521	513	224	224
R-squared			0.341	0.362
Pseudo R-squared	0.235	0.389		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 132: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Support Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.996**	1.377	0.357	-1.703
	(0.669)	(0.544)	(5.343)	(5.317)
Engage and Lose	3.257***	1.871	5.014	7.223
	(1.089)	(0.721)	(4.523)	(4.500)
Engage and Win	12.425***	3.680***	14.687***	14.689***
	(5.776)	(1.593)	(5.318)	(5.291)
Party Affiliation	1.077	1.595***	1.112	0.566
	(0.182)	(0.282)	(2.090)	(2.080)
Prime minister Approval	1.355**	1.632***	6.074***	5.231***
	(0.189)	(0.251)	(1.758)	(1.749)
Militarism	1.101	1.424	2.107	2.976
	(0.222)	(0.318)	(2.649)	(2.636)
Political Engagement	1.768***	1.666***	1.341	1.834
	(0.289)	(0.305)	(1.885)	(1.876)
Trust in the Government	1.587**	1.677***	7.307***	8.537***
	(0.301)	(0.337)	(2.565)	(2.552)
Constant	8.225*	0.990	32.856**	20.745
	(10.335)	(1.414)	(14.243)	(14.173)
Observations	551	529	225	225
R-squared			0.341	0.367
Pseudo R-squared	0.240	0.356		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 133: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose – Non-Tamils

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.249	0.878	-3.927	-7.352
	(0.420)	(0.351)	(5.428)	(5.452)
Engage and Lose	2.394***	1.592	1.097	2.876
	(0.808)	(0.625)	(4.422)	(4.442)
Engage and Win	7.745***	2.536**	8.905*	8.398
	(3.375)	(1.093)	(5.106)	(5.129)
Party Affiliation	1.093	1.871***	2.847	2.530
	(0.188)	(0.337)	(2.130)	(2.139)
Prime minister Approval	1.431***	1.584***	5.285***	4.938***
	(0.193)	(0.236)	(1.754)	(1.761)
Militarism	1.198	1.634**	2.168	2.610
	(0.245)	(0.387)	(2.777)	(2.789)
Political Engagement	1.770***	1.546**	1.458	1.947
	(0.296)	(0.287)	(1.949)	(1.958)
Trust in the Government	1.364*	1.847***	7.141***	8.127***
	(0.248)	(0.363)	(2.521)	(2.532)
Constant	3.269	0.467	36.087**	22.314
	(3.873)	(0.626)	(14.269)	(14.333)
Observations	521	513	224	224
R-squared			0.341	0.362
Pseudo R-squared	0.235	0.389		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 134: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse Manipulation Check

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Voting	(3) Reputation	(4) Prime Minister
Stay Out	1.551	0.923	-1.772	-5.925
	(0.541)	(0.383)	(5.223)	(5.199)
Engage and Lose	2.625***	1.562	1.986	2.448
	(0.916)	(0.625)	(4.275)	(4.256)
Engage and Win	10.166***	3.605***	12.448**	11.008**
	(4.813)	(1.661)	(5.065)	(5.042)
Party Affiliation	1.198	1.923***	2.774	3.099
	(0.211)	(0.354)	(2.075)	(2.066)
Prime minister Approval	1.526***	1.856***	6.691***	6.172***
	(0.227)	(0.303)	(1.700)	(1.692)
Militarism	1.021	1.497*	0.977	1.282
	(0.216)	(0.355)	(2.669)	(2.657)
Political Engagement	1.694***	1.487**	1.510	1.775
	(0.294)	(0.287)	(1.854)	(1.846)
Trust in the Government	1.520**	1.727***	5.503**	6.562***
	(0.292)	(0.355)	(2.534)	(2.523)
Constant	2.856	0.381	31.914**	18.113
	(3.629)	(0.551)	(13.829)	(13.766)
Observations	547	533	233	233
R-squared			0.326	0.349
Pseudo R-squared	0.238	0.400		

Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 135: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Vote	(3) Leader Reputation	(4) Country Reputation
Engage and Win	1.117***	0.907***	1.580***	1.303***
	(0.316)	(0.347)	(0.412)	(0.386)
Engage and Lose	0.989***	0.449	0.655	0.533
	(0.318)	(0.358)	(0.437)	(0.420)
Militarism	0.120	0.199	0.541**	0.338
	(0.186)	(0.218)	(0.257)	(0.243)
Political Engagement	-0.114	-0.499***	-0.422**	-0.385**
	(0.144)	(0.179)	(0.200)	(0.192)
Party Affiliation	-0.0106	-0.0221	-0.0228	0.00439
	(0.0153)	(0.0167)	(0.0180)	(0.0193)
Age	0.0263	0.00496	-0.245	-0.267
	(0.187)	(0.210)	(0.276)	(0.274)
Education	0.0524	-0.100	-0.0882	0.0113
	(0.0874)	(0.0948)	(0.107)	(0.112)
Prime Minister Approval	0.233**	0.0968	0.400***	0.224**
	(0.0941)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Income	0.0265	0.480**	0.469**	0.174
	(0.167)	(0.195)	(0.215)	(0.216)
Constant	-2.303***	-1.297	-2.365**	-2.825***
	(0.811)	(0.870)	(1.001)	(1.054)
Observations	361	311	325	326

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 136: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria Manipulation Checks

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Vote	(3) Leader Reputation	(4) Country Reputation
Engage and Win	0.860**	0.591	1.269**	1.012**

	(0.390)	(0.416)	(0.507)	(0.512)
Engage and Lose	1.071***	0.404	0.887*	1.158**
	(0.380)	(0.419)	(0.522)	(0.516)
Militarism	0.199	0.347	0.954***	0.837**
	(0.224)	(0.260)	(0.355)	(0.340)
Political Engagement	-0.0199	-0.413*	-0.379	-0.493*
	(0.180)	(0.214)	(0.245)	(0.255)
Party Affiliation	-0.00434	-0.0186	-0.0314	0.0147
	(0.0186)	(0.0198)	(0.0216)	(0.0246)
Age	0.0683	-0.0536	-0.603*	-0.380
	(0.210)	(0.235)	(0.351)	(0.335)
Education	0.109	-0.0841	-0.0583	0.0383
	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.138)	(0.154)
Prime Minister Approval	0.261**	0.0260	0.364***	0.219
	(0.118)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.148)
Income	0.0505	0.526**	0.680**	0.381
	(0.210)	(0.237)	(0.281)	(0.289)
Constant	-3.084***	-1.314	-2.250*	-3.843***
	(1.021)	(1.063)	(1.243)	(1.431)
Observations	242	218	221	225

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 137: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria Supporters of the Ruling Party

Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate Negotiations	(1) Approval	(2) Vote	(3) Leader Reputation	(4) Country Reputation
Engage and Win	1.066**	0.770	0.890	0.783
	(0.441)	(0.495)	(0.602)	(0.555)
Engage and Lose	0.772*	0.143	0.309	-0.352
	(0.424)	(0.491)	(0.601)	(0.617)
Militarism	0.178	0.173	0.804**	0.445
	(0.243)	(0.284)	(0.397)	(0.354)
Political Engagement	-0.162	-0.415*	-0.368	-0.472
	(0.205)	(0.252)	(0.316)	(0.307)
Party Affiliation	-0.149	-0.350	-0.780	-1.396**

	(0.301)	(0.371)	(0.557)	(0.596)
Age	-0.137	-0.208	-0.266	-0.0110
	(0.145)	(0.173)	(0.204)	(0.202)
Education	-0.0710	-0.0943	0.240	0.124
	(0.174)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.204)
Prime Minister Approval	0.198	0.405	0.396	0.614*
	(0.240)	(0.289)	(0.326)	(0.334)
Constant	-0.522	-0.0194	-0.238	-1.287
	(1.139)	(1.332)	(1.586)	(1.603)
Observations	195	167	170	173

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.4 Questionaire and Vignettes

[Demographic questions]

1.How old are you?

- 18-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60+

2. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No formal school education
- Primary
- Lower secondary
- Secondary
- High School Degree
- University Degree (Bachelor's Degree)
- Graduate Degree
- Professional Degree

4.Please read the following short text about house security in the country.

Twenty-four houses collapsed and at least 20 people were injured when a sudden storm having high wind speed swept through a village in the Ecotech Sector 3 area here Thursday night, police said.

The incident took place in Ali Bardipur village at around 8:30 pm, Ecotech-3 police station in-charge Inspector Anita Chauhan said.

The injured are undergoing treatment at various hospitals in Greater Noida, she said, adding that the condition of four victims was stated to be critical.

Question: Please point at what the text is describing:

- The effect of a storm and the collapse of four houses
- Military operations against another country
- Sport events
- Foreing policy

5.On what language do you communicate at home?[283]

On what language do you communicate at home?[284]

- Hindi
- Bengali
- Telugu
- Marathi
- Tamil
- Other

[283] http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx
[284] http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx

6.Could you indicate your annual income?[285]

- Up to 5,000 Indian Rupees
- 5,001 to 7500 Indian Rupees
- 7,501 to 10,000 Indian Rupees
- 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees
- 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees
- 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees
- Over 100,000 Indian Rupees

7.What is your religion?

- Hindu
- Muslim
- Christian
- Sikhism
- Buddhism
- Jainism
- Zoroastrianism
- Not Religious
- Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion
- Other
- Hard to answer/refused

[285] https://www.statista.com/statistics/653897/average-monthly-household-income-india/

8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party
- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other

9. For which party did you vote?

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Indian National Congress (INC)
- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)
- All India Trinamool Congress
- Bahujan Samaj Party
- Communist Party of India
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
- Other
- I did not vote
- Prefer not to answer

11. Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.

Voting

Organize to solve a community problem

Contacted a government official

Participated in a political protest

Participated in a political gathering or rally.

Worked for a political campaign

Donate money to a political campaign

Served in a community board

- Never
- One time
- Sometimes
- Several times
- On a regular basis[286]

12.How closely you follow national politics? 5 indicates very closely while 1 not at all.

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1

13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world? 5 indicates very closely while 1 not at all.

[286] Verba et al (1993)

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1

[Level of Military assertiveness]

Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, national identity, and India's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.

14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.

- Strongly agree
- Agree

- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

[Level of Ethno-Nationalism]

17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Indian culture						
Ethnicity						
Religion						
Language						

[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.]

For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Prime Minister						
The national government						
Political Parties						
Parliament						
The army						

[287]

Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very big problem.[288]

Lack of Employment Opportunities	0-100
Rising Prices	0-100
Corrupt Government Officials	0-100
Terrorism	0-100
Crime	0-100
China	0-100
Pakistan	0-100
USA	0-100
Corrupt Business People	0-100

[287] An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012)
[288] **https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/** Note that the question on China, Pakistan, and US are added by the author.

Gap between the Rich and the Poor	0-100
Poor Quality Schools	0-100
People Leaving India for Jobs in Other Countries	0-100
Air Pollution	0-100
Health Care	0-100
Communal Relations	0-100

[Introduction]

The following questions concern the decision of India's leaders when faced with domestic security challengers. You will read about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the situation in different ways. In the following lines you will read about one approach Indian leaders have chosen to take and ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.

[Engage condition]

In north India rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages.

[Blank //

For reference in a recent poll and this in survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.

// For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
// Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party together with their coalition partners expressed support for the prime minister' actions in this difficult situation.

To Summarize:

- *Rebels in the central part of India have taken control over several villages.*
- *The prime minister stated that the Indian government will by sending the army*
- *The army was sent and engaged the rebels.*
- *The rebels remained in control of the city and took control of several villages.*
- *[In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views approve how the prime minister handled the situation// In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views disapprove how the prime minister handled the situation // The Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party support how the prime minister's has handled the situation*

[No Engagement condition]

In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not send the army to retake the villages from the rebels. The prime minister announced that the government will start peace negotiations. The rebels continued to operate in the region, remained in control of several villages.

[Blank //

For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
// For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister's actions in this situation.
// Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party together with their coalition partners expressed support for the prime minister' actions in this difficult situation.

To Summarize:

- *Rebels in the central part of India have taken control of several villages.*
- *The prime minister stated that the Indian government will by sending the army*
- *However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army while announcing that the government will start peace negotiations.*
- *The rebels remained in control of several villages.*
- *[In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views approve how the prime minister handled the situation // In a recent poll and in this survey about About 75% of Indians with your political views disapprove how the prime minister handled the situation // The Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party support how the prime minister's has handled the situation.*

[Dependent variables.]
Please answer the following questions.
24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister handled the situation?

- Strongly Approve
- Approve
- Neither
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

25: As a result of the prime minister's actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?

- Very likely
- Likely
- No change in my intentions to vote
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:

1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly

	1	2	3	4	5
➢ Anger					
➢ Hatred					
➢ Contempt					
➢ Disgust					
➢ Fear					
➢ Disappointment					
➢ Shame					
➢ Sadness					
➢ Compassion					
➢ Relief					
➢ Admiration					
➢ Joy					
➢ Pride					

[The remaining questions will be presented in a random order.]

30: “Enhancing the government’s ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help prevent future attacks of this kind.”

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

31. What do you think the prime minister’s actions did to India’s reputation?

- Highly improved
- Improved
- Neither improved nor damaged
- Damaged
- Highly Damaged

32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future attacks.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

33. Some of your friend are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime minister has handled the security crisis. How likely you are to join this protest?

- Very likely
- Likely
- No opinion
- Unlikely
- Very Unlikely

34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?

- Yes
- No

35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army?

- Yes
- No

36. Which caste group do you belong to?

- Brahmin
- Kshatriyas
- Vaishyas
- Shudras
- Prefer not to answer

APPENDIX D: IRB APPROVAL

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138, IRB00012110
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

Memorandum

To: Zlatin Mitkov

From: UCF Institutional Review Board (IRB)

Date: July 23, 2021

Re: IRB Coverage

The IRB reviewed the information related to your dissertation *GROUP LEVEL CUES AND THE USE OF FORCE IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXTS*

Your project data is covered under the following protocols previously approved by the IRB. You are listed as a Co-Investigator on these studies and your use of the data is consistent with the the protocol. Additionally, because these studies are associated with another investigator, you are not required to close these studies and no further IRB requirements are associated with your dissertation

IRB Approval Number and Study Title
STUDY00000025 Bringing the Public Back into Politics: Individual and Group level risk taking behavior in foreign policy
STUDY00000026 In search of Domestic Audience Cost: Evidence from India
STUDY00000449 Backing Out or Winning on the Battlefield: Does the Public Rewards its Leaders for Winning?
STUDY00001402 Revisiting Democratic Peace Theory: Support for War, Economic Sanctions, and Democracy promotion, Democratic Peace Theory: Evidence from Africa and India

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB irb@ucf.edu.

Sincerely,

Renea Carver
IRB Manager

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

July 29, 2019

Dear Andrew Boutton:

On 7/29/2019, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study, Exempt Category
Title:	Bringing the Public Back into Politics
Investigator:	Andrew Boutton
IRB ID:	STUDY00000025
Funding:	Name: National Science Foundation (NSF)
Grant ID:	

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made, and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please contact the IRB. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request so that IRB records will be accurate.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

Kamille Chaparro
Designated Reviewer

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

March 8, 2019

Dear Andrew Boutton:

On 3/8/2019, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study, Exempt Category
Title:	In search of Domestic Audience Cost: Evidence from India
Investigator:	Andrew Boutton
IRB ID:	STUDY00000026
Funding:	Name: National Science Foundation (NSF)
Grant ID:	Pending

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made, and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please contact the IRB. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request so that IRB records will be accurate.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

Kamille Chaparro
Designated Reviewer

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

May 20, 2019

Dear Konstantin Ash:

On 5/20/2019, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study, Category
Title:	Backing Out or Winning on the Battlefield: Does the Public Rewards its Leaders for Winning?
Investigator:	Konstantin Ash
IRB ID:	STUDY00000449
Funding:	Name: IPRAF
Grant ID:	

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made, and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please contact the IRB. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request so that IRB records will be accurate.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

Gillian Morien
Designated Reviewer

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138, IRB00012110
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

January 13, 2021

Dear Kenicia Wright:

On 1/13/2021, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study, Category 3(i)(A)
Title:	Revisiting Democratic Peace Theory: Support for War, Economic Sanctions, and Democracy promotion
Investigator:	Kenicia Wright
IRB ID:	STUDY00001402
Funding:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	• Locations of research, Category: International; • Debriefing Form Ghana , Category: Debriefing Form; • Debriefing Form India, Category: Debriefing Form; • Debriefing Form Nigeria, Category: Debriefing Form; • Ghana Consent for Student Sample, Category: Consent Form; • India Consent Form for Mechanical Turk , Category: Consent Form; • Letter of Cultural Appropriateness , Category: Other; • Nigeria Consent for Student Sample, Category: Consent Form; • Protocol , Category: IRB Protocol; • T1_Ghana_Trade_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • T1_India_Trade_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • T1_Nigeria_Trade_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • T10_Ghana_No_Trade_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • T10_India_No_Trade_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • T11_Ghana_No_Trade_No_Alliance_Democracy, Category: Survey / Questionnaire;